This paper presents some information about the two disciplines which have hitherto composed our association. It is largely a by-product of a series of studies in which I have been collaborating on the international migration of scientists and engineers. My paper arises from our research because, as I hope to suggest, many of the particular characteristics of the collectivity of political scientists and economists in Canada arise from its uncertainty about its geographical reference. This in turn is a consequence of the dependence of Canadian academic departments, and of other employers, on sources outside Canada for the training of new recruits.

The subject is by no means new. At least part of my theme was put before this association almost twenty years ago by Professor H. F. Angus in his 1949 presidential address “Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences,” in which much consideration was given to advanced study abroad. In 1952 Professor J. E. Hodgetts reviewed three contemporary reports (by Professors Dawson, Watkins and Keirstead, and Macpherson) on the teaching of political science in Canada; they make gloomy reading today. We have also had the advantage of a series of papers on research in the social sciences, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council of Canada, by Messrs. Ostry, Dawson, Clark, and others.

“It appears that aggregation may be pushed much further in inventory analysis than has heretofore been generally felt justified.” Originating with P. G. Darling and confirmed by M. C. Lovell, this oft-quoted assertion has in large measure been responsible for what might be termed a “consensus” (albeit implicit) on the usefulness of aggregation in empirical inventory studies. Professors Eisner and Strotz carry this interpretation to its extreme by declaring that they “prefer, at the theoretical level, to disaggregate by motive rather than stage [of fabrication].”

The purpose of this study is to take a closer look at the role of the inventory components (i.e., finished goods, goods in process, and raw materials) in aggregate inventory behaviour. Paramount among the issues addressed is the Eisner-Strotz assertion: is it meaningful to speak (on a theoretical or empirical level) of motives for holding inventories without reference to the stages of fabrication?

According to Marxism-Leninism the “socialist reconstruction of agriculture,” or collectivization, is a necessary step in the process of building socialism and, subsequently, communism. The communists realize, however, that in a country where the peasantry constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population the process may require some time and they admit that in such cases “the socialist reconstruction of agriculture is, after the seizure of power by the working class, the most difficult task of the revolution.”

Lenin was aware of the danger inherent in collectivization and he was planning it as a gradual process. The communist leaders in Eastern Europe and in China, keeping in mind the catastrophic results of the Soviet collectivization drive in the years 1928–33, were even more convinced that they should proceed slowly, gradually, and carefully, without antagonizing the majority of peasants. They tried, as the Bolsheviks had done during the 1920's, to reduce the power of the “kulaks” (the better-off peasants who were still rather poor by Western standards) and to enlist against them the support of the poor peasants and of the rest of the society. Neither the Bolsheviks in the late 1920's nor the communists in Eastern Europe in the late 1940's and in China in the 1950's could tolerate independent producers who represented a political menace and created economic complications for the administrators and the planners. Moreover, the land reforms, which were introduced by the communists for tactical reasons although regarded by them as a retrogressive step, increased the number of small holdings below the optimum size and destroyed larger farms which had been producing the majority of marketable output. The “class struggle in the countryside” had adverse effects on productivity, even when it was limited to discrimination in taxation, in delivery quotas, in availability of credit and producers' goods, and the administrative pressure and chicanery. In many instances it went, however, far beyond these measures.

Political scientists have approached the study of administrative organizations with widely divergent purposes and modes of analysis. The early studies in this field were suffused with a desire to improve administrative institutions. Attention was centred on the “problems” of administrative accountability, red tape and inertia, administrative efficiency, and the public's low estimation of government service. Emphasis in these early studies was placed on the description of formal institutions and arrangements, since these arrangements, rather than informal behavioural patterns, were amenable to reform. This approach still characterizes the great body of literature on “public administration” in all western countries.

In the 1930s and 1940s some American political scientists began to focus their analysis on the “leadership” or “political” behaviour of top-level administrators. Rejecting the notion that public administration could be studied or taught apart from the general concerns of political science, this approach viewed administration as simply one phase in the political process. Emphasis was shifted from the internal aspects of administrative organizations to the environmental or “political” problems of these organizations. Emphasis was shifted from reform to value-free, neutral analysis. This “administrative politics” approach developed at the same time as the “behavioural revolution” in American political science and applied many aspects of that revolution to the study of public administration.

