¹ Rusk, Dean, “Parliamentary Diplomacy—Debate vs. Negotiation,” World Affairs Interpreter, 26 (1955), 121–38.Google Scholar Some writers attribute the term to Philip Jessup (for instance, Nicholas, H. G., The United Nations as a Political Institution (Oxford, 1963), 123)Google Scholar but Dr.Jessup, himself credits Mr.Rusk, in “Parliamentary Diplomacy,’ Receuil des Cours, Hague Academy of International Law, 89 (1956), 185.Google Scholar

² Sydney D. Bailey notes that a substantial number of items of business of the General Assembly fail to produce resolutions, and that many resolutions themselves are “formal or procedural,” lacking in substantive content. He suggests that in many cases it might be preferable not to vote on a resolution. The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice (New York, 1960), 157–8.Google Scholar

³ Compare the formulation by Haas, Ernst in “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,’ in Hekhuis, Dale J., McClintock, Charles G., and Burns, Arthur L., eds., International Stability: Military, Economic and Political Dimensions (New York, 1964), 232–3.Google Scholar In this piece Haas suggests that parliamentary diplomacy “mobilizes political mediatory forces-the uncommitted states, parties, groups, or persons-whose voice in the settlement process is given volume by the reluctance of the parties to the dispute to annoy the mediating forces.” This is probably too optimistic.

⁴ Stability is seen as a prerequisite for progress, not as an alternative to it. See ibid., esp. 9-15.

⁵ Cyprus's second encounter with United Nations, begun in 1964, has been chiefly with the Security Council. Here attention is on problems which have already dislodged the precarious stability of the world.

⁶ There is not yet a reliable account of the Cyprus struggle even until the 1959 settlement. A British-oriented account is succinctly presented in the British Information Services' pamphlet Cyprus (London, 1960)Google Scholar and a surprisingly objective pro-Cypriot account can be found in Alastos's, Doros Cyprus Guerilla (London, 1960).Google Scholar

⁷ The substantive text of the resolution reads as follows: “[The General Assembly] Expresses its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accord with the Charter of the United Nations.” General Assembly Official Records, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 68, p. 19.

⁸ Eden, , Memoirs, I, Full Circle (London, 1960), 395–6Google Scholar, and Doros, , Cyprus Guerilla, 41–2.Google Scholar

⁹ Woodhouse, C. M., “Greece,’ Annual Register 1955 (London, 1956), 263–5Google Scholar, and the British White Paper, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cmd. 9594, The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus (London, 10 1955).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Secretary of State for the Colonies, Cmd. 9708, Correspondence exchanged between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios (London, 03 1956).Google Scholar

¹¹ Great Britain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cmd. 455, Discussion on Cyprus in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization September-October, 1958 (London, 10 1958).Google Scholar

¹² Beloff, Max, New Dimensions in Foreign Policy (London, 1961), 74.Google Scholar Beloff is inclined to give NATO a good deal of credit for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

¹³ London Times, Jan. 17, 19, and 23 and Feb. 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 12, 1959.

¹⁴ Eden, , Memoirs, I, 398, 404 and 405.Google Scholar

¹⁵ On December 11 after the (secret) beginning of talks, the lead editorial in the Times was talking only of “Another Chance,” and in gloomy tones.

¹⁶ SirFoot, Hugh, A Start in Freedom (London, 1964), 164.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Pipinelis, Panayotis, “The Greco-Turkish Feud Revived,’ Foreign Affairs, XXXVII, no. 2 (01 1958), 313.Google Scholar

¹⁸ New York Times, March 13, 1956. We might compare here General Grivas's rage as head of EOKA at Greece's relatively restrained response to the act. Charles Foley, ed., Memoirs of General Grivas (London 1964), 65. Pipinelis gives a relevant account of Greek ideas about America's strategic valuation of Greece and Turkey. “The Greco-Turkish Feud Revived,” 311. And for the objective line-up of Greek and Turkish military strength, assumed by all to be relevent in American decisions, see the Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Strength of the U.S.S.R. and the NATO Powers,“ Political Quarterly, XXXI, no. 1 (01-March 1960), 71–88.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Foot, , A Start in Freedom, 177 Google Scholar, and Grivas, , Memoirs, 178–85.Google Scholar

²⁰ On each of the following occasions an interested member will be able to make at least one statement: During the General Debate, in a (written) request for placement on the Agenda (or supplement or reply to such a request), in the General Committee hearing on the request, during the Assembly discussion of the General Committee's Agenda recommendations, in the Committee of referral, and finally when the Committee reports to the Plenary Session. The Committee discussion is the lengthiest, but especially on a matter's first appearance before the Assembly, each stage is likely to include lengthy arguments and counter-arguments. In addition, every vote (and one is possible at all but the first two stages) may be given a substantial “explanation.”

