Parallels between the demands of the developing countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and earlier demands of American agrarian populists suggest that the NIEO reflects the characteristic grievances of commodity-producing societies (agraria) vis-a-vis their industrial counterparts (industria). Such grievances arise when modernization produces growing interaction and interdependence that threaten the autonomy of agraria. Conflict between agraria's ideal of independence and the reality of interdependence raises political consciousness, enhances group identity, leads to protests and proposals for reform, and stimulates efforts to withdraw from the dependency relationship. Both American agrarian populism and the NIEO movement protested the existing distribution of wealth and power, adverse terms of trade, an “excessive” middleman's share, a monetary system dominated by industria, limited access to credit, and the burden of debt. Proposed solutions were also parallel, partly because they responded to similar grievances, partly because they have arisen in a similar political context. A central problem of late 19th century American politics and contemporary world politics has been the restoration of political order under circumstances where the scope of political and social interaction has vastly expanded but where power within the political system is still widely dispersed. The proposals of both populist movements sought to deal with this problem by restoring local control and weakening supralocal forces.

A valuable source of data for the international organization researcher is interviews with delegates sent by their governments to participate in international conferences and meetings. With the appearance of many newly independent states in the 1960s and early 1970s, the size of international conferences and the workload of the individual delegate have grown to such an extent that it has become difficult to tap this resource effectively.

The fifteenth annual report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, covering the fiscal year July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960, was presented to the Board of Governors on September 27, 1960. The report noted that the year under review had clearly marked the beginning of a period of change in international economic relations, especially with regard to the less developed countries where new needs were emerging and new institutions and techniques to meet them were beginning to take definite shape. Although the external accounts of these countries had benefited from a substantial increase in the volume of their exports, their terms of trade had not shown a similar recovery, and their external public debt had increased. The Bank's lending for the year under review was slightly below the rate of each of the previous two years; it had made 31 loans totaling. $658.7 million as compared to 30 loans totaling $703 million in the previous year. Asia and the Middle East, sharing $273 million in loans between them, received the largest portion, while Africa received $183 million, Latin America $134 million, and Europe only $69 million. Lending operations continued to concentrate on basic facilities, with transportation loans amounting to $245 million, electric power loans to $208 million, and industrial loans to $146 million, while agricultural loans rose to $60 million, the highest sum in recent years. Net earnings, exclusive of receipts from loan commissions, came to $59.5 million, an increase of $13 million over the previous year; disbursements fell to $544 million, less than the $583 million of the preceding year.

Messrs. Laitin and Lustick make a useful advance in conceptualizing the components of leadership skill. It is quite obvious that such a venerable but often ill-conceived topic cannot be exhausted, even conceptually, within the space of a short article. I should like here to make three qualifying remarks, which are intended not to detract from the advance made by the two authors but to situate their contribution within a somewhat wider perspective. These remarks are directed toward the impact or consequences of leadership. They concern: (1) the relationship of leadership skill to leadership effectiveness; (2) pathological leadership, producing negative outcomes; and (3) the Tolstoyan question about the extent to which “A king is the slave of history,” i.e., whether political leadership does have room for maneuver and can significantly affect outcomes.

The concept of a “regime” is frequently used to describe and explain behavior in international political economy. Peter Cowhey and Edward Long, attempting to test theories of surplus capacity and hegemonic decline, advanced a version of a regime governing international trade in automobiles which was fundamentally liberal from 1966 to 1975, but then collapsed into protectionism. Their diagnosis is mistaken, however, because the trade regime for autos was neither as liberal as they assert during the 1950s and 1960s, nor as protectionist as they believe it has become in the 1980s. The discussion focuses on a new definition of the auto trade regime based on four fundamental rules that have persisted since the 1950s. By examining data on auto imports since 1955 on a region-by-region basis, it becomes clear that the trade expansion of the postwar years was not based on a global liberalization of the trade regime, but on carefully managed regional arrangements that favored imports within the region, or extra-regional imports that did not threaten domestic producers. The flurry of restraints on Japanese imports in recent years is not a collapse into protectionism, but a reinforcement of the fundamental regime rules. The auto industry case illustrates the tendency of analysts to underestimate protectionist elements in industry trade regimes and to overestimate the amount of changes that take place in their fundamental rules.

The General Assembly of the United Nations fell heir to one of the most vexing and obdurate problems of the postwar diplomatic scene when in September 1948 the big four powers referred to it the problem of the disposition of the Italian colonies. For over three years, the Big Four had wrestled ineffectually with this problem. Despite the deliberations of special deputies of the Council of Foreign Ministers for nearly a year, the efforts of a Four Power Commission of Investigation which visited the colonies, and the advice of nineteen other interested governments, the future of the colonies remained undetermined on September 15, 1948, one year after the coming into force of the treaty of peace with Italy. On that date, the authority of the Big Four to decide the future of the colonies expired according to Annex XI of the Italian peace treaty, which provided that in the event of failure of France, Britain, the USSR and the United States to agree to a solution, the matter was to be referred to the United Nations General Assembly.

