Since deregulation in 1980, there has been a major shift in antitrust enforcement to the states, specifically to state attorneys general (AGs). For advocates of deregulation, this move has had important unintended consequences. Specifically, it has allowed antitrust litigation to become hitched to the political incentives of AGs. Analysis of a panel dataset of all state antitrust actions between 1990 and 2008 suggests that antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general appears to follow electoral cycles, which is especially pronounced depending on specific institutional constraints that exist between the states.

In recent decades, both South Korea and Taiwan have made remarkable leaps in the development and production of semiconductors-the core element in burgeoning global telecommunications, computer, and computer equipment industries. Although many aspects of their sectoral industrial strategies have differed, both countries are now moving aggressively to adapt their semiconductor industries to turbulent global markets. In the wake of the severe regional financial crisis that began in 1997, this case study compares and contrasts continuing processes of adaptation among primary semiconductor manufacturers in the two countries. The crisis had observable effects, especially in Korea, but it was not deep enough to force fundamental adjustments in either country. In the early days of the industry in both places, a sense of vulnerability-the need to come from behind-gave rise to quite different corporate structures and attendant strategies. Remarkable differences persist in the ways in which the South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor firms are seeking new advantages in rapidly changing regional and global markets. Strategic change and structural continuity mark the attempt of two relatively small countries to stay competitive in a key industry.

Private firms are increasingly being regarded as moral agents of their stakeholders and the broader public. Stakeholders can use different types of evaluation organizations to monitor this division of moral labor, but must also monitor the credibility of this second layer of moral agents. This paper uses agency, signaling, and legitimacy theory to develop a novel conceptual framework showing how both firms and evaluation organizations send signals of their credibility as moral agents to earn grants of legitimacy from their moral stakeholders. The paper also describes how three specific characteristics of ratings and certifications – transparency, expertise, and independence – may signal different forms of credibility, appeal to particular stakeholder groups, and elicit different forms of legitimacy. A content analysis of the websites of 245 eco-labels, sustainability ratings and other forms of environmental evaluations reveals the multi-dimensional nature of these three characteristics, and finds that transparency is the most commonly-sent signal of credibility, followed by independence and then expertise. These results highlight the complexity of existing signals of credibility, and suggest several strategies – including voluntary credibility standards and a virtual information marketplace – that both private and public actors can pursue to improve the quality and accessibility of these signals of credibility.

While studies show a consistent negative relationship between the level of corruption and range indicators of national-level economic performance, including sovereign credit ratings, we know less about the relationship between corruption and subnational credit ratings. This study suggests that federal transfers allow states with higher levels of corruption to retain good credit ratings, despite the negative economic implications of corruption more broadly, which also allows them to continue to borrow at low costs. Using data on corruption conviction in US states and credit ratings between 2001 and 2015, we show that corruption does not directly reduce credit ratings on average. We find, however, heterogeneous effects, in that there is a negative effect of corruption on credit ratings only in states that have a comparatively low level of fiscal dependence on federal transfers. This suggest that while less dependent states are punished by international assessors when seen as more corrupt, corruption does not affect the ratings of states with higher levels of fiscal dependence on federal revenue.

The private prison industry is a multi-million-dollar industry that has increasingly profited from the detention of undocumented immigrants. As a government contractor, therefore, the industry has a natural interest in government decision making, including legislation that can affect its expansion into immigrant detention. In this article, we examine the relationship between campaign donations made on behalf of the private prison industry and an untested form of position taking—bill cosponsorship—in the US House of Representatives. We hypothesize the private prison industry will reward House members for taking positions that benefit the industry. We also hypothesize the private prison industry will also reward House members who incur greater political risk by taking positions out of sync with the party. To test our hypotheses, we focus on punitive immigration legislation that has the potential to increase the supply of immigrant detainees over the course of eight years. We find support for our second hypothesis, that private prison companies are more likely to reward House Democrats who cosponsor punitive immigration policies even after accounting for possible endogeneity. The findings have important implications regarding the relationship between House members and private interests.

In recent years a range of public policy (Howlett 2000) and international relations (Cutler et al., 1999; Hurd, 1999; Haufler, 2001) scholars have devoted attention to the emergence of voluntary (Kernaghan 1999; Prakash 1999), market-based, and “private” regulatory regimes that have emerged to address matters of concern to global civil society that previously were largely addressed through state-centered public policy instruments and processes.