²¹ In 1955, the Assembly voted not to place the question of Cyprus on the Agenda, but there had been considerable discussion both in the General Committee and in the Assembly. In 1954, 1956, 1957, and 1958 procedure was as indicated in n. 20.

²² General Assembly Official Records, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Session, 758th Meeting (09 25, 1958), 148.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid., 756th Meeting (Sept. 24, 1958), 119.

²⁴ Ibid., Ninth Session, Annexes, United Nations Document A/2703, p. 1, sec. 1.

²⁵ Ibid., Thirteenth Session, Plenary Session, 769th Meeting (Oct. 3, 1958), 314.

²⁶ Ibid., Thirteenth Session, First Committee, 1000th Meeting (December 4, 1958), 312.

²⁷ Of course, the prediction of international reaction will be only one of many elements entering into a policy decision. It may, however-as it seems to have been in the case of Greece's actions about Cyprus-be a crucial element, tipping the balance decisively. (For an interesting schematization of the sorts of influences that set the stage for a decision, see Rosenau, James N., “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Farrell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill., 1966), esp. Table 2 on p. 48).Google Scholar

²⁸ Karl W. Deutsch has some interesting remarks to make about the possibility of a “professional diplomat with long residence abroad” being able to “predict from familiarity.” Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 86–7.Google Scholar

²⁹ For a very useful statement of similar notions about prediction, see McClintoek, Charles K., Hekhuis, Dale J., Burns, Arthur L., and Tucker, Robert C., “A Pragmatic Approach to International Stability,” in Hekhuis, et al, eds., International Stability, esp. notes 7 and 8, pp. 13–15.Google Scholar

³⁰ See for instance Dinerstein, Herbert S., “The Transformation of Alliance Systems,” American Political Science Review, LIX, no. 3 (09 1965), 589–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Mr. Dinerstein discusses in passing the second phase of the Cyprus problem (from 1963 on) but seems to oversimplify the relationship of Greece and Turkey with the United States.

³¹ See Eden, Anthony, Memoirs, II, Facing the Dictators (Cambridge, Mass., 1964)Google Scholar, passim for mutual international incomprehension, and Eden's conclusion (p. 689): “nor did the dictatorships believe in the will of the democracies to act as they had pledged.”

³² See Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of Government (New York, 1963), esp. 148–50.Google Scholar

³³ The argument of this paper, of course, supports universal membership and participation in the General Assembly, especially for hostile powers who would not otherwise meet except in the parliamentary-style regional international organizations, where membership is based on at least partial shared interest.

³⁴ The members of the Soviet bloc limit the legitimacy of the United Nations to just such formally stated and sanctioned governmental acts. See Morawiecki, Wojciech, “Some Problems Connected with the Organs of International Organization,” International Organization, XIX, no. 4, (Autumn 1965), 913–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This suggests that their obvious appreciation of the organization (inferred from their continued participation) may be based on an argument similar to this paper's.

³⁵ See George, Alexander E., Propaganda Analysis (Evanston, 1959)Google Scholar, on the whole problem of deliberately slanted messages.

³⁶ See, for instance, the rather heated exchange about population statistics for Cyprus, between Zorlu, M. for Turkey and Averoff-Tossizza, M. for Greece, General Assembly Official Records, Thirteenth Session, First Committee, 997th and 998th Meetings (11 26 and 27, 1958), 256, 258, 259.Google Scholar

³⁷ Hadwen, John G. and Kaufman, Johan write that “a governmental position stated in detail and in public becomes difficult and frequently impossible to change, whereas in private negotiations there is less need for ‘face-saving.’ An individual can withdraw an opinion he has expressed. It is more difficult for a government.” How United Nations Decisions are Made (Leyden, 1960), 54.Google Scholar This intended criticism of public statements seen as negotiation suggests their value as information which cannot be denied or withdrawn.

³⁸ General Assembly Official Records, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Session, 769th Meeting (10 3, 1958), 311–15.Google Scholar Greece's request for inscription that session confirmed the impression of the relatively moderate General Debate speech; it was a legalistic discussion of self-determination. Ibid., Thirteenth Session, Annexes Agenda Item 68, United Nations Documents A/3874 and A/3974 Add. 1, Aug. 15 and Sept. 13, 1958.

