This paper is primarily an impressionistic sketch of an on-going piece of family research. No conclusions can as yet be offered. Instead, I intend briefly to suggest a frame of reference for the study of family hostility as well as enumerate some of the procedures of field work used in the present project.

Much has been written about the family by many sociologists of various persuasions. Yet a large part of this phase of sociological effort leaves one dissatisfied. Admittedly data on our own types of family structure are hidden from clear view precisely because of their familiarity as well as their privacy. But this fact is not sufficient to account for the disparity between the experienced complexity of family life and the sparsity of published details made significant by a sustained and incisive theoretic orientation. Headway could be made by the use of a frame of reference which combines sociological with psychological considerations, without confusing them, and which draws its vitality from the impassioned analyses of the structure of large-scale social systems and of individual character as begun by Weber and Freud. At the present time family research seems on the whole to have made little consistent use of the leads of kinship analysis and to have by-passed a cumulative effort at spelling out the empirical details of the social structure of various types of American families. As it is, we hear much about the family as a “unity of interacting personalities,” about processes of accommodation or conflict, or about the kinds of valuation that marital partners place upon one another; yet we hear little of the intervening details which, in their fullness, would give us a sense of how indeed a family as an on-going concern functions and how the inherent or emergent demands of its social structure are met, how the social structure of a family is related meaningfully or functionally to the rest of the social system, and how any given family of orientation dissolves into successive families of procreation.

On May 1, 1851, Queen Victoria, accompanied by the Prince Consort, to whom must be given credit for the undertaking, with the royal family, the ministers of state, ambassadors, and a great throng of all who were famous in the United Kingdom, opened the Great Exhibition housed in the Crystal Palace, “that blazing arch of lucid glass.” A massed choir of a thousand voices—the Victorians loved massed choirs and massed orchestras—sang an ode composed by Tennyson, the Poet Laureate, in which they praised “the invisible, universal Lord,”

Who lets once more in peace the nations meet,
Where Science, Art and Labour have outpour'd
Their myriad horns of plenty at our feet.

The exhibition was off to a good start, and its success was phenomenal. Fourteen thousand exhibitors from all the leading nations of the world had brought the best they had of their wares. Six million visitors, brought to England by the new steamships and to London by the new railways, came to see the marvels displayed, and thought it all very wonderful. And it was wonderful; nothing like it had ever been seen before. It was the apotheosis of the Industrial Revolution. The Victorians believed in Progress; they had every reason to believe in it and the Crystal Palace was its outward and visible sign. The entrepreneurs, the manufacturers were entirely satisfied with things. Everything was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. God was in his heaven and all was right everywhere; or at least it was all right in Manchester where they made fortunes from cottons; and in the Black Country where, under the shadow of those “dark satanic mills” which had vexed the gentle soul of William Blake, they were making even greater fortunes.

This paper has two aims, one substantive and the other methodological. Substantively the paper presents data from the April 1963 parliamentary election in Halifax in an array parallel to that in my article on the June 1962 election there: this presentation can be brief since the reader may refer to the earlier study if he desires amplification of the argument. On the other hand, the methodological problems involved in repeating a case study and in generalizing one's findings raise issues that must be discussed in greater detail.

A Canadian wheat problem had existed, in one form or another, for ten years prior to the outbreak of war in September, 1939. Economic nationalism and world depression had brought shrinking export markets and ruinously low prices to the wheat economy of the Prairie Provinces; drought and soil drifting had brought complete destitution over wide areas; and crop failures in Western Canada had placed a heavy relief burden on the federal Treasury and redacted sharply on the economic life of every province in the Dominion. Surplus world wheat stocks had accumulated rapidly after 1928 (see Table I) but were reduced between 1934 and 1938 by lower average yields so that by the end of the 1937-8 crop-marketing season both world and Canadian carry-overs were back to normal levels or even lower. As a result, both world and Canadian wheat prices began to rise in 1936 and, although subject to fairly wide swings, were maintained for nearly two years at the highest levels since the fall of 1929. However, in 1938 world wheat production reached an all-time peak with good yields harvested from a record world wheat acreage; the Winnipeg cash price of No. 1 Manitoba Northern wheat, basis in store Fort William-Port Arthur, fell from $1.49 a bushel in January, to an average of 59 cents in November, and governments intervened to support prices paid to growers in each of the four major wheat-exporting countries of Canada, the United States, Argentina, and Australia. A t the end of the 1938-9 crop year, despite a moderate increase in international trade in wheat, the world wheat carry-over was approaching the 1934 peak; world wheat production in 1939 was second only to the large crop of 1938; and world supplies of wheat were the largest on record.

In recent years in many countries of the world a great deal of attention has been directed toward the need for more nutritious diets. The term “protective” foods has become established in the literature on nutrition. While there may be some differences of opinion as to what constitutes protective foods, practically all the lists of such foods which have been prepared by nutritionists include milk, meat, eggs, cheese, and fruits and vegetables.

