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Intentional content in psychopathologies requires an expanded interpretivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Marc Slors ,
Jolien C. Francken  and
Derek Strijbos
Marc Slors
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HD, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. [email protected]@ftr.ru.nlhttps://radboud.academia.edu/MarcSlors/https://radboud.academia.edu/DerekStrijbos/
Jolien C. Francken
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected] Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, 1001 NK, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Derek Strijbos
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HD, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. [email protected]@ftr.ru.nlhttps://radboud.academia.edu/MarcSlors/https://radboud.academia.edu/DerekStrijbos/ Center for Development Disorders, Dimence Mental Health Institute, 7416 SB, Deventer, The Netherlands.
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Abstract

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how. Incorporating this practical approach to intentional state ascription in psychopathological cases expands and improves traditional interpretivism.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e26
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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