³⁹ Foot, , A Start in Freedom, 176–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ In a series of articles Mr. Chadwick Alger has discussed the less obvious influences on international relations of the parliamentary style activities of the United Nations. He suggests that the participating national leaders will experience changes in affiliation, style, and procedural preferences, and that a sort of “intergovernmental society” builds up around problems considered under such conditions. He is interested, however, chiefly in the more private side effects of parliamentary procedure on international relations-the more elusive and diffuse aspects, that have only an indirect impact on policy making. See his “Personal Contact in Intergovernmental Organizations,” in Kelman, Herbert C., ed., International Behaviour (New York, 1965), 546 Google Scholar, and particularly his most general article on the subject, “Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, V. no. 2 (06 1961), 126–45.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Karl W. Deutsch on “limit signals” about “limit probabilities,” warnings of obstructions. The Nerves of Government, 212-13.

⁴² Haas, Ernst, “Dynamic Environment and Static System-Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations,” in Kaplan, Morton, ed., The Revolution in World Politics (New York, 1962), esp. 267–8.Google Scholar

⁴³ Grivas, , Memoirs, esp. 166, 186.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Ibid., 65, 92, 170.

⁴⁵ Turkish jets buzzed and later bombed the island, but there was no Greek counter-attack. See New York Times, 12 1963, and Aug. 1964.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Conor Cruise O'Brien employs Dean Rusk's term much as he does himself to describe using the special facilities of the General Assembly. “Conflicting Concepts of the United Nations,” The Correspondent, no. 34 (Spring-Summer 1965), 23.Google Scholar See also Murphy, Robert in Diplomat among Warriors (New York, 1965), 404, 412.Google Scholar O'Brien and Murphy are, of course, also professional diplomats.

⁴⁷ For instance, Robert McIver compares the eclipse of the Security Council by the General Assembly to “the process through which, in so many countries, the ‘common’ or representative body gradually enlarged its prerogatives over the ‘upper house’ or aristocratic council.” The Nations and the United Nations (New York, 1960), 81.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See, for example, Mr. Ernst Haas's criticism of the organization for its failure to “increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its members” or to achieve “systemic autonomy,” and his use of resolutions and votes as indications of lack of progress in these respects. The indices are very parliamentary and the suggestion is of a parliamentary model. (“Dynamic Environment and Static System,” esp. 281, 305, and 307). Other scholars who discuss the United Nations as a sort of failed Concert of Powers or collective security system nevertheless are likely to find the organization's one redeeming feature to be the partial creation of a world wide consensus through the (parliamentary) debates in the General Assembly. For example, Inis L. Claude, Jr., ends a careful analysis of possible functions of an international “Great Debate” with praise of the “process of deliberation” as part of the means to achieve “the kind of order for which decent men yearn.” Swords into Plowshares (New York, 1964).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ This is also a standard complaint about national legislatures, but they of course have compensating powers of “control of government activity” that are meaningless when translated to the United Nations. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliaments: A Comparative Study on Structure and Function of Representative Institutions in Forty-One Countries (New York, 1963), esp. 398.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ For instance, Senator J. William Fulbright says that the General Assembly “bears no relationship to the realities of world power. A body in which Guatemala or Bulgaria exercises the same voting power as the United States or the Soviet Union can scarcely be expected to serve as a reliable instrument of peace enforcement or even of consultation.” Theobald, Robert, ed., The United Nations Reconsidered (New York, 1955), 63.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Recently we have seen a number of interesting attempts to apply to international organizations some of the analytical methods newly developed for the study of national legislatures and party systems. For instance, see Alker, Hayward R. Jr. and Russett, Bruce M., World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven, 1965).Google Scholar The authors find that distinct limits are set on their work by failures of resemblance between national and international politics (see 148-9 and 280-90, especially the implications of n. 16 on p. 290).

⁵² The effort to use this notion of world public opinion along with the customary parliamentary pattern of majority/minority decision leads to some odd contortions, as when a Greek analysis of votes about Cyprus drew a distinction between a “majority in the formal sense,” and “the formal majority or the … majority of consciences.” General Assembly Official Records, Tenth Session, Plenary Session, 521st Meeting (09 23, 1955), 53.Google Scholar The vote in question had been seven ayes, four nays, four abstentions.

⁵³ Hans Morgenthau gives a criticism of parliamentary diplomacy in which three out of the four points amount to decrying its more “parliamentary” aspects. However, he notes the defects and not the values of “publicity,” in spite of an appreciation of classical diplomacy that fits well with the virtues I see in the parliamentary version. Politics among Nations (New York, 1948), 431–45.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Alger, , “Non-Resolution Consequences,” 130.Google Scholar