The first studies of consumption of agricultural products in Canada were made by the Economics Division of the Dominion Department of Agriculture in 1930 when by the use of mail questionnaires a survey was made of the purchases of apples by consumers in Toronto and Montreal. A year later the first study of milk consumption in Canada was made by the Economics Division in the Sydney-Glace Bay area of Nova Scotia and in 1935 a more comprehensive study of milk consumption was undertaken in a number of urban and rural areas. Since 1935 additional studies of consumption of foods of various kinds have been made by the Economics Division as well as by other agencies. Most of these studies have been in relation to protective foods which in the main are the more expensive kinds of foods. These studies have been largely confined to city people although information has been gathered on the use of certain commodities in rural Canadian homes.

A transformation in the pattern of consumer expenditures has occurred in the nations that have reached high income levels during the past century. Smaller fractions of national income are spent on food, clothing, and shelter; larger fractions on recreation, medical care, education, and luxury goods. Cross-sectional studies of family budgets have been fairly reliable indicators of this trend. As early as 1857 Ernst Engel had pronounced his famous law about food expenditures on the basis of Edouard Ducpetiaux's Belgian budget studies. Similar assertions by others about clothing, fuel, and shelter followed; and in 1919 William Ogburn published his statistics of Washington, D.C., family budgets, indicating, in effect, that income elasticities of demand were highest for amusement and education. As the pattern slowly emerged, economists were not much disturbed. Why should consumers not be left alone in choosing between carrots and bedrooms? Interference with choices among luxury goods and services seemed even less warranted. Advertising posed no problem beyond encouragement of elementary veracity.

In the past decade, however, this unconcern has faded. Several economists have joined sociologists, moralists, and general philosophers in questioning trends in consumer expenditures. Their concern is less with morals and social repercussions than with optimum consumption patterns in terms of economic value and resource allocation. Advertising in particular is no longer reproached merely for a bent towards mendacity. It is seen as more insidious, as manipulating consumers' choices by kindling subconscious anxieties. It puts consumers in a squirrel cage in which production and the want-satisfying process create wants that would otherwise not exist.

The great increase in the construction of index numbers of economic data, particularly of prices, since the turn of the century, has increased our knowledge of the mechanism of the economic system. One of the earliest uses of index numbers of prices was to measure the long time movements of the general price level. Later, index numbers of prices were used a great deal in studying the movements of the business cycle. Within more recent years they have been used to study changes in the relative positions of different types of economic activity.

The world-wide depression of the 1930's stimulated the use of index numbers of prices in indicating the relatively unfavourable position of agriculture. As a result of the widespread use and study of index numbers of prices in this period, the “Parity Prices for Agriculture” slogan was born. The acceptance by the Government of the United States of the parity principle, based on price ratios, as a basic government agricultural policy has had a profound influence on the thinking of the farmers of Canada. Within recent years the distressing position of agriculture in the Canadian economy has resulted in a widespread demand by the farmers for parity prices for agriculture.

Recent research on national income in Canada and the United States has enabled estimates to be made of the total national income and break-downs of some of its more important parts. In Canada three agencies have computed these estimates, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and a special committee for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. The yearly levels of national income as computed by these three agencies do not agree exactly, as one might expect due to somewhat different methods of calculation, but the general trends correspond fairly well.

I do not propose to discuss here the problems of the transition from war to peace, or how unions can help to get full employment in the first place. I am concerned with the more fundamental problem of the place of unions in a society which has achieved full employment in peace-time, without sacrificing any of the essential freedoms, and which wants to keep both full employment and freedom. I am assuming that full employment involves planning. I am assuming also that unions are not just nuisances but, in one form or another, permanent and desirable social institutions. Can we plan production without planning wages, hours, and conditions of work? If full employment involves planning these also, where do the unions come in ? Must they sacrifice their traditional freedom to bargain collectively on behalf of their members, and suffer a sea-change into something, if not rich and strange, at least very different from what they have ever been before? Or can the community do this part of its planning through collective bargaining? Can we continue to have purely sectional bargaining, plant by plant, industry by industry, or must the various unions act as a unit according to a general wage policy laid down by some central organization? Must trade unionism change its functions, or its structure, or both?

These questions have been widely discussed in Britain, and to some extent also in the United States; in Canada, as far as I know, hardly at all. If we mean business when we talk of full employment, especially full employment in a free society, it is high time they were. For they are not by any means minor questions. Mrs. Wootton goes so far as to say that “Of all the possible points of conflict between conscious planning of priorities and traditional freedoms, the regulation of wages is likely to prove the most stormy”; and of course in this context “wages” include hours and conditions of work—not only what is paid, but what it is paid for. In Canada, freedom to bargain collectively can scarcely be called one of the “traditional” freedoms; for most Canadian workers it is still a recent, hard won, and imperfect conquest. But it is none the less prized for that, and it will not be easily surrendered, even as the price of full employment. For of all the freedoms, this is perhaps the one that comes closest home to the ordinary worker.

