Article contents
Collectivization and Economic Development*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
Extract
According to Marxism-Leninism the “socialist reconstruction of agriculture,” or collectivization, is a necessary step in the process of building socialism and, subsequently, communism. The communists realize, however, that in a country where the peasantry constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population the process may require some time and they admit that in such cases “the socialist reconstruction of agriculture is, after the seizure of power by the working class, the most difficult task of the revolution.”
Lenin was aware of the danger inherent in collectivization and he was planning it as a gradual process. The communist leaders in Eastern Europe and in China, keeping in mind the catastrophic results of the Soviet collectivization drive in the years 1928–33, were even more convinced that they should proceed slowly, gradually, and carefully, without antagonizing the majority of peasants. They tried, as the Bolsheviks had done during the 1920's, to reduce the power of the “kulaks” (the better-off peasants who were still rather poor by Western standards) and to enlist against them the support of the poor peasants and of the rest of the society. Neither the Bolsheviks in the late 1920's nor the communists in Eastern Europe in the late 1940's and in China in the 1950's could tolerate independent producers who represented a political menace and created economic complications for the administrators and the planners. Moreover, the land reforms, which were introduced by the communists for tactical reasons although regarded by them as a retrogressive step, increased the number of small holdings below the optimum size and destroyed larger farms which had been producing the majority of marketable output. The “class struggle in the countryside” had adverse effects on productivity, even when it was limited to discrimination in taxation, in delivery quotas, in availability of credit and producers' goods, and the administrative pressure and chicanery. In many instances it went, however, far beyond these measures.
Deux arguments contradictoires sont prônés en faveur de la collectivisation. Aucun ne s'avère en accord avec les faits observés à date. Selon le premier argument, la collectivisation est nécessaire pour que l'agriculture soit temporairement sacrifiée au bénéfice de l'industrie en expansion. Elle aide à accroître l'épargne forcée et à la diriger vers l'industrie. Elle favorise aussi le passage de la main-d'oeuvre de l'agriculture à l'industrie et elle accroît la proportion de la production qui doit être mise en marché. Cependant, l'épargne des paysans provient du travail additionnel de toute la famille et d'une réduction volontaire de la consommation à un niveau qui ne peut être imposé. Cette addition nette aux fonds disponibles pour fin d'investissement disparaît lorsque le processus d'accumulation tombe aux mains de l'Etat. Comme l'établissement du collectivisme requiert du capital, le transfert n'est pas très considérable. Le transfert de la main-d'oeuvre dépend d'autres facteurs: le stimulant n'était pas nécessaire et a eu des résultats excessifs; la productivité du travail est demeurée faible; même si des campagnes de recrutement furent facilitées, d'autres mesures eurent été suffisantes. Même si la collectivisation accroît la proportion de la production qui est mise en marché, son volume absolu ne doit pas nécessairement être plus considérable. La « décollectivisation » en Pologne n'a pas réduit la part destinée au marché, mais la production a augmenté. Le volume de la production destinée au marché dépend des incitations et delà stabilité.
Selon le second argument, la collectivisation est une mesure visant à la modernisation et à l'expansion immédiates de Vagriculture. Les faits révèlent cependant que la stagnation et même le déclin de la production en constituent le résultat en courte période. Même les pays relativement développés ont éprouvé des difficultés dans leurs efforts tendant simultanément à la collectivisation et à Vindustrialisation et n'ont pu allier collectivisation et modernisation de Vagriculture. Les conditions en Europe, en Chine et, jusqu'à un certain point, en Union Soviétique ne sont pas propices à la culture extensive. Les grandes unités ne sont pas un pré-requis à la modernisation et la collectivisation ne crée pas nécessairement des fermes de dimension optimale. Toujours dangereuse en courte période, la collectivisation n'accélère pas le taux de croissance en longue période.
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- Information
- Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , February 1967 , pp. 1 - 15
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1967
Footnotes
This paper is an abbreviated part of a larger study. It is based on research which has been made possible by several Canada Council grants.
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