Taxation reform has dominated Australian politics over the past twenty-five years. Despite this prominence on the political agenda, until recently Australian governments have lacked the capacity to consolidate key elements of this tax reform agenda. While the problematic nature of Australian tax reform can be explained in part by macro-level variables, this protracted policy deadlock has also influenced historical patterns of business-government intermediation. The article argues that the evolution of the Australian tax policy network over the study period was prompted by both associational and state actors reassessing their strategies in the context of the political failure of tax reform proposals. These developments provide empirical insights into the ongoing debate relating to the factors which lead to the formation and evolution of sectoral level policy networks. The article concludes that while the increasing levels of business mobilization experienced over the study period enhanced the electoral viability of reform proposals, these new patterns of sectoral business politics should be regarded as a consequence of the policy deadlock relating to tax reform rather than primary cause of policy change.

The globalization of production and finance is responsible for much of the variation in political contestation over exchange rates since the end of Bretton Woods. On the one hand, globalization increases the salience of the policy decisions that affect exchange rates, as more firms and their workers engage more in international trade and compete more against imports. On the other hand, globalization offers firms a myriad of opportunities to manage their exchange rate risk, through operational and financial hedging. But hedging is available to only certain types of economic actors and in certain situations of exchange rate risk. In this way, globalization has redrawn traditional political cleavages on exchange rates. This argument is tested with an original survey of US firms, labor unions, and trade associations on their preferences and political activity on exchange rate policy.

Legality of abortion has been one of the most controversial political initiatives in modern times, which also impacts the healthcare delivery system especially for women. The debate often devolves into disagreement on either access to services on demand from healthcare providers or service refusal regardless of the circumstances. However, the reality is different from this bipolar conversation. Instead, it varies depending upon location of the potential abortion recipient and a host of factors associated with nation-states. Thus, our purpose is to reveal different legislative protocols that lead to or inhibit availability of this aspect of women's reproductive rights, and to empirically determine what are the underlying series of factors that drive these policy decisions. Together they reveal a complex mosaic of fundamental principles that are rarely considered when formulating public policy. We hope our research across nations will help healthcare providers and policy makers recognize the genealogy of options and opportunities as they continue to debate abortion's provision to women within healthcare systems.

Over time and across countries, researchers have noted frequent and mostly unexplained gender differences in the levels of support for policies of free or freer trade: according to aggregate results from many surveys, women tend to be less favorable toward policies of liberalizing trade than men. Positing an economic security explanation based largely on a mobile factors approach, we ask if it is women generally who are more negative toward trade or rather women who are more economically vulnerable – i.e., women from the scarce labor factor. We utilize data from two recent surveys on individuals’ attitudes toward different facets of trade and its effects to examine this hypothesis empirically. Rejecting a monolithic definition of “women,” we find that disaggregating by education level illuminates to some extent what underlying characteristics might be helping to drive some of these findings. Lower-skilled women in the US are much less likely to support free trade compared to higher-skilled women and this may largely explain previous negative findings. The low versus high-skill dynamic is, however, much less clear in the findings using survey data from a small sample of developing countries.

This study of Japanese consumer electronic networks in North America challenges conventional wisdom on the pervasiveness of keiretsu ties in Japanese production networks abroad. The consumer electronics industry poses hard questions to current views on the relationship between keiretsu and FDI not only because of the more modest internationalization of subcontractors, but more interestingly, because Japanese electronic production networks overseas remained remarkably closed to outside suppliers even in the absence of keiretsu commitments that could constrain purchasing decisions. This article offers a comparison of domestic subcontracting practices in the Japanese automobile and consumer electronic industries, a discussion of the internationalization of electronic part makers, and an analysis of the sourcing strategies of Japanese firms in North America. The article highlights the impact of the non-market environment in Japanese FDI strategies since Japanese companies embarked on foreign production in North America as a direct response to export caps imposed by the American government and/or tighter regional integration rules adopted in NAFTA. Revealingly, Japanese automobile and electronic firms diverged in their reliance on subcontracting firms to meet the more stringent demands for regional production.

