South-East Asian government, politics and policy

Summary

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Summary

In 1916, Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah, an Islamic religious scholar (ulama) from Sumatra, made a sneering remark about the Mufti of Johor. “To become a Government Mufti in Malaya is a great glory,” he said. “You have an official uniform, with a whole banana-comb of epaulettes on the shoulder, a jubbah [Arabic-style garment] embroidered with gold thread, a silk turban, and your own car. The ra'ayat [people] fear and obey you, eat the scraps from your table, your spat of sireh [betel leaf]. And if you want to get married…Bismillah [anytime with God's consent].”

Muftis are religious scholars (ulama) whose role is to provide guidance to the Muslim community and issue fatwa (religious rulings). In Malaysia, Muftis are appointed by the Malay Rulers. Ideally, an alim (singular for ulama) must not blindly serve the interest of ruling elites; instead, they must be pious individuals who protect the interests of the religious community. Haji Abdul Karim's harsh words showed that he must have felt strongly that the Johor Mufti of his time had been falling far short of those ideals.

To be sure, Haji Abdul Karim and the then-Johor Mufti came from rival schools of thought. Haji Abdul Karim was a key player in the reformist/modernist movement in Sumatra, which called for Indonesian Muslims to return to the fundamentals of the Quran and the Hadith (sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad). The movement appealed for “pure” Islam in Indonesia, one that was erased of local beliefs coloured with mysticism and irrationalism. The reformists’ position on theology, rituals and cultural practices was in fact quite similar to that held by Salafi-Wahhabi scholars. Salafism is a Sunni orientation that can be traced back to the theologian Ibn

Taimiyyah (b.1263–d.1328). It urges Muslims to return to Islam's pristine past, and considers the first three generations after Prophet Muhammad's death as the ideal period for Islamic societies to copy. Salafis believe that ideas and scholarship generated by savants of these three generations should therefore be applied in contemporary social and political life. One of the main tenets of Salafism is its rejection of Islamic innovations. Its followers can however be either progressive or regressive in their religious outlook. For progressive Salafis, reliving the system of the first three generations after the Prophet means the upholding of its values and principles.

Many scholars on Malaysia have recognized that Salafism-Wahhabism has penetrated substantially into the countr's political and social life. The southern state of Johor has always been considered, and remains, the bastion of kaum tua, with its religious institutions dominated by ulama (religious scholars) who are traditionalist in character but tolerant of religious practices that are infused with local culture and mysticism. These scholars have also tended to maintain conservative attitudes on gender issues, inter-religious relations, and intra-faith differences. The Sultan of Johor appoints the Mufti whose primary role is to issue fatwas (religious rulings) and be the ex-officio of the Johor Islamic Religious Council, the highest Islamic body in the state. Johor's Muftis are dominantly political quietists, and loyal to the ruling family. Occasional interventions by the Sultan of Johor in the religious sphere have proved crucial in ensuring that the state maintains its Malay character. The Sultan also acts to protect the state's religious institutions from encroachment by the federal government.

Summary

Malaysia is a monarchy — albeit one that is sui generis. Rather than following a single line of succession, the kingship rotates among a group of traditional rulers — or sultans — who head nine of the country's thirteen states. Although some of the sultanates pre-date the arrival of Islam in the region, they are now closely associated with the religion and have been a part of the Malayan peninsula's political context for 600 years.

During the pre-colonial and colonial eras, the rulers had a wide scope of prerogatives but many of these were relinquished during Malaysia's transition to independence. At present, the sultans are ceremonial rulers, and executive power rests with the prime minister at the national level, and chief ministers and menteris besar at the state level. That said, they are responsible for religion and Malay culture within their respective states, while their historic and symbolic importance as well as a number of constitutional provisions allow their influence to extend significantly further.

Over the past few years, these rulers have begun to assume a more visible role in the country's political life. In some states, they have chosen to withhold their consent for the appointment of menteris besar and, in Perak in 2009, the sultan played a decisive role in toppling the coalition in power. Collectively, the sultans have also weighed in on national-level issues such as the quality of governance and rule of law.

Of the traditional rulers, the Sultan of Johor, Ibrahim Ismail, has been arguably the most notable. Part of his public persona revolves around his extensive collection of vehicles. He recently purchased a blue and gold 737 Boeing, which will be used to “promote Johor” and allow him to travel the world like his ancestors “who once travelled around in ships”. He has also given another plane to the Johor soccer team, which is owned by his eldest son, the Crown Prince.

