The target article claims that evolutionary theory predicts the emergence of sex differences in aggression in early childhood, and that there will be no sex difference in anger. It also finds an absence of sex differences in spousal abuse in Western societies. All three are puzzling from an evolutionary perspective and warrant further discussion.

Carruthers' arguments depend on a tenuous interpretation of cases from the confabulation literature. Specifically, Carruthers maintains that cases of confabulation are “subjectively indistinguishable” from cases of alleged introspection. However, in typical cases of confabulation, the self-attributions are characterized by low confidence, in contrast to cases of alleged introspection.

One facet of Vigil's socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB) suggests that females are more sensitive to facial expressions than are males, and should detect facial expressions more quickly. A re-examination of recent research with children demonstrates that girls do detect various facial expressions more quickly than do boys. Although this provides support for SRFB, further examination of SRFB in children would lend important support this evolutionary-based theory.

Beliefs may be true or false, and grounded or ungrounded. McKay & Dennett (M&D) treat these properties of belief as independent. What, then, do they mean by misbelief? They state that misbeliefs are “simply false beliefs.” So would they consider a very well-grounded belief that is false a misbelief? And why can't beliefs that are very poorly grounded be considered delusions, even when they are true?

We propose that middle childhood female ambivalent attachment, given the adaptive problem of uncertainty of future investment, is designed to evoke immediate investment from current caregivers, rather than new investment sources. We suggest greater specificity of strategic attachment solutions to adaptive problems that differ by sex, time, and relationship type.

Focusing on the individual's internal cognitive architecture, McKay & Dennett (M&D) provide an incomplete analysis because they neglect the crucial role played by the external environment in producing misbeliefs and determining whether those misbeliefs are adaptive. In some environments, positive illusions are not adaptive. Further, misbeliefs often arise because the environment commonly fails to provide crucial information needed to form accurate judgments.

According to evolutionary, genetic, and endocrinal perspectives, gender differences are modulated by the interaction between intra-uterine stress, genetic equipments, and the availability of the facilitating environment during the newborn period. The social message of fitness over obstacles during socialization and the discussion of secure/non-secure attachment styles should take into consideration the brain functions, which are altered differently in response to intra- and extra-uterine stress in each gender.

Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.

We draw a distinction between defensive and predatory forms of aggression, and how these forms relate to basic neuropsychological systems, especially the Fight-Flight-Freeze-System (FFFS; putatively related to defensive aggression), and the Behavioural Approach System (BAS; putatively related to predatory aggression). These systems may help further to account for proximal brain processes and personality influences in the context of sex differences.

Vigil summarizes sex-related differences in emotivity, and presents a psychological model based on the restrictive assumption that responses to stimuli are dichotomous. The model uses for support the concept of intrasexual selection, but ignores intersexual selection. An alternative hypothesis might be that emotivity signals age: maturity in men and youth in women. Integration requires considering all evolutionary biology, not just agreeable concepts.

Mindreading often requires access to beliefs, so the mindreading system should be able to self-attribute beliefs, even without self-interpretation. This proposal is consistent with Carruthers' claim that mindreading and metacognition depend on the same cognitive system and the same information as one another; and it may be more consistent with this claim than is Carruthers' account of metacognition.

In this commentary, I question the idea that positive illusions are evolved misbeliefs on the grounds that positive illusions are often maladaptive, are not universal, and may be by-products of existing mechanisms. Further, because different beliefs are adaptive in different situations and cultures, it makes sense to build in a readiness to form beliefs rather than the beliefs themselves.

In this commentary, the idea of reciprocity potential indicators is tied in with ultimate accounts on sex differences in social sensitivity. It is proposed that, rather than crying, smiling is a more likely cooperative signal. The possibility of coevolution and polymorphism in perceptual and signalling systems are also discussed briefly, with a reference to Theory of Mind and Machiavellianism.

We add to Archer's review with mention of sexual orientation differences in aggression and empathy, which suggest a biological basis for the mediating role of empathy. We also note that Archer's view of sex differences will illuminate discussion of conduct disorder, which can only be of help to researchers in this field.

The problem with elaborations of attachment theory is attachment theory itself. How would a mind that works the way the theory posits have increased its owner's fitness in hunter-gatherer times? The child's mind is more capacious and discerning than attachment theorists give it credit for. Early-appearing, long-lasting personality characteristics, often mistaken for the lingering effects of early experiences, are more likely due to genetic influences on personality.

We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.

A sex difference in the tendency to outbreed (female exogamy) is a premise for the target article's proposed framework, which receives some support by being shared with chimpanzees but not with more distantly related primates. Further empirical support is provided, and it is suggested that recognition of sex differences might improve effective fairness, taking sexual assault as a case in point.

The mechanism proposed by Del Giudice by which adult attachment style is adapted to the extrinsic risk in the local environment via attachment style during the early years does not fulfill important criteria of an adaptation. The proposed mechanism is neither specific, nor developmentally reliable, nor effective. Therefore, it should not be considered an adaptation.

Our social role/biosocial theory provides a more adequate account of aggression sex differences than does Archer's sexual selection theory. In our theory, these sex differences arise flexibly from sociocultural and ecological forces in interaction with humans' biology, as defined by female and male physical attributes and reproductive activities. Our comments elaborate our theory's explanations for the varied phenomena that Archer presents.

McKay & Dennett (M&D) argue that positive illusions are a plausible candidate for a class of evolutionarily “selected for” misbeliefs. I argue (Flanagan 1991; 2007) that the class of alleged positive illusions is a hodge-podge, and that some of its members are best understood as positive attitudes, hopes, and the like, not as beliefs at all.