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Social Contract: The Only Game in Town

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2016

JAN NARVESON
JAN NARVESON*
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

David Gauthier once said that the social contract offers ‘the only game in town’ if we hope for a rational morality. I argue that he’s correct. Morality consists of rules notionally directed at everyone everywhere. Only individual people are rational, and they have varying interests. The social contract proposes principles that everyone would, in view of their social and environmental circumstances, agree to as constraining their separate pursuits of their ends. There is no other rational way to understand morals, and so it is indeed the only game in town.

David Gauthier a dit un jour que le contrat social constitue la seule option permettant de parvenir à une morale rationnelle. Je soutiens qu’il a raison. La morale se compose de règles notionnelles visant tout le monde, partout. Seuls les individus sont rationnels, et ils ont des intérêts divers. Le contrat social propose des principes auxquels chacun, compte tenu de sa situation sociale et environnementale, consent bien qu’ils limitent les activités par lesquelles chacun poursuit ses buts. Il n’existe aucun autre moyen rationnel de comprendre la morale; c’est donc bien la seule option possible.

Keywords

morals (morality)interactionsocial contractconstrained maximizationoptimalgame theory
Type
Special Topic: Gauthier’s Contractarian Project
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 695 - 711
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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