One of the significant structural differences between the organization of economic and social work under the League and under the United Nations is the extent to which non-governmental organizations (NGO's) have been allowed to participate. NGO's have been granted far greater privileges in the UN than they enjoyed in the League. Initially, they were formally recognized in Article 71 of the Charter, which gives the Economic and Social Council the right to make “suitable arrangements” for consultation with them. While defined in differing ways during different periods, consultative status under this article has, subject to various conditions, always included the right to participate in the debates of ECOSOC, its commissions and committees, and to propose items for inclusion in their provisional agenda. NGO's have made extensive use of these privileges. Their use, however, as well as the entire record of NGO action in the UN, has been inseparably linked with the cold war. Russian demands at San Francisco for privileges for the newly created, communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) were a contributing factor in the decision to include Article 71 in the Charter. The initial definition of this article resulted primarily from the interaction of pressures by the Soviet Union and the WFTU and the western response.

How do extremist sympathizers respond to counter-radicalization efforts? Over the past decade, programs to counter violent extremism have mushroomed around the world, but little is known of their effectiveness. This study uses social media data to examine how counter-radicalization efforts shape engagement with extremist groups in the online world. Matching geolocated Twitter data on Islamic State sympathizers with granular information on counter-extremism activities in the United States, I find that, rather than deradicalizing, these efforts led Islamic State sympathizers to act strategically to avoid detection. After counter-extremism activities, the group's supporters on Twitter who were in the vicinity of these events began self-censoring expressions of support for the Islamic State, altered profile images and screen names, and encouraged followers to migrate to Telegram, an encrypted network not viewable by the public. These findings reveal previously unknown patterns in the effects of counter-extremism programs in the digital era.

The relation of an international military authority to the industrial (once nuclear) powers in a disarmed world is an intriguing one. We should not expect much success in finding an ideal strategy for it. It is hard enough to find one for the United States, Britain, or the Soviet Union in the familiar world of competitive military force.

At the present time, the political popularity of foreign assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, has reached a low point in the United States. The lack of enthusiasm is epitomized by the vote of the House of Representatives in January 1974 against the United States's pledge of $550 million to support the International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan subsidiary of the World Bank (even though that vote was subsequently reversed). Total US commitments of official development assistance have declined from 0.59 percent of GNP in 1963 to 0.29 percent in 1972.

As periodic stock–taking efforts would indicate,1 students of international organizations have become increasingly sophisticated in the methods and techniques used for assessing the dynamics of international efforts at cooperation, and the impact of these efforts on the general stream of international politics. Nowhere has this been more true than in attempts by scholars to come to grips with the political processes acted out in the General Assembly of the United Nations. To para–phrase Keohane,2 we have come to witness a change of focus from a somewhat static description of structures, rules and regulations, to analyses of patterns of voting behavior (and correlates thereof) to, finally, systematic analyses of patterns of interactions leading to votes and resolutions.

The problem of squaring the circle is not confined to mathematics. A somewhat similar task confronts the members of the Organization of American States (OAS) as they seek to enlarge respect for human rights and to create a firmer basis for democratic institutions in the life of the western hemisphere while maintaining the treasured principle of non-intervention. Not a new problem, it has increased in urgency in the last few years with the mounting opposition to dictatorships throughout the continent, with the increasingly communist orientation of Castro's government in Cuba, and with the political unrest elsewhere in Latin America to which Castro's victory appears to have contributed. Faced somewhat obliquely at the Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Foreign Ministers in Costa Rica in August 1960, it will have to be confronted more directly at the Eleventh International Conference of American States to be held in Ecuador in May 1961. The agenda for the Eleventh Conference contains items relating both to the protection of human rights and to the preservation of representative democracy.

The study of integration provides a seemingly endless variety of theories, frameworks, approaches, definitions, terminology, and methodologies. An unfortunate consequence of this profusion and confusion is that research findings exhibit the same variety. For instance, studies of integration within the European Economic Community (EEC) can easily be divided into two types: those that find integration progressing steadily and even rapidly and those that find it stagnant.

