International monetary arrangements in effect since the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 underwent major changes in the early 1970s, most notably from the norm and practice of “fixed” exchange rates to a new mixed regime in which major rates are now flexible. The outcome strongly reflected the external monetary behavior of the U.S. government, which changed dramatically with the “Nixon shocks” of August 1971 and again with a second devaluation of the dollar in February 1973. Since then the U.S. has officially advocated the once-heretical policy of exchange-rate flexibility.

How effective are states at assessing and predicting the nuclear intentions of foreign countries? Drawing on close to 200 US assessments of foreign countries’ proliferation intentions between 1957 and 1966, this research note finds that close to 80 percent of testable US assessments were correct and that they shifted from highly inaccurate in the late 1950s to highly accurate in the 1960s. Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, I conclude that learning from early failures led the intelligence community to achieve higher accuracy.

According to press reports from Beirut, Lebanon, on August 11 and 18, 1959, representatives of nine Arab states—all the members of the Arab League except Tunisia—were preparing a lengthy reply to the suggestion of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the UN, that the Palestine refugees being sheltered by various Arab countries be economically integrated into these countries. Spokesmen for the Arab states declared at the end of a tenday conference that they would unanimously support the refugees' demand to return to their homes in what had become the state of Israel; this was tantamount to rejection of Mr. Hammarskjold's proposal to spend $1.5–$2 billion within the next five years to create productive jobs for about one million refugees living in Arab lands. Although the Secretary-General had asserted that economic integration would not prejudice any rights of the refugees, the Arabs interpreted the plan to mean that the refugees would be permanently resettled among them. Apparently the only part of Mr. Hammarskjold's report that was acceptable to the Arabs was that calling for the continued existence of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the organization administering the relief program for refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic.

Little work has been done—on either a conceptual or an empirical level—in assessing the way in which national political support operates in the context of the regional integration scheme. The purpose of this study is to describe and explain patterns of national support for one regional integration scheme, the Andean Pact. It is suggested here that foreign policy behavior toward a regional integration scheme is not a simple, unidimensional type of behavior, but rather is a complex set of activities and attitudes directed toward specific programs of the regional integration scheme in the pursuit of specific economic development goals and limited by the constraints of resources. The policies of member governments toward the Andean Pact are clearly designed to satisfy national goals and needs. Although some governments have been willing to acquiesce in certain areas of national interest on occasion, by and large the Andean Pact members have consistently sought to further national interests through support of the Andean Pact as a whole.

The second session of the Executive Committee of the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization was convened in Geneva on August 25, 1948. Among the items discussed were 1) a report of the work of the secretariat and its information activities, 2) relations with the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the International Court of Justice, 3) financial and staff regulations for the permanent Organization, 4) a report by the secretariat on the Havana resolution relating to economic development and reconstruction, and 5) representation of the Interim Commission on the Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Agreements. Consultations were held with the Secretariat of the United Nations and Registry of the International Court of Justice in connection with the preparation of agreements bringing the ITO into relationship with these two organizations.

Only six of the small states of Western or Western oriented Europe participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. They were Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Norway, Luxembourg, and, after a struggle between the Soviet Union and its wartime allies, Denmark. Their participation followed, for the most part, the model of the “honorable, independent, disinterested small state”: sober, responsible, speaking mainly when spoken to, but assiduously seeking out ways to make their voices heard in the alleviation of international conflict. True, they were there as part of the winning coalition in World War II and shared the hopes and expectations of the larger Western powers concerning the role of the United Nations. But they joined similar countries outside Europe, particularly Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, in helping to shape a UN Charter which in certain ways differed from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The role of the General Assembly was, for example, enlarged, thus modifying the special position of the Great Powers, and the scope of the United Nations in economic and social fields was expanded. The influence of the small states in Europe stemmed from the desire of the major Western allies, particularly the United States, to ensure the success of the enterprise by concessions to those whose participation would be necessary to make it a worthwhile undertaking.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.

The main purpose of this article is to try to make clear what in the present condition of the world we can legitimately expect the United Nations to do: a) as regards the maintenance; and b) if aggression should unfortunately recur, as regards the restoration of world peace. These are two very different matters; and it is possible to believe that the first is more important than the second. For the United Nations will certainly have achieved its major purpose if there is no third world war; whereas, if there is, the issue will only to a comparatively minor degree be decided by the United Nations. I know that, stated so bluntly, this thesis may not be accepted by everybody; but the general trend of any argument will be that prevention is better than cure, more particularly if the cure involves the indiscriminate plastering of large areas with atomic bombs and “other weapons of mass destruction”.

Ever since World War II the United Kingdom has been engaged in the process of withdrawal from the Caribbean—indeed the beginnings were made before the war ended. The clearest and most recent evidence has been the advance of Jamaica and Trinidad from colonial status to independent membership in the British Commonwealth and the United Nations. But this was not quite what had been intended. The aim originally had been to make one federal union of all the British colonies in the region. The attempt, however, failed. British Guiana and British Honduras withdrew from the scheme at an early stage, and the federation of the islands foundered after a four-year period of trial.

