Does international investor sentiment improve when a crises-ridden country participates in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program? I argue that merely participating in an IMF program may not revive the sentiments of investors. Rather, investor sentiment would improve when governments enhance the credibility of their commitment to reforms by accepting severe conditions imposed by the IMF, which incur ex ante and ex post political costs. Using panel data on 166 countries during the 1992–2013 period (twenty-two years), I find that countries participating in IMF programs, with conditions attached, specifically prior actions and performance criteria conditions, after controlling for endogeneity concerns using exogeneous instruments, are associated with an increase in long-term investor sentiment. These results are robust to using alternative data, variables and estimation methods. My findings are in stark contrast to those who argue that IMF conditional programs are akin to swallowing a bitter pill. In fact, my results demonstrate that the so-called bitter pill may act as a palliative.

In a globalized and hegemonically organized international economy, the economic fundamentals and policy choices of the hegemon often have spillover effects for peripheral economies. This is a well-recognized dynamic of the contemporary political economy, but it was true during the first age of globalization as well. Motivated by literature examining the impact of the U.S. macroeconomic conditions on other economies throughout the international system, this article advances a systemic theory of financial crisis and applies it to the long nineteenth century, when British hegemony reigned. My main motivation is the earliest example of a systemic theory of financial crisis, Charles Kindleberger's Hegemonic Stability Theory. However, while Charles Kindleberger focused on the stability brought about by a hegemonically structured international economy, I emphasize the dynamics of volatility present in this type of system. I argue that a hierarchical distribution of economic activity in the international system means that the financial cycle of the most central country influences the financial conditions in peripheral countries that lead to financial crisis. Evidence from financial crises which occurred in the long nineteenth century supports this theory.

This paper discusses how MNCs reacted to NAFTA and MERCOSUR in terms of their investment and operations patterns in three sectors - automotive, electronics, and apparel - and assesses the likely impact of the upcoming Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). It shows that NAFTA functioned – at least in its first years - as an investment relocation engine, while MNCs' reaction to MERCOSUR was significant only in the automotive sector. The emergence of China and other Asian economies, with their low cost and vast markets, and the progressive enlargement in the scope of MNCs operations, seem to diminish the economic relevance of NAFTA and MERCOSUR. FTAA may provide a new impetus to the integration of the automotive industry in the Americas, and a stronger rationale for a slowdown of plant relocation to Asia in light industries such as electronics and garments. But it is unlikely that it will reverse current trends which point to Asia – with China at the epicenter – as the global magnet for manufacturing and exports.

What explains the pattern of selective business interest in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with active campaigning for and utilization of tariff preferences for some trade agreements, but not others? Under what conditions can business advocates of PTA policy mount an effective lobbying campaign to influence policy outcomes (i.e., shaping decisions on who to negotiate with and what to negotiate about)? These are important questions given that analyses of Asian PTAs frequently assign a negligible role to business interests either out of apathy or lobbying weakness. To understand the pattern of selective business lobbying for PTAs, I develop a theoretical model with three main independent variables: venue selection, preference intensity, and advocacy effectiveness, and apply it to the case of Japan to test its usefulness. My model shows that the conditions for effective business PTA campaigning are exacting: loss avoidance, high technical expertise, and influence-seeking strategies that maximize access opportunities given institutional constraints. And yet when these factors align, business interests do influence PTA outcomes. My research shows that the current trend to characterize the agency of PTA proliferation as either state-led or business-driven needs to be re-examined as it is more useful to think about state-society constellations in favor or against PTAs.

This paper strives to shed light on the interaction between business groups and the main governing parties after the onset of the economic crisis through a “thick narrative” approach. By focusing on the Portuguese case, the study aims to examine the preferences of the employer confederations during the distinct phases of the economic crisis and to analyze the political alignments established with different party governments. This contribution confirms the fragmentation of business interests on the one hand and tensions between the right-wing government and the main employer confederations on the other. While a pragmatic approach to party politics seems to be the predominant trend, historical and institutional legacies are still important factors when considering the actions and inner tensions of these organizations.

In the period from the 1990s emerging market financial crises until the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2008, the development of domestic bond markets in developing economies was a prominent agenda item in international financial reform circles. The crises of the 1990s drew attention to the vulnerabilities generated by frequently occurring double mismatches of currency denominations and maturities in the borrowing of emerging economies. This led to a series of reform efforts targeted at both increasing liquidity and the range of borrowers in domestic bond markets. In the aggregate, these efforts were successful: For emerging market economies as a whole, domestic debt now exceeds international debt. Moreover, domestic corporate bond markets have emerged in many countries, often for the first time. However, the nature of market development has been far from uniform, and often has not been in line with government aims. In this paper, we examine the interplay of government and business actors in market development. Drawing on 155 interviews with policy and market actors as well as secondary data, we show that the main explanation of variation in market development lies in the pre-existing structure of financial markets, conceptualized as a heterogeneous set of interest/influence constellations.