Scholars often assume that courts in authoritarian regimes cannot credibly protect foreign investors’ interests because these institutions lack judicial independence. In this article, we construct a novel data set on multinational corporations’ litigation activities in Chinese courts from 2002 to 2017. This supports the first systematic case-level analysis of foreign firms’ lawsuit outcomes in an authoritarian judiciary. We find that foreign companies frequently engage in litigation in authoritarian courts. Moreover, we theoretically and empirically distinguish between two types of government–business ties in terms of their effectiveness in incentivizing the host state to protect foreign investors’ interests. We argue that ad hoc, personal political connections deliver only trivial lawsuit success for multinational enterprises, while formal corporate partnerships with regime insiders can lead the state to structurally internalize foreign investors’ interests. In particular, we demonstrate that joint venture partnerships with state-owned enterprises help foreign firms obtain more substantial monetary compensation than other types of multinational enterprises. By contrast, the personal political connections of foreign firms’ board members do not foster meaningful judicial favoritism. These findings are robust to tests of alternative implications, matching procedures, and subsample robustness checks. This article advances our understanding of multinational corporations’ political risk in host countries, government–business relations, and authoritarian judicial institutions.

The United Nations Charter states that, in building the Secretariat, the Secretary General must give “paramount consideration” to achieving “the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity”, and adds that he must recruit “on as wide a geographical basis as possible”. A dozen years have passed since these standards were set down at San Francisco, and in those years two Secretaries General have attempted to apply them. In their efforts to create a professional civil service, they have had to face extraordinarily difficult problems, but it is clear that the Secretariat today largely fulfills the expectations of the Charter

The First Conference of Independent African States, attended by representatives of the independent states of western and northern Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic), was held in Accra, Ghana, from April 15 to 22, 1958. The purpose of the conference was: 1) to discuss problems of common interest; 2) to formulate and coordinate methods aimed at accelerating mutual understanding; 3) to consider means of safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of participating countries and of assisting dependent African territories in their efforts toward the attainment of self-government; and 4) to plan cultural exchanges and mutual assistance schemes.

We examine whether politically irrelevant events can cause conflicts, by analyzing the effects of professional football games in Europe on protests in Africa—an unintended spillover across the continents. By expanding psychological theories, we argue that the outcomes of the football games in Europe can affect African people's subjective evaluation of domestic politicians, which in turn can trigger protests. By exploiting as-if random variation in the results of 15,102 close football games conditional on betting odds, we find that compared to draw games, close losses of African players’ teams increase peaceful protests in their original countries while not changing the likelihood of riots or armed conflicts. The effect is particularly large for non-ethnic protests targeted at a central government. Close losses also temporarily decrease people's trust in their country's leader. By contrast, close victories do not have equivalent or compensating effects on protests or public opinion. These results suggest asymmetric misattribution: people in Africa unreasonably blame domestic politicians for bad luck in European football games, prompting protests; but they do not credit politicians with football victories.

No feature of United Nations activity has raised more doubts about the ability of international organization to assure peace and security than the recurrent appearance of the veto in the Security Council during the past two years.

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.

The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.

Eight journals were surveyed for articles reporting empirical research on international organizations, under the assumption that periodic self-assessment is a necessary component of any program of scientific inquiry. Forty-five article published between 1970 and 1975 are compared to articles from the 1960s on a variety of dimensions. In the recent period more authors view international organizations comparatively while fewer concentrate their efforts on the UN. The types of organizations and organizational process being studied have become more diversified, as have the research methods being utilized. Several questions receiving the sustained attention of researchers, such as studies of UN voting groups, the attributes of UN member states, the effects of economic assistance on influence in the UN, and the role of IO's in conflict resolution, all reflect a growing accumulation of knowledge about international organizations.

The governments of the five major Western powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Japan—coordinated policy on two key North-South issues from 1974 to 1979: relieving the external debts of developing nations and establishing the Common Fund to help finance international commodity agreements. A prominent feature of the coordination process was the emergence of transgovernmental coalitions among like-minded bureaucrats. Previous studies have suggested that such coalitions may affect national policies by promoting learning and attitude change in their members and by legitimizing the policy changes sought by their members. But these suggestions do not account for the ability of coalitions to translate their policy preferences into national policy commitments, particularly where one or more of their members are relatively weak in their national policy-making systems. On the Common Fund and debt relief, some coalition members held positions in their national systems strong enough to induce their governments as a whole to commit themselves to certain concessions. Weaker members of these coalitions then gained the external support they needed to lead their own governments to make similar commitments, thus preparing the way for agreements with the developing countries and some incremental changes in the international economic order.