The Syrian Civil War that began in 2011 killed more than 400,000 civilians. Could a limited intervention motivated by humanitarian concerns have reduced the death toll at an acceptable cost to the intervenors? I distinguish between two approaches to intervention: penalizing atrocities, by raising the cost and lowering the benefit of killing civilians; and fostering a balance of power, to convince the two sides that they cannot win on the battlefield and so must negotiate an end to the war. I show, using a game-theoretic model, that fostering a balance of power causes the government to commit more atrocities and prolongs the war. Penalizing atrocities, while it increases the likelihood of war, can reduce the expected level of atrocities. The model helps account for the failure of US efforts to promote negotiations by aiding Syrian rebels, and the success of efforts to deter Syrian chemical weapons use through threats and limited strikes.

The sixteenth session of the General Assembly on December 19, 1961, adopted two complementary resolutions, one on the “Decentralization of the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations and Strengthening of the Regional Economic Commissions” and the other on “Planning for Economic Development.” The latter, inter alia, recommended the establishment of regional development and planning institutes “closely linked to the respective regional economic commissions.” As in many national administrations, the forces for centralization and for decentralization of the administration of the United Nations programs in the economic and social fields will no doubt continue to operate in the years to come. But the adoption of the resolutions referred to above tips the scale in favor of decentralization. It means recognition of the ascendancy of forces which have become increasingly apparent in the world organization, particularly since the recent strides towards universality of membership.

Sovereign states determine the health and safety regulation of nuclear power facilities almost exclusively. Yet the Soviet nuclear power accident at Chernobyl (April 1986) demonstrated that nuclear power can have significant health and political effects transcending state boundaries. Several meetings have been held at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the Chernobyl accident, with delegates seeking to find the proper balance between autonomous state decision-making and international or transboundary interests. This article examines the nuclear safety role of IAEA in the past, and comes to conclusions regarding its likely role in the future. I claim that IAEA is unlikely to become a powerful regulatory “watchdog,” but that incremental changes in the agency could, over time, create a significant international presence.

The great hope for United Nations peace forces is that they may become a ready means of pacifying small wars in underdeveloped areas—civil wars and border quarrels which inevitably will flare up out of the tensions of national development—in order to keep violence and the issues behind it from spreading beyond local bounds. The nightmare of Vietnam as well as the recent eruption in the Middle East bear out the awful truth that a conflict without great international significance, if unsolved and uncontrolled too long, can easily become a stake in big-power politics, producing even at best a rising level of international tension and at worst a terrifying increase in the level of violence. Crucial to the preservation of peace, then, is the settlement of small conflicts before they get bigger. This is not because the danger to peace comes, as it did in the 1930's, from an aggressor with an insatiable appetite which has to be stopped before it gets too strong but because each of the Great Powers, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and, increasingly, the People's Republic of China, is concerned that the others may take advantage of local conflict to extend their influence into the disturbed area. Therefore, even disputes of no great concern to any of them are indirectly a concern to all. The strengths of the Great Powers are so delicately balanced, the stakes of the competition so great, and the war potential of each so fearful that none is willing to allow another any new advantage.

Increasingly, technological decisions are entering into the political arena. They alter the environment in which policy must operate. It is claimed that British foreign policy since the Second World War has been dominated by unrealizable goals. Britain has been preoccupied by the debate about her world-role, a debate which was in itself the product of anachronistic values and assumptions. The Concorde project was the manifestation of a desire to maintain Britain's position as a leading aeronautical power. The aircraft industry faithfully reflects the pattern of government interests and influence. But Concorde was also intended to emphasize what the British government felt to be changing relationships with the United States and Europe. However, in “modernized” states, the boundaries between foreign and domestic policies are increasingly blurred. Although this phenomenon may result in interdependence at an international level, the formation of transnational links can restrict the power of sovereign states. It can also inhibit the domestic process of democratic control. While international burden-sharing may place unforeseen pressures on the structures of government, the momentum for technological development is often so strong that it becomes impossible to resist. While visible technology can be a potent instrument of prestige, it must also respond to needs at a market level in order to be successful. Concorde has conspicuously failed to do this.

Despite the approaching universality of the United Nations, Switzerland continues to be a non-member. Her traditional policy of permanent neutrality, which is theoretically incompatible with the United Nations collective security system, and an unsatisfactory experience as a member of the League of Nations largely explain this absence. Ironically enough, however, Switzerland has played in effect as active a role in the United Nations as have many actual members. Switzerland belongs to most of the specialized agencies and many of the Organization's ancillary organs. She has even involved herself in numerous peacekeeping activities. Geneva serves as the Organization's European headquarters. Thus, the Swiss freely participate in what they refer to as the “technical,” as distinguished from the “political” United Nations. The increased prestige of neutrality and neutral Austria's successful membership, approaching universality, the waning of collective security, and a desire to participate fully in international relations are encouraging a gradual reorientation towards the United Nations which may some day lead to formal Swiss membership.