The author wishes to show that there is a political dimension to rational action—a dimension which can be expressed in terms of the power which its possessors exert on one another. This power constrains their decisions, and may he said to limit the rationality of their action, in the same way that lack of information and conflict of values hinder rational action. This dimension is absent from economic theories of rationality, especially from the theory of games. But political man cannot be treated in terms of existing notions of economic rationality, even when these are enlarged—that is to say, enfeebled—as in the work of Downs. The reason is that the power of one man over another is inherent in politics. This power must be integrated into our idea of political rationality. The solution can be found through Dahl's formula for the measurement of one man's power over another.

The author extends Dahl's formula to cover cases in which several persons exert power over each other. After identifying sixteen “rules of power” which define all possible positions in a game where each of two persons has two alternatives, he investigates various situations with the aid of these rules, showing that conventional game theory must be modified when some players compete with one another, or when they co-operate.

The ideas of power, and of rules of power, are said to be useful for a more rigorous political science, which could be divided into “macro-politics” and “micro-politics.” The concluding paragraphs of the paper contain definitions and explorations of these two terms.

In the 1962 federal election in Canada, to the great surprise of almost all political observers, the Social Credit party obtained 26 per cent of the votes in Quebec—as against 39 and 30 per cent for the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives respectively—and gained 26 of the 75 seats of the province. If one considers that in the preceding election the Social Credit Party had obtained no seats and less than one per cent of the vote, there were good reasons to be astonished.

The purpose of this paper is, first, to show in what ways the political situation at the federal level in Quebec was particularly conducive to the rise of the Social Credit party and, second, to present a general hypothesis concerning the political factors which account for the rise of third parties during other periods, and elsewhere in Canada.

To be sure, the rise of Social Credit, as well as of other third parties in Canada, was not the result of a single overriding factor. Many facets of reality—social, economic and political—were involved. In the case of Social Credit, in particular, economic “strains” were as important an independent factor as the political conditions to be discussed below. As can be seen from Table I, our survey data clearly show the strong effect of unemployment in the respondents' family, which accounts for some 30 per cent of the variation in the support of Social Credit.

For some time now, and with increasing frequency, it has been asserted that cultural differences between the two major language groups in Canada are marked and that these differences carry over into economic behaviour. On a less general plane it is also said that there are differences between patterns of consumption in Ontario and Quebec and that these differences are largely due to “cultural” and not economic factors. However, to date there has been no verification of the latter hypothesis.

There are several reasons for undertaking such a verification. First, it may make an indirect empirical contribution to the current debate about the existence and future development of a separate French-Canadian community, different from the rest of Canada in both cultural and economic aspects. Second, as far as it was possible to determine, there have been no investigations undertaken comparing regional patterns of consumption, possibly because most economically developed countries are considered homogeneous in this respect (but note, for instance, Belgium and Switzerland). Is it likely that two large groups of people living since “time immemorial” in a single economy and exposed to much the same economic and social pressures differ in important respects in their consumption patterns? And that these differences, if any, will tend to persist even after certain important economic and demographic variables have been controlled? Finally, on the commercial plane, if we can find significant differences in consumer expenditures (albeit confined in this study to major expenditure classes), sellers may be led to a conscious effort at the exploitation of regional market segments.

“The wages fund theory is the crowning instance of an untrue abstraction … and it has probably done more injury to the reputation of economic theory than any other generalization ever received into economics textbooks and then expunged from them.” These words, by James Bonar, fairly well express the view that has dominated economic thought on the wages fund doctrine for the past century. Writing forty years after Bonar, Paul Samuelson claims he has been impressed by the “falseness and emptiness of the wage fund doctrine,” stating that the controversy it inspired “constitutes one of the most sterile chapters in that dreary gap between the classical age and the revolutionary neoclassical discoveries of that last third of the nineteenth century.”

Canada had a flexible exchange rate from October 2, 1950, to May 2, 1962. Many observers have commented on the stability of the Canadian exchange rate during this period and have discussed the significance of the Canadian experience for the general debate on fixed v. flexible exchange rates. The purpose of this article is not to enter this debate directly, but rather to document the facts on stability and to examine two possible reasons for it.

Using daily data on the US/Canadian exchange rate, measures of the stability of the rate are presented in section I. In section II tests of the hypothesis that speculators were a stabilizing force are conducted, and an affirmative conclusion reached. Finally, in section III the argument is made that much of the stability may have been a result of the generally parallel courses of the Canadian and United States economies in the years from 1950 to 1962.