This paper explores the plurality of institutional environments in which standards for the service sector are expected to support the rise of a global knowledge-based economy. A wide range of international bodies is able to define standards affecting the internationalization of services. Relying on global political economy approaches, the analysis uncovers the power relations underpinning the various forms of standards supporting a deeper integration of the market for services. Service standards are conceived as heterogeneous forms of transnational hybrid authority. The empirical study focuses on recent developments in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the European Union, and the US. In contrast to conventional views opposing the American system to the ISO/European framework, the paper argues that institutional developments of service standards are likely to face trade-offs and compromises reflecting contrasting models of standardization, not only between, but also across, those systems. While this undermines the conventional analysis of a transatlantic divide in standardization, it also shows that the variance between product and service standards is much greater in the European context and the ISO system than in the US, where it is hardly debated.

In this research we hypothesize that aggregate PAC behavior is conditional in nature. PACs in a specific issue sector donate more to a certain political party's candidates the more that political party controls the legislature. However, the more active the legislature is on a specific set of issues the more people/groups/PACs are mobilized in response to the issue. Thus, a conditional relationship emerges where aggregate PAC donations to a political party are a function of party control, agenda activity, and an interaction of the two. We test this conditional theory using data from the Institute on Money in State Politics database on PAC donations to state legislative candidates divided into issue sectors. Our results provide support for our hypotheses that aggregate PAC donations to a political party's candidates are conditional on the level of agenda activity on the issues that concern the PACs.

This article specifies and explores the hypothesis that the diversity of human languages, right now a barrier to “interoperability” in communication and trade, will become significantly less of a barrier as machine translation technologies are deployed over the next several years. We argue that machine translation will become the 2020's analogy for ideas, to what container shipping did for goods trade in the second half of the twentieth century. But as with container shipping or railroads in the nineteenth century, this new boundary-cost and transaction-cost reducing technology does not reduce all boundary and transaction costs equally, and so creates new challenges for the distribution of ideas and thus for innovation and economic growth. How we develop, license, commercialize, and deploy machine translation will be a critical determinant of its impact on trade, political coalitions, diversity of thought and culture, and the distribution of wealth.

Why do states participate in bilateral investment treaties (BITs)? In this article, I examine the role of indirect investment on BIT formation. Indirect investment flows are an important aspect of the global investment regime that are underexamined by research focused on direct flows only. Indirect flows play an important role in affecting incentives for BIT participation because firms channel investment through intermediary destinations to take advantage of existing BITs. I argue that governments are more likely to participate in BITs when states expect to access groups of capital exporting states through second order links. When selecting BIT partners, states evaluate expected indirect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows by considering characteristics of a potential partner's second order FDI partners. States are thus more likely to participate in BITs when expectations for indirect flows are high. I use a variety of analyses to demonstrate evidence in favor of my hypotheses. I find evidence that indirect flows affect the likelihood of BIT formation and increase dyadic FDI flows. This research provides a novel explanation for BIT formation and contributes to research on indirect capital flows, treaty shopping and BIT formation.

Among the factors providing incentives to monitor the behaviour of input suppliers are the regulatory requirements to which downstream firms are subject. We develop a formal economic model to examine the relationship between the strictness of the regulatory environment and downstream firms' incentives to act as inspectors of their sub-contractors. We consider the interaction between a downstream producer and an upstream input supplier. The downstream chooses the probability with which to monitor the upstream's compliance and the upstream chooses a compliance level which determines compliance of the end product with quality or environmental regulation. We find that the strictness of regulation affects the downstream's monitoring strategy in combination with the level of quality or environmental standards. If the standards are sufficiently low then the strictness of regulation increases incentives to monitor the upstream. Contrary, if the standards are sufficiently high then the pressure on the downstream to monitor the upstream is relaxed and the strictness of regulation decreases incentives to monitor. We argue that the strictness of regulation should not be treated in isolation as a factor determining the choice of downstream firms to monitor their input suppliers.