In recent years programs of private regulation have spread from North America and Europe to developing countries around the world. Though central to debates over public versus private international governance, little is known about the actual operations of these programs, especially in developing countries where weak state regulation has failed for decades to control environmental degradation. This paper assesses the effectiveness in Argentina of two prominent global private environmental regulatory programs'the chemical industry's Responsible Care® program and the Forest Stewardship Council. Argentina presents an intriguing country case because, despite conditions and policies that should support such programs, their implementation there has been stunted when compared against other regional cases. A focus on the demand and supply factors that shape these programs in Argentina reveals that market demand is a necessary but insufficient condition for regime effectiveness. Supply-side factors such as industry characteristics, public policies, and the institutional culture of firms significantly influence program implementation. Some transnational corporations helped export these program to Argentina; however, many others have shown opposition or disinterest, stifling program development. Also, feckless and unstable state agencies have created an institutional environment unfavorable even for private initiatives aimed at bypassing government interference.

As the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) continues to grow, policymakers are increasingly grappling with the question of how to regulate this technology. The most far-reaching international initiative is the European Union (EU) AI Act, which aims to establish the first comprehensive, binding framework for regulating AI. In this article, we offer the first systematic analysis of non-state actor preferences toward international regulation of AI, focusing on the case of the EU AI Act. Theoretically, we develop an argument about the regulatory preferences of business actors and other non-state actors under varying conditions of AI sector competitiveness. Empirically, we test these expectations using data from public consultations on European AI regulation. Our findings are threefold. First, all types of non-state actors express concerns about AI and support regulation in some form. Second, there are nonetheless significant differences across actor types, with business actors being less concerned about the downsides of AI and more in favor of lax regulation than other non-state actors. Third, these differences are more pronounced in countries with stronger commercial AI sectors. Our findings shed new light on non-state actor preferences toward AI regulation and point to challenges for policymakers balancing competing interests in society.

This study examines the relationships between deregulation, business strategy (low cost, differentiation, and scope), size, and firm performance in the U.S. airline industry based on archival data for the Major, National, and Large Regional air carriers in the U.S. from 1972 to 1995. Cross-sectional time series regression analysis shows that deregulation had a significant impact on the strategic choices made by airlines. Results also support a significant relationship between business strategy and firm performance. Further, the study found that firm size moderates the environment-business strategy relationship and the business strategy-firm performance relationship, thereby supporting the salience of firm size as a contingency variable in strategy studies.

Over the last 20 years, developing countries have witnessed the increased role of non-governmental actors such as health industry associations and umbrella organizations in the diffusion and governance of health innovation. Utilizing extensive interviews with actors in the Indian and South African health industries, this paper argues that, in a context of emerging pluralism – i.e., a dynamic context of bargaining between competing (public and private) interests and values – these associations constitute public actors that play dual roles in the politics of innovation and development. Specifically, not only do they engage downstream by diffusing knowledge to their respective health innovation systems in order to achieve common objectives, they also engage upstream with their governments to co-develop policies and regulations. This dual role of health industry associations and umbrella organizations makes them less neutral politically but more effective institutionally, and their innovative and political role should be seriously taken into account in the healthcare sector.

This special issue focuses on the difficulties of negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), with contributions by scholars from different perspectives. This introductory article briefly examines the trend to mega-FTAs of which TTIP is a leading example. It then reviews the contributions to this special issue, drawing on an analytical approach that reflects extant work on transnational and transgovernmental relations. This approach, we contend, helps to understand the stark mismatch between the desire of some parties to negotiate binding trade rules on behind-the-border regulatory policies in certain key sectors of national economies and the progress made in TTIP talks. We then highlight the significance of some key actors in a case study of failed E.U. attempts to include financial sector reforms and associated regulatory processes in TTIP.

In the 1990s, there was a lot of concern in studies of post-communism about communist-era managers stalling institutional reforms due to their ability to gain long-term advantages through institutional capture. By influencing market governance rules (corporate governance, bankruptcy, competition laws), managers could protect and amplify initial economic gains from liberalization, entrenching economic inequality. Yet in the 2000s, even the laggards of transition have implemented significant market governance reforms and have enjoyed rapid economic growth. Moreover, business perceptions of state capture (from BEEPS) have dropped substantially. The paper examines this surprising turnaround with evidence from the Romanian case. I argue that contrary to expectations, business interests have failed to capture market governance institutions. In spite of benefiting from shady privatization deals and other advantages based on political connections, the new Romanian entrepreneurs were not threatened by sophisticated market governance laws. This argument based on the preferences of business actors is a necessary addition to explanations of institutional reforms that rely on international conditionality or on economic crisis.

