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Functional disorders can also be explained through a non-reductionist application of network theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Michael E. Hyland
Michael E. Hyland*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.plymouth.ac.uk/staff/michael-hyland
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Abstract

A network structure explains why reductionism is not possible for mental illness, but the same argument applies for the somatic symptoms of functional disorders. Because the covariation of symptoms of functional disorders cannot be explained in terms of symptom-to-symptom causality, explanation requires a network of biological mechanisms having emergent properties that cannot be reduced to biology.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e12
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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