Buoyed by the success of two large-scale bingos in 1993 Alberta's First Nations initiated plans to construct reserve casinos to mitigate economic hardships. That year Alberta commenced with neoliberal reforms to slash the provincial budget. This paper explores how Alberta's acquisition of regulatory authority over First Nation's gaming led to the creation of a bureaucracy responsible for oversight of reserve gaming, the costs of which were borne by reserve casino revenues thereby resulting in no additional taxation of non-Native Albertans.

Due to EU legislation, public procurement through competitive tendering has been applied in most European countries. One purpose of such procurement is to lower the costs of the procured service and another is for the political level to gain better control over what it is purchasing. However, monitoring problems exist when conducting public procurements; recent studies indicate that actions related to public servant corruption are most common in public procurement processes. Citing cases from Sweden, this article argue that, in the case of public procurement, private firms have assumed a monitoring role towards the public sector similar to that of whistleblowers, and that the public system in fact depends on private firms to detect procurement bypasses committed by civil servants. This article provides an understanding of this monitoring role and discusses its theoretical and practical implications for the public system. I conclude that upholding the public system is not the primary objective of the private whistleblower but a positive side effect. The monitoring role is analyzed in the framework of principal–agent theory and should be seen as complementary to the existing monitoring functions available to public principals.

Airbus strategies in Asia operate in an environment shaped by three forces: the technical constraints of building modern aircraft, the demands of world and regional markets, and the structure and objectives of the consortium itself. These factors map onto an integrated strategy analysis. The positional analysis for Airbus must focus on its status as the challenger to the dominant firm, on the consortium's peculiar organizational structure, and on the opportunities and constraints offered by its nonmarket context (multiple national governments plus the European Union). One way of looking at Airbus's experience is as a continual series of disruptions aimed at creating openings for Airbus to enter markets dominated by well-established competitors, in particular, Boeing. These strategic moves have involved both market and nonmarket elements. This article assesses the market and nonmarket strategies that Airbus has employed to establish itself in the crucial Asian market.

What accounts for the growing cost of government in the US? [Berry, William D., and David Lowery. 1984. “The Growing Cost of Government: A Test of Two Explanations.” Social Science Quarterly 65 (3): 735–749] tested two explanations for why the costs of goods and services in the public sector have increased faster than these costs in the private sector in the US: “Baumol's Disease” [Baumol, William J. 1967. “Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis.” The American Economic Review 57 (3): 415–426], which focuses on the need for government to match wage increases in the more productive private sector, and [Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1977. “The Expanding Public Sector: Wagner Squared.” Public Choice 31 (1): 147–150] Bureau Voting explanation, which focuses on the voting power of government employees. Berry and Lowery (1984) tested these two explanations using data for the 1947–1979 period and found strong support for the former but little support for the latter. Decades later, a much longer time-series is now available for empirical analysis. Additionally, the character of both public- and private-sector production and the voting power of public employees have changed in ways that may influence the empirical veracity of the two explanations. For these reasons, we extend the original analysis through 2010 to assess whether Baumol's Disease and Bureau Voting continue to have relevance for understanding government cost growth. We find that Baumol's Disease continues to be the better explanation despite changes in both sectors, although public sector wages are now more closely tied to general private rather than manufacturing wages, suggesting that growing production costs may be serving as an increasingly relevant downward pressure on the scope of real government activity.

Although technological learning is indispensable for economic transformation in developing countries, recent research on industrial policy both lacks consensus regarding policy models and engages in little long-term analysis of policy impacts. This study contributes to this literature through a controlled case comparison of the varied addition of new and unique functional capacities in the Mexican and Brazilian automotive and petroleum industries from 1975 to 2000. It offers a dynamic industrial policy perspective that underscores the explanatory role of alternating state- and market-led industrial policy approaches and their associated cumulative processes of “exploration” and “exploitation” (March (1991)). It also suggests that two background conditions—prior investments in learning and exogenous shocks that undermine the status quo—intervene decisively in the successful sequencing of policy approaches. The study concludes by proposing a framework that recognizes three main learning pathways formed through different configurations of the main independent variable and background conditions. This framework can be deployed as a rough predictive tool to assess how other industries might most effectively increase their technological sophistication.