The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of the EEC on one border region, the French province of Alsace, through an examination of its economic and social transactions with West Germany since 1960. No great increase in Alsatian social ties with Germany has been observed, but there has been considerable growth in economic contacts, leading to a new prosperity for the province. Alsatian economic integration with the rest of France is not increasing as fast, but it has not been noticeably weakened. Alsatian elite and public opinion generally supports the growth of economic bonds with Germany, largely because of their contribution to economic welfare. Transaction and attitude data indicate a continuation of the present trend of important economic, but only limited social, ties between Alsace and its German neighbor.

In this essay I suggest a newcomer to the list of types of transnational relationship discussed in this volume. This is the relationship that arises from the use of a common-property natural environment. These relations are not new, of course, and have led to conflict and accommodations at various levels for centuries, as Innis's work on the codfisheries testifies. As world population grows and technology broadens, both demand and capacity to exploit these international common property resources in ways that will harm other users have also increased. Yet international law has not been able to devise rights of tenure for international property as efficient as those for, say, agricultural land. This resulting lack of suitable concepts of ownership (or sovereignty) has, therefore, been one source of the loss of control by central governments that is frequently mentioned in the transnational relations literature.

Since 1975, the United Nations has undertaken major deliberations to consider institutional reform of the UN system. Such restructuring activities have sprung from widespread dissatisfaction with the United Nations' capacity to deal with problems of economic development and relations between industrialized and developing countries. UN reform efforts have focused on two broad areas: reshaping the deliberative and policy-making operations of central UN institutions in order to reach more coherent global policies on international economic and social affairs; and reorganizing the planning, coordination, and implementation of UN programs to achieve these policy goals more effectively. In 1977, the General Assembly adopted the report of an intergovernmental Ad Hoc Committee, which provided detailed guidelines for prospective UN restructuring, and assigned its recommendations to relevant units within the UN system for the purpose of implementing these reforms. Major themes emphasized in these guidelines include an increased centralization and integration of the UN system in dealing with international economic and social affairs and improved efficiency and coordination of UN operations and activities in these areas. Fundamental to the course of UN restructuring deliberations—and to the extent and significance of eventual institutional reforms—has been the linkage between UN reorganization and the disposition of substantive North-South issues, as the restructuring exercise remains tied to the pace and direction of negotiations concerning “a new international economic order.”

Economic interdependence complicates domestic policymaking by interposing the decisions of foreigners in the loop that links policy instrument settings to economic outcomes. Nowhere was this vulnerability to external decisions demonstrated more forcefully—even for the world's major economies—than by the energy supply shocks of 1973 and 1979. The oil shocks posed challenges that offer unusual insight into the way nations choose policies: their severity forced a policy response; their unpredictable timing and (at least in 1973) unprecedented nature ruled out conventional formulas and brought to the fore explicit policy trade-offs. This article seeks to explain how policymakers in the world's two major economies responded to these external shocks. The analysis successively employs three vantage points—system, society, and state—in tracing the sources of domestic adjustment policies. It focuses specifically on the extent to which policies accommodated or extinguished each shock's inflationary impulses and on the coherence and consistency with which the executive in each government formulated and pursued particular policy goals. A comparison of these four cases illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of increasingly detailed theoretical frameworks for explaining policy choice. Although the research does not contradict the depiction of the United States and Japan in terms of state strength, it does underscore the importance of looking beyond formal institutional arrangements to consider how elite policy preferences, ambitions, and capacities can define the way constraints influence policy.

It is a commonplace that the world in which we live has changed more rapidly and more drastically in the last hundred years than perhaps at any other stage of its history. So evident is this fact, and so familiar are the forces that have made for change, that by a curious paradox the mere repetition of arguments about “the shrinking globe,” “the increased speed of travel,” “the growth of communications,” and so on has tended to deaden our awareness of what they mean. From the earliest years of the century, we have become accustomed to hearing that the invention of automobiles, of aircraft, of telephones, and of radio would radically transform our world. If, now, we once more hear the same, or similar statements, made about space travel, ballistic missiles, atomic energy, and television, our immediate reflex is probably a shrug, denoting the understandable feeling that we have met it all before.

In 1955 the General Assembly of the United Nations will have to consider the revision of the Charter, and there are reasons for believing that a number of governments are already giving thought to this question.

By the Charter of the United Nations the Secretariat is established as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations. The Secretary-General is designated ‘the chief administrative officer,’ not—be it noted—of the Secretariat but of the Organization. The Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General together with the staff appointed by him. The two institutions, the Secretariat and the Secretary-General, may well be regarded as distinct but inseparable—distinct in that the Charter confers in Articles 98 and 99 certain functions and powers specifically on the Secretary-General; inseparable in that the Secretariat is a unitary institution, organized on a functional basis, the members of which are ‘subject to the authority of the Secretary-General’ and ‘responsible to him in the exercise of their functions.’