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Union-Management Co-Operation at the Toronto Factory of Lever Brothers Limited*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

W. R. Dymond
W. R. Dymond*
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Extract

This case study of union-management co-operation at the Toronto factory of Lever Brothers Limited was undertaken for several reasons. It is an example of the union-management co-operation in which increases in productive efficiency were brought about solely by savings in man-power requirements. Further it is a case of the fulfilment of a collective bargaining demand by co-operation. These two facts, in themselves, are highly unusual. Although this case of co-operation took place during the war and was influenced by war-time conditions, it is in no way a part of the general war-time pattern of labour-management co-operation, stimulated in Canada by the Industrial Production Co-operation Board and in the United States by the War Production Drive.

Historically, industrial relations can be divided into an area of conflict of interest or collective bargaining and an area of mutuality of interest or co-operation. Employee representation tried to integrate these areas, but without the presence of an independent union, management tended to determine unilaterally the conditions of employment. Union-management co-operation later developed the area of mutuality in parts of the railroad, clothing, steel, and printing industries, but with the exception of the clothing industry, little integration was affected with the area of bargaining. During the recent war labour-management co-operation had a mushroom growth, but little attempt was made to integrate the two areas of industrial relations. In Canada, particularly, the role of the union on the co-operation committees was largely undefined. Co-operation at Lever Brothers is significant because it provides a clearcut case of integration between co-operation on productive efficiency and bargaining on wages and hours. Co-operation arose as a result of a demand by the bargaining agency for increased wages and shorter hours, while their achievement was brought about by the joint action of union and management. This, then, provides an example of union-management relations which may have profound implications for the achievement of industrial peace.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , February 1947 , pp. 26 - 67
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1947

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Footnotes

*

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the several officers of the company and union who gave so generously of their time to the process of gathering data, interpreting it, and revising the manuscript. A special debt of gratitude, in this connexion, is owing to Mr. Douglas Young of Lever Brothers and to Mr. James Harper of the International Chemical Workers' Union, Local 32. The study was made while holding an appointment as a research assistant in the Institute of Industrial Relations in the University of Toronto.

References

1 See Labour Gazette, 03, 1945, pp. 272–3.Google Scholar

2 This account of union activity prior to the independent employees' association was obtained from union sources.

3 This is an apparent reversal of management's policy towards outside affiliation in 1936, but top management personnel had changed in the interim.

4 Technically the union was granted maintenance of membership for those in the union at the time of contract signing plus the requirement that all new employees join the union as a condition of employment.

5 The new president replaced a man whose position was left vacant because of death. The union feels that it got along much better with the new management than it could have with the former.

6 In 1945 the Personnel Manager was made responsible to the Board of Directors as a whole.

7 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, The Soldier's Return (Toronto, 1945), p. 35.Google Scholar

8 Instead of “paternalism” the company prefers “sense of social responsibility” in this connexion.

9 The union considers them to be subject to the grievance procedure as well as forming a part of the “working conditions” which cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the union. Management considers them “ex-gratia privileges” which can be introduced or withdrawn at will.

10 These reasons have not been suggested by management, indeed it disagrees with a good many of their implications. They are rather the author's analysis of the factors which contributed to the development of the industrial relations policy conceived by management.

11 Lever factories in the United States suffered a series of bitter organizational strikes prior to the unionization of the Toronto factory.

12 The company states that its present personnel policy would have been introduced in any case; that the war-time benefits of that policy were incidental.

13 The collective agreements are relatively brief dealing only with union security and management rights, wage schedules, hours, vacations, seniority, grievance procedure, and the duration of the agreement.

14 These examples of co-operation are obtained from the minutes of the meetings of the Negotiating Committee with management. These are referred to below as “Minutes.”

15 Reference to Sunlight Frames Department, Minutes, 10 15, 1942.Google Scholar

16 This is one of the few examples of outside influence from the union movement having an influence on the local's policy.

17 In the United States the company was working a thirty-five-hour week before the war.

18 Management has offered no comment on this meeting. The description of what took place at it is from union sources.

19 The company does not appear to have ever proposed that a forty-hour, five-day week be put into effect on the basis of a three months' probationary period.

20 In any case the company could not have introduced the forty-hour week without the approval of the War Labour Board.

21 Minutes, January 11, 1944.

22 Ibid.

23 Turnover at this time took care of all those whose jobs were eliminated. No one was laid off; the company merely stopped hiring new employees.

24 These suggestions have been selected at random from the minutes of the Joint Committee Meetings on the Forty-Hour Week.

25 A “step” consists of a series of jobs in a department requiring comparable skills, qualifications and experience.

26 Cf. Dymond, W. R., “Production Committees Can Bring Industrial Peace” (Saturday Night, 06 15, 1946).Google Scholar

27 A limitation of our study is that no analysis of rank and file reaction to the effects of the efficiency programme could be undertaken. This kind of analysis, which requires an intensive interview programme, would add a great deal to the literature of Labour-Management Co-operation.

28 The president, prior to the recent change in the executive of the union.

29 For discussion of a formula designed for management and labour both to share the gains of union-management co-operation, cf. Dymond, W. R., “An Employer-Worker Formula” (Saturday Night, 10 5, 1946).Google Scholar

30 Management's present position is that it recognizes the principle of gains-sharing, but that it is not willing to share the gains of improved efficiency on a straight pro-rata basis with labour.

31 Collective Agreement, April 5, 1945, Article 1, Clause (4).

32 Sunlight News, Apr., 1946.

33 According to the statements of the former president, members of the executive, Personnel Manager of the company, and the present President of the union.