What explains the variation in countries’ propensity to engage in austerity policy? Economic and political country-level factors are the paramount explanations in the literature. Nevertheless, variation in fiscal preferences at the executive level remains underexplored, except for ideology. Moreover, budget decisions are endogenous to the state of the economy, thus casting doubt on standard measures based on the debt and/or deficit ratio. This article contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I turn to the individual level of analysis and suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely to pursue a balanced budget and tend to implement fiscal consolidation policies based on spending cuts. Second, I ease concerns about individuals’ self-selection into office by relying on fiscal adjustments that are weakly orthogonal to the economic cycle. The statistical analysis of a panel of 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2014 confirms the theoretical expectations. The results are robust to a variety of specification and statistical methodologies and hold for a subset of as-if random leadership transitions following close elections. A case study of Brian Mulroney's governments in Canada (1984–93) further illustrates the argument.

Recent decades have witnessed increased public concern about vehicle emissions and growing frustration with political inaction and business preferences for the status quo. This article provides historical perspective on such regulatory dynamics by analyzing the Swiss and the Swedish cases of vehicle emission governance in the1970s-1980s. Relying on archival documents detailing the policy process in both countries as well as on international regulatory arenas, the analysis focuses on political solutions for reducing the toxicity of vehicle emissions. It uncovers the influence of national as well as international business groups and the existence of the tension between various national ministries, arising from conflicting environmental and trade-related goals. Is also highlights the importance of different institutional settings in creating the expertise to explain the political outcomes. While the Swiss corporatist system gave a great deal of power to a variety of interest groups at each stage of the political process, the Swedish government invested significant resources in the creation of independent expertise and enjoyed a relative autonomy, despite the importance of the Swedish car industry. The analysis also assesses the importance of the Swiss–Swedish collaboration in overcoming certain obstacles and their contribution to the implementation of stricter regulations in Europe that ultimately occurred at the margins of the European Economic Community.

There has been a brewing argument on the effects of economic globalization on the repression of human rights. My argument in this article joins the optimistic perspective on the relationship between the globalizing economy and state repression. I argue that governments consider backlash from investors in their decisions about whether to use repression. Investors, motivated by international human rights norms and a fear of violent conflict, would prefer that governments not introduce brute force into a nonviolent protest. Thus, governments in countries that depend more on foreign direct investment (FDI) should be less likely to use violence against protesters than those that are less dependent on FDI. Using data analysis of protest events and inward FDI stock, I test this argument and find a negative relationship between these two variables.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is one of the most important mega-regional trade agreements signed to date. Yet, it failed to include an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism in its investment chapter. What explains this omission? To unpack this, we examine international negotiations as a two-step process. In the first stage, we theorize that initial preferences towards ISDS are based on countries’ orientation toward foreign direct investment (FDI), experience with ISDS, and past treaty practice. Second, we theorize that during protracted negotiations, adverse regime developments and domestic politics can have a profound impact on treaty design. To test our framework, we examine the RCEP negotiations. Our analysis shows that mounting cases as well as the eroding norm of ISDS in other treaties lowered support for ISDS as the negotiations progressed. Then, a change of government in Malaysia shifted that country’s position dramatically, which tipped the balance against ISDS in the final round of negotiations. Our findings have important implications for the international investment regime. They highlight the factors that determine countries’ initial preferences while also demonstrating the importance of developments during the negotiations, which can lead to the abandonment of the institutional status quo.

The current level and future evolution of trans-Pacific business linkages are tightly linked to domestic politics in Latin American countries. Where the structure of a nation's political institutions offer credible checks and balances against discretionary policymaking, external linkages including those with Pacific partners are stronger. Future liberalization including the formation of an FTAA is more likely when new policymakers arrive in office or when existing policymakers feel strong internal or external pressure to shift the course of their trade policy. A given liberalization is more likely to be sustained when coupled with short-term observable improvement in social and economic indicators. Countries with political institutions that fail to limit policymakers' discretion are particularly sensitive to a failure to demonstrate clear and immediate results. An analysis of the potential of an FTAA to influence trans-Pacific business linkages based on these arguments suggests that adoption is far from certain and that northern and southern countries alike will have to design an agreement with particular attention to social and economic consequences in Latin American countries.