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“Can do” attitudes: Some positive illusions are not misbeliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Owen Flanagan
Owen Flanagan
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0743. [email protected]://www.duke.edu/~ojf
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Abstract

McKay & Dennett (M&D) argue that positive illusions are a plausible candidate for a class of evolutionarily “selected for” misbeliefs. I argue (Flanagan 1991; 2007) that the class of alleged positive illusions is a hodge-podge, and that some of its members are best understood as positive attitudes, hopes, and the like, not as beliefs at all.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 519 - 520
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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