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Why not be pluralists about explanatory reduction?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Kathryn Tabb
Kathryn Tabb*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. [email protected]
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Abstract

Borsboom et al. convincingly argue that, from their symptom network perspective, mental disorders cannot be reduced to brain disorders. While granting that network structures exist, I respond that there is no reason to think they are the only psychiatric phenomena worth explaining. From a pluralist perspective, what is required is not a full-scale rejection of explanatory reductionism but a critical attention to the circumstances of its application.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e27
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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