In “A Society of Individuals,” I sketch a society that has no good of its own, no social end, but exists to enable each individual member better to pursue his own good, facilitating cooperation, and resolving the basic Interaction Problem (exemplified by the Prisoner’s Dilemma): that utility-maximization and Pareto-optimization are sometimes incompatible. The orthodox defend the rationality of maximization; I defend Pareto-optimization. I argue that if (per impossible) we could determine the features of our society by prior agreement we would agree to a Society of Individuals, and that we would agree ex ante to some social practice or institution is the best possible justification of it holding for us.

I then sketch some of the main features of the Society. In doing this I assume that members of the Society are not all adherents of contractarianism, but may hold any of a number of reasonable views, which the Society must seek to accommodate. I consider how several alleged rights, such as a right to resources, fare in the Society. And I conclude with the idea that contractarianism, in arguing that each adult member of society enjoys equal citizenship, must afford each the right to participate in choosing and dismissing governments. We may then think the emergence of a Society of Individuals is democracy’s fulfillment.

I focus on David Gauthier’s intriguing suggestion that actions are not to be evaluated directly but via an evaluation of deliberative procedures. I argue that this suggestion is misleading, since even the most direct evaluation of (intentional) actions involves the evaluation of different ways of deliberating about what to do. Relatedly, a complete picture of what an agent is or might be (intentionally) doing cannot be disentangled from a complete picture of how s/he is or might be deliberating. A more viable contrast concerns whether actions and deliberative procedures are properly evaluated on the whole or, instead, through time.

Contractarianism is more inclusive than critics (and, indeed, David Gauthier) sometimes suggest. Contractarianism can justify equal moral standing for human persons (in some respects) and provide sufficient moral standing for many nonhuman animals to require what we commonly call ‘decent treatment.’ Moreover, contractarianism may allow that some entities have more moral standing than do others. This does not necessarily license the oppression that liberal egalitarians rightly fear. Instead, it shows that contractarianism may support a nuanced account of moral status.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) plays a central, but shifting, role in David Gauthier’s moral theorizing. In “Morality and Advantage,” it provides a model, demonstrating how morality can have seemingly contradictory properties. In Morals by Agreement, it poses a special problem for the view that moral behaviour is individually rational. Authorities on game theory have subsequently disputed the idea that the PD is an appropriate tool for thinking about moral theory. In the first part of this paper, I examine the roles of the PD in Gauthier’s writings. In the second part, I outline a project, with both descriptive and normative components, that develops the insights of “Morality and Advantage” while preserving it from the game theorists’ attack.

David Gauthier develops morality in the social contract tradition as an emergent property rationally necessitated by the presence of inefficiency. To demarcate situations in which morality arises from those in which it does not, two principles, Strategic Emergence and Market Emergence, are motivated and assumed by Gauthier to be equivalent. Following the work of Bob Bright, this paper formalizes and expands upon a demonstration of the inconsistency of the two principles. Eliminating each of the emergence conditions is considered to resolve the inconsistency. Additionally, the Kantian equilibrium is examined in place of the Nash equilibrium; however, Gauthier’s approach resists such amendments.

David Gauthier once said that the social contract offers ‘the only game in town’ if we hope for a rational morality. I argue that he’s correct. Morality consists of rules notionally directed at everyone everywhere. Only individual people are rational, and they have varying interests. The social contract proposes principles that everyone would, in view of their social and environmental circumstances, agree to as constraining their separate pursuits of their ends. There is no other rational way to understand morals, and so it is indeed the only game in town.

In 1975, Gauthier discussed Schelling’s pure coordination games and Hodgson’s Hi-Lo game. While developing an original analysis of how rational players coordinate on ‘focal points,’ Gauthier argued, contrary to Schelling and Hodgson, that successful coordination in these games does not depend on deviations from conventional principles of individually rational choice. I argue that Gauthier’s analysis of constrained maximization in Morals by Agreement, which famously deviates from conventional game theory, has significant similarities with Schelling’s and Hodgson’s analyses of coordination. Constrained maximization can be thought of as a pragmatic and contractarian variant of the team-reasoning approach pioneered by Hodgson.

My fellow contractarians and I are of a mind that it would be irrational to comply with a distribution of the cooperative dividend that worsens one’s condition. But worse than what? According to David Gauthier et al., it’s non-interaction, i.e., what would be the case were the negotiators never to have met. I argue that it’s what would be the case in the absence of their coming to an agreement. As it turns out, this distinction can be, and often is, a matter of life and death.

In this article, I examine two aspects of the transition from Kant to Fichte: systematicity and the primacy of practical reason. It is commonly agreed that Kant saw the critical exercise as an occasion to renew, rather than supress, the possibility of a positive metaphysics; however, most scholars now consider the “system” he sketched to be the sole heritage of Schulmetaphysik. However, I take literally Kant’s demand for a system that expects from the “practical” a new and absolute “foundation,” rather than a system that must be completed. Here, Fichte’s perspective gives us the common thread.