In recent years some economists have suggested that under a wide range of circumstances free international trade will result in a situation where each country simultaneously produces, exports, and imports products which are very close substitutes for each other in consumption, production, or both. Because of the similarity of these products they are commonly accounted for in the same statistical “industry” classification, and the resultant international pattern of production and trade can conveniently be described as “intra-industry specialization” as contrasted with “inter-industry specialization” which results when countries produce and export but do not import the output of some industries while they import but do not produce or export the output of some other industries. It was considered that in the European Common Market intra-industry specialization dominated over inter-industry specialization and that similar developments were important in the development of Benelux trade. At the same time, but independently from these two suggestions in the literature, two pieces of research produced models capable of explaining which country would tend to specialize in which of the different qualities or styles of commodities making up the international trade in products of the same industries.

In 1965, many Canadian and British writers paid tribute to the seven hundredth anniversary of the founding of the British Parliament, and this year, Canadians celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of theirs. Criticism of parliament has been vigorous and almost continuous throughout all these years, and in the midst of these celebrations Canadians are conscious of an apparent decline in the time-worn institution. On October 8, 1963, the Globe and Mail reprinted excerpts from prominent Canadian newspapers describing parliament as “a farce,” “a wasteful bore,” whose members were “incompetents and buffoons” who “had played the role of clowns.” If parliament is to remain a vital and central part of our democracy, it must be resurrected from the morass of ineffectuality into which it has fallen. Although much of the criticism can be dismissed as irresponsible because the public does not understand its workings or functions, there still remains a hard core of difficulties that must be examined.

It is now a more or less established feature of Canada's political life that many sectors of the Canadian electorate are disposed to reject the two “major” political parties in favour of “minor” party alternatives. Recently, the New Democratic party, one of these so-called minor parties, has received substantial electoral support especially in urban English Canada, to such an extent that it is now bidding either to replace one of the major parties or to join both of them in a position of relative equality. Until now, the rather scanty commentaries attempting to account for this “deviant” electoral behaviour of some Canadians have tended to be highly speculative.

This article analyses survey findings that shed some light on the NDP phenomenon in the 1960s in four cities in English Canada. It begins by examining the economic and social elements in partisan choice, emphasizing religion and class identification. Next it deals with political habits and attitudes and with party identification and issue orientation. Following this, some of the characteristics of people switching to the NDP are probed. Finally, the findings are related to other research on the topic and some limited comments about the future are made.

Although the interrelationship between socio-economic characteristics and electoral behaviour in Canadian elections is widely recognized, only recently have attempts been made to evaluate these interactions in a precise manner. The approaches used so far vary in methodology–using both interviews and voting results–and in the level of analysis–ranging from poll to constituency to province to nation. The results depend to some extent on the research approach. Particularly strong variations exist in the effects of social variables in different provinces and different constituencies.

This study presents another research alternative, using multiple regression techniques to combine census small-area information with voting results at the poll level. Although the strengths and weaknesses of this approach are discussed in detail by Meisel and Paquet, few Canadian studies have yet exploited its potential return. Problems of sampling and of variations in candidates and issues among constituencies are replaced by the difficulties of ecological correlation, but the use of regression procedures allows the evaluation of the predictive power of the explanatory variables.

1965 was one of the worst years for the United Nations. Its prestige was low; its critics were vocal. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, few world leaders were ready to say that the organization was useless or even in real danger of dissolution. President Johnson's appointment of Mr. Justice Goldberg as UN ambassador- and Mr. Goldberg's acceptance of the position-were among many indications of agreement that the United Nations has something more than ceremonial significance. Of course, the mere continuing existence of any international organization, even the most rudimentary and technically oriented kind, may do good and is unlikely to do harm. The more optimistic will see a developing world community, and, if such a thing is emerging, the United Nations surely has some share in the process. This paper would like to suggest that, apart from any hopes for the future, the United Nations performs a unique and important function for the world to today. Such a tough-minded national leader as Lyndon Johnson, concerned before all else with national self-interest, has indicated his awareness that the organization has a real contribution to make for his nation.

A recurring lament in commemorations of classic works is that they are so well known that little remains to be said about them. This is certainly not true of Marx's Capital. Its difficult method of presentation, the numerous myths about it which have grown up over the years, and recent tendencies to mathematicize popular conceptions of Marxian economics in lieu of digging into Marx's own writings have together made this work almost as little understood today as it has ever been. Böhm-Bawerk's famous “refutation” of Marx's “labour theory of value” continues to be reproduced, along with the economic “breakdown” of capitalism theory, the “dialectical” forces at work, and all the old familiar cast of fictitious characters. If one accepts the cynical definition of a classic as a work that everyone talks about and no one reads, there is certainly no more classic work in economics than Capital. The hundredth anniversary of its publication seems an appropriate time to reexamine not only the book itself but also the beliefs about it which have acquired a life-almost an immortality-of their own.