The oratory of the General Assembly and the Security Council and the resolutions adopted by these organs are the most obvious activities of the United Nations in the field of human rights and the features usually studied. They alone, however, give little indication of the effectiveness and the effects of the UN's actions. To investigate this one needs to go beyond New York to the national capitals. How do governments whose policies are severely criticized in the UN respond? On one level the questions can be simply answered. The alternatives are reasonably clear. They include token and substantive compliance, indifference, and defiance. But how is one alternative chosen over the others and does what goes on in New York have any impact on the political dynamics within the national framework? This article is an attempt to investigate a limited aspect of this question. It is an analysis of both the reactions within the parliaments of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa to UN actions concerning these territories and the possible importance of these reactions in parliamentary elections.

The postwar increase in the number and scope of intergovernmental organizations has meant that many fields hitherto subject to national regulation, or to bilateral agreements, are now regulated by a multilateral convention. There are other fields, however, which appear to be as yet unready, for international control. The economic regulation of international air transport is a case in point. Although air navigation principles have been internationalized since 1919, and a respectable amount of technical co-operation on safety rules has been achieved, rights to engage in air commerce between the territories of two or more states continue to be determined largely by bilateral agreements

In the 21 years since the conclusion of the Second World War, a complicated, piecemeal framework of trading arrangements under various international organizations has been created. Now there is concern, internationally and domestically, as to whether this framework is a durable basis for expanded world trade.

Development planning has become a routine activity for large numbers of corporations as well as for public authorities at various levels, particularly national governments. The time has come to make an attempt to create a framework for all these activities at the highest, that is, the world, level. Several of the most important arguments in favor of the construction of such a world “indicative” development plan1 will thus be discussed in this introductory section.

The title of this article may promise too much. First, this article will limit itself only to the problems of Socialist states in universal, worldwide organizations, not in all kinds of international organizations, as the title implies. Second, the wording of the title may incorrectly suggest that the unique economic, social, and ideological characteristics of the Socialist system determine the nature of Socialist participation in international organizations. In fact, however, Socialist states act much as other states in their relations with international organizations. Third, the title and content of the article may imply that all Socialist states behave identically in regard to international organizations. It seems necessary, therefore, to emphasize that treating the Socialist states as a group is merely a recognition of the greater community of interests and higher degree of cohesion within the group than between members of the group and states outside it. There remain, however, different viewpoints on some issues among members of the group. Membership in the group may be formal, e.g., participation in a caucusing group, or informal, e.g., sharing in a feeling of responsibility for the welfare of the Socialist world. A formulation of the general attitudes of the Socialist group consists in setting forth policies which result from similar or common economic and social systems, ideology, interdependence, and, last but not least, dangers. In the author's opinion the relevance of establishing and recognizing diese common attitudes despite individual deviations cannot be denied.

An examination of the past relationships between nuclear proliferation and American security policy substantiates several propositions. First, the political relationship between the United States and each new nuclear weapon state was not fundamentally transformed as a result of nuclear proliferation. Second, with the exception of the Soviet Union, no new nuclear state significantly affected U.S. defense programs or policies. Third, American interest in bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations has been confined to the Soviet Union. Fourth, a conventional conflict involving a nonnuclear ally prompted the United States to intervene in ways it otherwise might not have in order to forestall the use of nuclear weapons.

In all respects, however, the relationship between nuclear proliferation and American security policy is changing. The intensification of the superpower rivalry and specific developments in their nuclear weapons and doctrines, the decline of American power more generally, and the characteristics of nuclear threshold states all serve to stimulate nuclear proliferation. It will be increasingly difficult in the future for American security policy to be as insulated from this process as it has been in the past.

The Agreement for the Establishment of the Caribbean Organization, Article V (2), stated that the agreement would enter into force on signature of a joint declaration to that effect by the signatory governments following deposit of instruments of approval or acceptance by the signatory governments and after the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Commission had received notification from not less than six of the prospective members of the Organization. It was announced in February 1961 that the Secretary-General had received formal notification from six prospective members, who had accepted the obligations imposed by the Statute of the Caribbean Organization and elected to become members. These were: France for the departments of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique; Surinam; the Netherlands Antilles; British Guiana; Puerto Rico; and the Virgin Islands of the United States. The government of the British Virgin Islands later notified the Secretary-General of its intention to join the Organization and became a member on May 31, 1962.

On March 27, 1964, Secretary-General U Thant announced that the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had become operational. This announcement occurred only a few days after the initial Canadian units landed in Cyprus soon to be joined by the forces from other contributing countries. The operation, initiated under the executive direction of the Secretary-General and at the request of the Security Council, thus became another in a series of peacekeeping efforts by the United Nations. One year later the Secretary-General was able to report that during the first year of operation UNFICYP had achieved “very creditable results” but that major difficulties still remained with respect to achieving a stable and enduring peace.