Research shows that trade openness and high social spending go hand in hand, at least in wealthy democracies. It is not clear, however, exactly why this is so. Many scholars and policymakers argue that generous social spending facilitates trade liberalization, but there is no direct empirical support for this claim. This paper is the first to show directly that social spending promotes freer trade. Specifically, I show that U.S. state-level unemployment insurance makes Congress members significantly more likely to vote for freer trade. Since state unemployment insurance is exogenous to individual congressional votes, my analysis shows clearly that the former affects the latter. My results imply that social spending insures not only citizens but also open trade policies against hard economic times. They also highlight the importance of subnational policy choices to national policy outcomes.

The conventional view of private campaign contributions is that they distort policy to the detriment of society. Formal models consistent with such views, however, are based on restrictive assumptions about the nature of campaigns, interest groups and policy dimensionality. This paper relaxes those assumptions and allows for informative campaigns, multiple interest groups and multiple issue dimensions. It uses analytical and computational methods to demonstrate that private campaign contributions from societally unrepresentative contributors can, under reasonable conditions, improve social welfare. Multidimensionality is important because politicians need to be responsive on salient issues to prevent opponents from raising money based on less salient issues and using the money to publicize positions on salient issues.

What strategies work best for enforcing sanctions? Sanctions enforcement agencies like the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) face resource limitations and political constraints in punishing domestic firms for violating sanctions. Beyond monetary fines, sanctions enforcement actions also serve a “naming and shaming” function that tarnishes violators’ reputations. Larger, higher-profile companies tend have much more at stake in terms of their reputations than smaller or less well-known firms. At the same time, punishing higher-profile companies for sanctions violations is likely to generate more publicity about the risks and potential consequences of not complying with sanctions. We theorize that OFAC should impose larger fines on high-profile companies to draw attention to those cases, make the enforcement actions more memorable, and enhance the reputational costs that they inflict. We conduct a statistical analysis of OFAC enforcement actions from 2010 to 2021 and find support for our theory.

This article examines the “technology, information, and news corporations” (TINCs), a group of under-studied non-state actors to enhance understanding of the interplay between forms of private authority in times of crisis. Three interrelated arguments regarding the shifting private authority of leading UK- and US-based TINCs are presented. First, contributions to the period of economic instability that began in 2007 have destabilized the long-standing authority of Anglo-American firms including Bloomberg, Dow Jones, and Thomson Reuters. Second, through their involvement in two overtly normative niches of global finance, environmental and Islamic finance, these private actors have responded to contestations of their authority with an enhanced stress on moral authority since 2007. Third, a mere tinkering around with pre-crisis technical knowledge and a persistent reliance on liberal market values is likely to perpetuate rather than resolve the unstable authority of the leading TINCs. Based on an original analysis of primary documents and interviews undertaken with industry participants, this article contributes to existing literature analyzing the changing nature of private authority by revealing limits to shifts and combinations between its moral and technical forms.

Researchers have extensively studied how large firms and SMEs use business and political ties to obtain tangible and intangible resources in transition economies. However, how SMEs establish these ties in the context of power-imbalanced dependence by using unethical and illegal “strategic practice” such as bribery remains underexplored. Furthermore, how SMEs deploy strategies to mitigate such risky actions in the process of resource acquisition is also given limited attention in the literature. Lack of exploration of these issues leaves significant gaps in our understanding of how SMEs are able to initiate and operate their ties for survival and growth despite enormous institutional constraints. We analyze the negative and positive effects of power dependence on business resource acquisition via regression analysis using survey data drawn from 232 Chinese SMEs. The findings indicate that power-imbalanced dependence among SMEs is associated with their use of bribery to establish political ties with officials for access to resources. The moderating effect of power-mutual dependence on this relationship is also examined. Theoretical significance and managerial implications of these findings for SMEs in transition economies are discussed.

Which factors make some American multinational corporations (MNCs) take political action in response to the US–China Trade War and cause others to stay on the sidelines? We identify China-based subsidiaries of US firms to identify firms’ political actions in response to the trade war. We combine data on firms’ tariff exposure, economic actions in China, and political actions in the United States during the trade war. Together these data highlight the divergent strategies with which firms engage. Even though more than 63 percent of MNCs in our sample were adversely impacted by tariffs, only 22 percent voice opposition and 7 percent exit in response to the trade war. Our analysis reveals that US MNCs in China differ in their business models, ownership structure, experience in China, and size of capital investments. These firm-level factors determine the degree to which US MNCs are embedded in China. This in turn shapes how firms perceive political risk and choose from the menu of options to deal with the trade war. Size and age increase voice while joint-venture status decreases it.

Formal regulatory parity can entail counterintuitive effects. In a series of state statutes, municipal governments have been directed to issue cable TV franchises to new competitors only after (a) formal hearings considering the ‘public interest’ in competition; and (b) imposing terms and conditions which are at least as burdensome as those contained in the incumbent's franchise. While billed as ‘level playing field’ laws, economic theory, an important case study in Connecticut, and a probit analysis of Ameritech's cable franchise acquisition strategy suggest that these statutes actually tilt the field against entrants.

