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Gauthier and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2016

STEVEN KUHN
STEVEN KUHN*
Affiliation:
Georgetown University
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) plays a central, but shifting, role in David Gauthier’s moral theorizing. In “Morality and Advantage,” it provides a model, demonstrating how morality can have seemingly contradictory properties. In Morals by Agreement, it poses a special problem for the view that moral behaviour is individually rational. Authorities on game theory have subsequently disputed the idea that the PD is an appropriate tool for thinking about moral theory. In the first part of this paper, I examine the roles of the PD in Gauthier’s writings. In the second part, I outline a project, with both descriptive and normative components, that develops the insights of “Morality and Advantage” while preserving it from the game theorists’ attack.

Le dilemme du prisonnier occupe une place centrale dans la théorie morale de Gauthier, mais cette place est en évolution. Dans «Morality and Advantage», ce dilemme fournit un modèle montrant comment la moralité peut avoir des propriétés apparemment contradictoires. Dans Morals by Agreement, il pose un problème particulier pour l’opinion selon laquelle un comportement moral est individuellement rationnel. Suite à ces publications, certains experts en théorie des jeux ont contesté l’idée voulant que le dilemme du prisonnier soit un cadre approprié pour réfléchir sur la théorie morale. La première partie de cet article examine les rôles du dilemme du prisonnier dans l’œuvre de Gauthier. La deuxième partie présente un projet, incluant des composantes descriptives et normatives, qui développe les idées de «Morality and Advantage» tout en le préservant de la critique des théoriciens des jeux.

Keywords

Gauthierprisoner’s dilemmaadvocacysocial pressurerationality
Type
Special Topic: Gauthier’s Contractarian Project
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 659 - 676
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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