Private regulations are often presented as low-cost and flexible institutions that can act as policy incubators. In this article, I question under which conditions they go beyond legal compliance and experiment with new rules. Based on a content analysis of 126 data privacy regulations adopted between 1995 and 2016 in the European Union and the United States and thirty-five semistructured interviews, I show that most private regulations include no regulatory novelties. By disaggregating the temporal and spatial distribution of the few novelties, I add nuance to this overall finding and show that private regulations adopted in the United States before 2000 experimented more than others. I argue that this variation reflects the different demands for private regulation in the two jurisdictions and their evolution over time. In the European Union, the early adoption of privacy laws led public regulators and businesses to look for private regulations to reduce transaction costs and thus limited their interest in experimenting with new requirements. In the United States, businesses hoped to gain a first-mover advantage by including new data privacy rules in their private regulations. However, the growing use of private regulations to ease transnational data flows also led to their use as tools to reduce transaction costs.

The myriad applications of artificial intelligence (AI) by the private and public sectors have exploded in the public consciousness in the postpandemic period. However, researchers and businesses have been working on AI technology applications for decades, and in many ways, governments are rushing to catch up. This article presents an argument that the future of AI policy in the United States will be driven in large part by current and future state-level policy experiments. This argument is presented by drawing on scholarship surrounding federalism, regulatory fragmentation, and the effects of fragmentation on business and social equity. The article then presents the case of autonomous vehicle policy in the states to illustrate the degree of current fragmentation and considers the effects of layering new AI policies on top of existing rules surrounding privacy, licensing, and more. Following this consideration of existing research and its application of AI policy, the article presents a research agenda for leveraging state differences to study the effects of AI policy and develop a cohesive framework for governing AI.

For more than a decade, political science scholars have stressed the harmonizing effect of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Recent implementation practices in developing countries, however, have challenged this view. In this article, I argue that different manifestations of innovation systems can lead to varying patterns of innovation. I substantiate this claim through a comparison between the pharmaceutical sectors of India and Brazil. Drawing on the NSI approach, my analysis reveals that different forms of state engagement have played a decisive role for the varying directions of post-TRIPs pharmaceutical innovation in the two countries. The article illustrates that developing countries can opt for different approaches to innovation even after TRIPs and that the socioeconomic effects of global IP regimes can only be assessed properly when taking into account the country-specific configurations of national innovation systems.

The paper illustrates a practical framework for understanding and predicting political economy risk for project managers operating in a variety of developing country settings, including non-democracies, ethnically diverse environments and societies undergoing political transition. In doing so, the paper also develops a number of novel cases illustrating the effectiveness of this framework in helping us understand both surprising success and failure in the realms of sustainable, private sector and human development. These cases include Tata Nano's difficulties in locating its automobile plant in West Bengal, how a small NGO, the Mehta Foundation, helped secure passage of green fuel mandates in Delhi over strong political opposition, and the sustained success of Mexico's pioneering conditional cash transfer program-Progressa/Oportunidades – in an environment of dramatic political regime change.

Since the 1970s many firms expanded their operations across national borders and were restructured to fit the changing economic conditions during these times of economic globalization. Using a sociological approach to transnational firms, in this article the authors research the consequences of these developments for the responsibility of two transnational firms towards their employees in the Netherlands. These firms experienced a shift in their dual embeddedness in national and transnational economic fields, with the latter gaining importance. In response, they adjusted their corporate policies and structure to fit the competitive conditions of these fields, causing a centralization of their corporate labor policy on the transnational level, the polarization of this policy and the instrumentalization of labor and labor policy. This also meant that their responsibility for their employees was restructured and reduced.

This study examines the effects of two major environmental jolts, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, on strategic change and performance in the U.S. air carrier industry. The sample includes the Major U.S. air carriers during two periods of time: deregulation (1974-1986) and 9/11/2001 (1997-2008). Data were collected from archival sources and analyzed using cross-sectional time series regressions with fixed effects. The results show that following both environmental jolts, the initial response of the airlines was emphasis on cost control. However, over the long run, there was a deceleration of the emphasis on cost control. Further, following deregulation, the long run response involved the acceleration of differentiation change. We also found a significant relationship between strategic change and firm performance. The results contribute towards a reconciliation of the conflicting predictions of the repetitive momentum hypothesis and the deceleration hypothesis.

Current explanations of demand for anti-dumping protections focus on the role of the business cycle, and fluctuations in real exchange rates. However, empirical evidence supporting these explanations is based primarily on the experience of industrialized countries. Here, we examine anti-dumping petitions in a broader sample of thirty-four industrialized and middle income countries from 1978–2015. We also propose a new determinant of demand for anti-dumping petitions—changes in the pattern of industrial production between developed and developing economies over this period have contributed to deindustrialization in advanced economies and premature industrialization some developing countries. These changes threaten established industries and motivate them to demand protection.