The activist foreign trade missions of the Clinton Administration are intended to open strategically important, but often difficult-to-enter, emerging markets to US foreign investment with government-to-government negotiations. Some research streams suggest that participation in a trade mission should benefit firms, while others suggest that participation should have no discernible benefit. This paper performs several event studies to analyze the stock return of a portfolio of the publicly traded firms participating in trade missions from 1993 to 1996. It finds that participants did not experience positive or significant abnormal stock returns as a result of mission participation, regardless of how the event date is defined or the data segmented.

In this paper we analyze the distribution of pay and changing trends of inequality in Argentina and Brazil, illuminating the specific winners and losers, by region and by economic activity (sector). In both countries we find that inequality rose in the neoliberal period, but that it declined following the severe crises of neoliberal policy, in 1993 in Brazil and in late 2001 in Argentina. This period of post-neoliberalism is characterized in both countries by a decline in the economic weight of the financial sector and a recovery of the position of the civil service. In both countries, the rise in inequality leading to the crisis produced an increase in the relative position of the major metropolitan centers; this positional advantage also declined modestly in the post-crisis recovery period.

This article outlines the ways in which corporations are powerful and can realize their interests in society and policy, through a case study of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the U.S. It diverges from the main bodies of literature on corporate power—which focus more on corporate actions in the formal policy process (such as lobbying or campaign contributions) or on the structural dependence of the state on capital—by showing how corporate-led material and ideational societal change was key to the realization of corporate interests in formal policy, as corporate-led societal change reshaped the baseline from which policy was made. Additionally, through the case study, this article offers a new conceptual language for corporate power, and demonstrates how to approach and test power analysis with a sensitivity to both the temporal element of power and an understanding that power can operate beyond the formal political arena. This original case study, then, is significant in that it should encourage political economy scholars to adopt a broader societal focus, to work with a more comprehensive understanding of power, and to utilize longer study timeframes when seeking to assess corporate power.

Industry has organized increasingly effective self-governance initiatives since the 1980s. Almost all of these are based on the economic leverage of large retailers and manufacturers over their worldwide supply chains. This article documents commonalities in six of the best-studied examples—coffee, dolphin-safe tuna, fisheries, lumber, food processing, and artificial DNA—and offers straightforward economic and political theories to explain them. The theories teach that oligopoly competition can strongly constrain private power so that firms are answerable to a shadow electorate of consumers. Furthermore, rational firms often benefit from ceding significant power to suppliers and NGOs. These results extend traditional arguments that free markets constrain private power and suggest an explicit framework for deciding when private politics are legitimate.1

This article examines the roles of multinational corporations and the European Union (EU) in structuring global competition around wireless standardization. It analyzes the realities of global competition in information and communications technology (ICT) markets from a more liberal-strategic viewpoint than the subsidy-based industry support promulgated by strategic trade theorists in the 1980s and 1990s. According to a liberal-strategic trade perspective, public actors try to tweak the rules of the world economy to structure global competition in ways that enhance job creation, overall competitiveness in high-technology sectors, and domestic welfare, rather than being primarily concerned about import competition. The story of the European approach to global standardization and competition—and the strategic use of international standards bodies by multinational corporations—primarily represents an aggressive outward-oriented strategy. European actors pursued a globally oriented strategy in the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) with the objective of aligning Europe with market and policy developments in the rapidly growing markets of the Asia—Pacific region. By downplaying the importance of import competition, often stressed by strategic trade theorists a liberal-strategic approach to the ICT industry focuses on the prospect of cutting-edge innovations based on a coherent industry strategy that looks at the creation of internationally competitive technologies in the longer-term rather than at incremental change and current import competition pressure.

Scholars have shown that corporate responsibility (CR) initiatives can create intangible assets that help MNCs reduce their liability of foreignness and even gain competitive advantage over local rivals. But scholars have not addressed the ability of MNCs to transfer CR initiatives to subsidiaries. This study builds theory about the conditions that influence success and failure in the transfer of CR practices from headquarters to overseas subsidiaries. We analyze CR transfers from the headquarters of an Indian multinational to its subsidiaries in China and the U.K. Our findings suggest that CR transfer differs in substantial ways from operational practice transfer. In particular, the ambiguity of the CR initiative, the social competency of the business unit transferring the CR initiative, and the active involvement of local stakeholders play significant roles in CR transfer success.

This paper explores the determinants of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms. Using a Cox conditional model in gap time, this paper provides new empirical evidence on the linkages between the adoption of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms at the firm level and government ideological affiliation in 16 OECD countries over the period 1970–2009. I find strong evidence linking rightward shifts in government ideological orientation with the adoption of minority shareholder protection legislation. This result supports our argument that changes in the composition of the coalition of heterogeneous interests and/or a change in the expectations of the parties’ constituency will affect government strategy on the adoption of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms. I also find that the macroeconomic context at the international level may influence the adoption of these reforms. Our findings suggest that international economic integration has resulted not in the convergence of corporate governance regimes to the Anglo-Saxon model, but rather the emergence of hybrid corporate governance systems.