In 1960, the first major decision of any doctrinal importance concerning mergers under section 32 of the Combines Investigation Act was handed down in the Supreme Court of Ontario. This decision established that there is no merger problem under the Act unless the fusion of firms creates a monopoly situation. Such a test, aside from being incomprehensible in economic terms, is based on a narrow legal premise (that may or may not be legally correct) which, taken together with the decision in R. v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. and the inexplicable decision of the Crown to appeal neither case, has resulted in complete emasculation of the merger section of the Act. In effect, mergers have ceased to become an economic problem.

The purpose of this paper is to reevaluate the Brewing case solely in terms of economic criteria, by putting economic flesh on the bones of the statutory offence: “merger … which has operated or is likely to operate to the detriment or against the interest of the public.” Such criteria as will be erected are generally applicable to the section because here the application of appropriate economic criteria requires not so much a change in the Act as a better and more sophisticated treatment in the courts.

The studies of non-voting made in the United States and Europe have firmly established that failure to vote is associated with conflicting political preferences, with lack of interest in politics, with low position on the social stratification scale, with a feeling of political powerlessness and, to a lesser extent, with sex (women voting usually less than men) and with age (the very young and the very old voting less than the average). But while identifying the causes of non-voting these studies have been unable to determine with any precision the true level of voluntary non-voting and the relative size of the various groups of non-voters. The reason for this failure is in the non-coincidence of four types of electoral universes used and often confused during the research and the analysis: (a) the universe of the cases studied; (b) the universe of the sample (when the research is done by sampling, as is normally the case); (c) the electors registered on the rolls and thus able to vote; and (d) the potential electors. Unless there is a close coincidence between these four universes, determining the true level of electoral participation and the relative importance of the various types of non-voters becomes an open confrontation between hard data and guess work.

Although most of this essay relates to the work of political scientists, some of it deals with the writings of others who have contributed to our understanding of the government and politics of Canada. It would be a perverse and superficial student of our political institutions indeed who confined himself to the scholarship of political scientists without familiarizing himself at least in a general way with the writings, for example, of historians Ramsay Cook and W. L. Morton, sociologists S. D. Clark and John Porter, economists John Dales and Harry Johnson, legal scholars Edward McWhinney and Frank Scott, and, outside the bounds of Academia proper, journalists Peter Newman and Claude Ryan, and practising public administrators A. W. Johnson and Herbert Balls.

The Stolper-Samuelson theorem asserts that an ad valorem import tariff (in a two-commodity, two-factor country) will bring about a more than proportionate rise in the price of the corresponding “intensive” factor in that industry. On the other hand, Rybczynski establishes the proposition that an increase in the labour force with constant aggregate endowment of the other productive factor (in a two-commodity, two-factor country) results in a greater than proportionate increase in the output of the labour-intensive commodity and an actual decline in the total output of the other commodity when the terms of trade are held constant. Jones has recently pointed out in this Journal the dual nature of the relationship between the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski effect.

One of the most interesting periods of Canadian economic history is that which encompasses the years 1890 to 1929. During this period, the prairie provinces were largely settled, new staple exports emerged, and regional interdependence increased. Any explanation of national economic growth over these years, then, necessarily involves an examination of the different responses among regions to these new sources of growth. In essence, we are asking the question: what is the relation between the spatial reallocation of economic activity and the growth of the Canadian economy over this period? To answer this question and to look at some of its implications, regional (provincial) gross-value-added estimates for selected years were made.

Regional estimates of gross value added were made for the years 1890, 1910, and 1929. These three years were chosen to satisfy, as closely as possible, the condition that they represent a similar level of economic activity at each point of time. These years were chosen since they are all years of relatively high economic activity. The first two years faced the additional constraint that they had to coincide with census dates. The choice of years of high level economic activity was made in order to avoid biases in the trend rates of growth which would arise if the initial and terminal dates were at different phases of the business cycle. For example, if the initial year coincided with a year of high unemployment and the terminal year low unemployment, then an upward bias in growth rates might have occurred. Initial and terminal dates chosen at the trough of business cycles would also have avoided this potential slope bias.