Economic literature of the past decade suggests, and most economists would surely agree, that there are two fundamental economic problems: unemployment and monopoly. Together, enforced idleness of resources and maldistribution of resources due to monopolization of all kinds are responsible for whatever gap exists between actual and potential national real income. They account for a good deal of the inequity of income distribution as well. Economic policy has as its chief concern the elimination of monopoly without loss of efficiency, and the elimination of unemployment without inflation or misuse of resources.

The post-war period will present these two basic problems in aggravated form. Exigencies of war have led to increased concentration of industry, which could easily crystallize into enhanced monopoly power. With half our national income now generated by war expenditures, the task of maintaining full employment while shifting production from things that win wars to things that promote welfare will be of unprecedented magnitude. At the same time, vast new holdings of cash and other liquid resources, combined with the backlog of demand for both consumers' and producers' goods that will have accumulated, will constitute a grave threat of inflation. The balance of the economy, which must be maintained by what Professor Lerner has aptly called “functional finance,” will be delicate indeed.

This article suggests an approach to post-war tax policy designed to meet these problems. While the setting is Canadian, the analytical tools and even the policies proposed would be applicable to the British or American scenes with minor modifications.

This article tests hypotheses about the electoral support of Canada's first—and perhaps most significant—third party. It demonstrates that two micro-economic concepts, price elasticity of demand and efficiency of production, describe accurately the material base of Progressive party support. It thereby subsumes the study of agrarian parties and voting behaviour within a more general (public choice) framework. It also clarifies and substantiates important elements of the conventional wisdom about Progressive support, and it suggests means which might also shed new light upon the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and Social Credit.

In any study of Canadian industry today, words such as growth and development quickly come into their own. The very scope and rapidity of the changes have introduced a new pace which in many ways is unique. Some of the reasons are not hard to trace. Once growth reaches a certain stage it seems to accumulate momentum. The proximity of Canada to the United States and her access to the industrial technology of that country have also contributed greatly.

A large measure of the expansion of Canadian industry has been the result of extensions of United States corporate activity into Canada through the establishment or development of branches and subsidiaries. In this manner, United States industrial technology, supported by abundant sources of financing in that country, has speeded and extended the process of Canadian development. And important parts of the growth which provide sources of supply for United States industry are in turn closely linking Canadian growth to growth in the United States economy. Participation by British and European enterprise and industry to a greater degree than formerly should also be noted, although it is much smaller in scale than the parts sponsored by United States industry. The pace of development would have been much slower had there not been this borrowing of non-resident resources both technological and financial. In the past half-dozen years or so, over half the increase in investment in Canadian industry has been owned by non-residents. That suggests the degree of financial assistance. It would be very difficult to evaluate the borrowing of technology but in some industries it has been very great and has provided the indispensable “know-how” without which ventures would carry much greater risks. Most of this increased investment has taken the form of equity ownership and control which carries with it potential claims to participate in subsequent growth in the rapidly developing, commodity-producing industries—manufacturing and mineral production.

Developments and problems in contemporary thinking about strategy

The purpose of this analysis is to review the most important changes in contemporary thinking about strategy and to draw certain conclusions. Beginning with the different stages in the evolution of “classical” theories and the coming of “academic” ideas developed as explanations of a strategy of deterrence between the two super-powers, the analysis emphasizes the relation between the new explanations of conflicts among social groups and the new categories for defining strategy. It also stresses the relation between a theory of the multiple causes of conflicts and wars and the development of the interdisciplinary interpretation of the analysis of strategy. In conclusion, it is argued that the current stage of research into a “qualitative” change in the analysis of strategy also implies new objectives for strategy that are required for the problem of the survival of mankind.

The speakers in Thucydides who give voice to the sophistic thesis that might is right do not generally think that what they are releasing upon the world is a war of all against all. On the contrary, they are hopeful, like the modern utilitarians they anticipate, that their realistic assessment of human motives can serve as the foundation of an inter-state order based not on justice but on clear and certain power relations. The most perceptive of these speakers is Diodotus, who addresses his theory of imperial management to the difficult problem of the rise and fall of states. But the psychology upon which this theory rests points toward confederation in place of empire and toward constitutional government in place of democracy, run by demagogues. It also implies a reasoner, perhaps Diodotus himself, who is master of his own desires. In the end Diodotus seems somewhat at odds with the sophistic rationalism he so ably espouses.

From 1905, when Saskatchewan was made a province, to 1911, the Liberal party in Saskatchewan controlled both the federal and the provincial patronage. These six years gave it an enviable opportunity for laying firm foundations for a political organization. During the next ten years the federal patronage was in the hands of a Conservative or a Union party but the more important provincial patronage remained with the Liberals. Then in their last eight years of uninterrupted power, the Saskatchewan Liberals once more had the support of a federal Liberal government. Thus for twenty-four years after the formation of the province the Liberal rule over Saskatchewan was uninterrupted, and for fourteen of those years the Liberals also ruled over the Dominion. Until a few years before its defeat in 1929, it seemed as if the longer the party remained in power the stronger grew the party organization. It is this long period of development under favourable conditions which makes the Liberal organization in Saskatchewan worthy of close study.

The Liberal party in Saskatchewan, like Liberal and Conservative parties in the other provinces, had two sides to its organization—one formal and ineffective, the other informal and effective. In its formal aspect it resembled party organization elsewhere. The Liberals in each polling sub-division elected one or two representatives. These met to elect a constituency executive. Each constituency executive had one representative on the central council of the provincial party, on which there also sat the executive elected at a party convention. This formal organization, which paid so strict a homage to democratic theory in its pyramidical structure based upon the people's will, was unimportant. The constituency organization, for example, did very little; it met, perhaps, once a year. The formal organization constituted a democratic façade which hid from the common gaze the naked autocracy of effective party management. In the effective party organization which did the work, won the elections, and consequently possessed the reality of political power, appointments were from the top down.

When I was invited to present a paper on “Problems of Public Administration in International Organizations” I readily accepted as I am a firm believer in the efficacy of public discussion of important issues. Ordinarily, the selection of a topic in this broad field would offer unlimited choice, but taking into account recent changes in the international political scene, there was no doubt in my mind about the subject on which I should speak.

Anyone associated with the activities of international organizations over the past ten years has inevitably been impressed by the intense desire of the poorer countries for improved standards of living through accelerated economic development. Equally impressive has been the substantial response of the more advanced countries.

Reflecting their mutual interest in achieving social progress and economic development, and acting in fulfilment of article 55 of the United Nations Charter, governments of most advanced countries (outside the Soviet sphere) increased the flow of bilateral aid in the early post-war period and at the same time joined in establishing a number of new international agencies and programmes for economic development. In the time at my disposal today I will not attempt to describe in detail the different concepts underlying each of these programmes. But it will give some indication of their objectives and scope if I mention the large amounts of bilateral aid now being provided by the United States through the International Cooperation Administration and by Canada and other Commonwealth countries under the Colombo Plan. At the same time international organizations have increased their programmes substantially. Loans extended by the International Bank since the war now exceed $2½ billion.