Broadcasting is the most pervasive, and therefore one of the most powerful, of agents for influencing men's thoughts and actions, for giving them a picture, true or false, of their fellows and of the world in which they live, for appealing to their intellect, their emotions and their appetites, for filling their minds with beauty or ugliness, ideas or idleness, laughter or terror, love or hate.

The truth of this statement from the Beveridge Committee on British broadcasting is not now questioned. Indeed the danger today is that governments, instead of ignoring the power of radio to influence opinion, will exaggerate it and take needless precautions against the “contamination” of the public mind. Such an attitude has long been recognized as characteristic of totalitarianism, but in this paper I am concerned to show that the “fundamental freedoms” of speech and of the press do not always extend to the broadcasting services, even in states with otherwise strongly established democratic traditions. In the two countries examined, Great Britain and New Zealand, broadcasting is a government monopoly, operated in Britain through the British Broadcasting Corporation, a semi-independent public corporation, and in New Zealand through the New Zealand Broadcasting Service, a government department under the control of a minister. According to a recent announcement from New Zealand, however, the Government intends “to end direct state control of radio and television in New Zealand and create an independent three man corporation to assume control from 1st April 1962.” The governments of both countries have demonstrated that they regard broadcasting rights as a privilege not to be extended to all who might claim access to them.

Economic literature of the past decade suggests, and most economists would surely agree, that there are two fundamental economic problems: unemployment and monopoly. Together, enforced idleness of resources and maldistribution of resources due to monopolization of all kinds are responsible for whatever gap exists between actual and potential national real income. They account for a good deal of the inequity of income distribution as well. Economic policy has as its chief concern the elimination of monopoly without loss of efficiency, and the elimination of unemployment without inflation or misuse of resources.

The post-war period will present these two basic problems in aggravated form. Exigencies of war have led to increased concentration of industry, which could easily crystallize into enhanced monopoly power. With half our national income now generated by war expenditures, the task of maintaining full employment while shifting production from things that win wars to things that promote welfare will be of unprecedented magnitude. At the same time, vast new holdings of cash and other liquid resources, combined with the backlog of demand for both consumers' and producers' goods that will have accumulated, will constitute a grave threat of inflation. The balance of the economy, which must be maintained by what Professor Lerner has aptly called “functional finance,” will be delicate indeed.

This article suggests an approach to post-war tax policy designed to meet these problems. While the setting is Canadian, the analytical tools and even the policies proposed would be applicable to the British or American scenes with minor modifications.

When I was invited to present a paper on “Problems of Public Administration in International Organizations” I readily accepted as I am a firm believer in the efficacy of public discussion of important issues. Ordinarily, the selection of a topic in this broad field would offer unlimited choice, but taking into account recent changes in the international political scene, there was no doubt in my mind about the subject on which I should speak.

Anyone associated with the activities of international organizations over the past ten years has inevitably been impressed by the intense desire of the poorer countries for improved standards of living through accelerated economic development. Equally impressive has been the substantial response of the more advanced countries.

Reflecting their mutual interest in achieving social progress and economic development, and acting in fulfilment of article 55 of the United Nations Charter, governments of most advanced countries (outside the Soviet sphere) increased the flow of bilateral aid in the early post-war period and at the same time joined in establishing a number of new international agencies and programmes for economic development. In the time at my disposal today I will not attempt to describe in detail the different concepts underlying each of these programmes. But it will give some indication of their objectives and scope if I mention the large amounts of bilateral aid now being provided by the United States through the International Cooperation Administration and by Canada and other Commonwealth countries under the Colombo Plan. At the same time international organizations have increased their programmes substantially. Loans extended by the International Bank since the war now exceed $2½ billion.

In any study of Canadian industry today, words such as growth and development quickly come into their own. The very scope and rapidity of the changes have introduced a new pace which in many ways is unique. Some of the reasons are not hard to trace. Once growth reaches a certain stage it seems to accumulate momentum. The proximity of Canada to the United States and her access to the industrial technology of that country have also contributed greatly.

A large measure of the expansion of Canadian industry has been the result of extensions of United States corporate activity into Canada through the establishment or development of branches and subsidiaries. In this manner, United States industrial technology, supported by abundant sources of financing in that country, has speeded and extended the process of Canadian development. And important parts of the growth which provide sources of supply for United States industry are in turn closely linking Canadian growth to growth in the United States economy. Participation by British and European enterprise and industry to a greater degree than formerly should also be noted, although it is much smaller in scale than the parts sponsored by United States industry. The pace of development would have been much slower had there not been this borrowing of non-resident resources both technological and financial. In the past half-dozen years or so, over half the increase in investment in Canadian industry has been owned by non-residents. That suggests the degree of financial assistance. It would be very difficult to evaluate the borrowing of technology but in some industries it has been very great and has provided the indispensable “know-how” without which ventures would carry much greater risks. Most of this increased investment has taken the form of equity ownership and control which carries with it potential claims to participate in subsequent growth in the rapidly developing, commodity-producing industries—manufacturing and mineral production.