The Sultan was also the first of the rulers to obtain a locomotive driving licence, and he piloted the last Malayan Railway train out of Tanjong Pagar Station in Singapore in 2011. A long-time automobile aficionado, he has a collection of some 300 units.

Malaysia's sultans have in recent years taken on an increasingly discernible role in the country's political life. However, rather than something new, the rulers' resurgence should be viewed as part of a longer term negotiation over the precise boundaries of their role. The Sultan of Johor, Ibrahim Ismail, is arguably the most visible of the country's rulers at present. Since ascending to the throne in 2010, he has constructed a prominent media profile and been active in many areas of policy-making. Sultan Ibrahim Ismail has also weighed in on national-level issues, such as the quality of national education and bilateral relations with Singapore. While the more ceremonial aspects of his actions are inspired by the pivotal role traditionally played by Malay rulers, the more operational aspects hark back to the colonial era when Johor had a reputation for modern administration, well-developed infrastructure, and a high degree of autonomy. At its core, the Sultan raises questions about Malay leadership, and may revive a long-standing contest between the rulers and the political elite, sometimes referred to as a battle between "princes and politicians".

Summary

Concept of National Security

Vietnam has a distinctive concept of national security. Unlike most countries where national security relates to the survival of the state, to Vietnam it is, according to a senior Vietnamese diplomat, “the survival of the ruling regime that acts in the name of [the] country”.

Its latest defence White Paper, “Vietnam's Defence Policy at the beginning of the 21st Century,” while declaring that the country was ready to defend itself against “all aggression, threat against national security, infringement on its national interests”, insisted that the “preservation of a peaceful and stable environment for economic and social development, the achievement of industrialization and modernization under socialist orientation are the highest national interests”.

A major architect of Vietnam's defence diplomacy, Vice-Minister of Defence Senior General Nguyen Chi Vinh insisted that defence diplomacy is only an “important part of, and an instrument to implement the [broader] foreign policy of the Party and State in defence matters”. While asserting that defence diplomacy must contribute, and has contributed, to “the defence of the country's independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and national interests”, he linked this traditional mission of the military to the mission of protecting the party and socialism. According to him:

Defence diplomacy contributes to the struggle against peaceful evolution and subversive violence, protects the Party and socialism and political stability to develop the country, and plays an important role in the mission of providing solid protection for the country's independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.

His superior, former Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh, made clear that: “Today, [the task of] protecting the fatherland does not only mean maintaining the country's independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, but also protecting the Party, state, people and the socialist regime …”

The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) which prides itself for having led the successful struggle for the country's independence finds it impossible to separate the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity from the leadership of the party. Resolution No. 28-NQ/TW of the party Central Committee on 25 October 2013 stressed that “In both wars of resistance against France and the United States, our party always fought under two banners: national independence and socialism and have achieved complete victory. Realities have also demonstrated that [it was] only by persistently linking national independence to socialism that our country won true independence.”

Vietnam's concept of national security is based on "the survival of the ruling regime that acts in the name of the country". Because the challenges to Vietnam's national security are perceived as challenges and threats to the ruling regime, the concept of national security tends to focus on the internal dimension of national security. The Mid-term National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 1994 listed "four threats" facing the country, namely, the danger of falling behind neighbouring countries economically; the threat of "peaceful evolution"; deviation from socialism; and corruption and bureaucratism. None of them, except for peaceful evolution, comes from outside. Today, China is the only external threat to Vietnam's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the focal point of that threat is the South China Sea. Vietnam has responded to this threat with a three-point policy: accommodating China's security interests; building up self-defence capability; and mobilizing international support. Recent serious challenges to Vietnam's national security policy include: the unpredictable politics of the United States over ratification of the TPP and uncertainty over its "pivot" to Asia strategy; President Rodrigo Duterte's tilt towards China, his country's "separation" from the United States, and the uncertain future of the U.S.-Philippines military alliance; China's strong reaction to the July ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favour of the Philippines, and a divided and weakened ASEAN.

Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary

Chapter 2 began with a quote from a public sermon given by the Burmese monk Ashin Eindaga in 2011: “Democracy means acting in accordance with taya.” That chapter laid out the various elements of the moral universe that I argue gives necessary context to the monk's claim and allows for the navigation of multiple ways of understanding a notion such as taya. Here I return to the monk's idea to interpret it further and to compare it with other conceptions of democracy that circulate in contemporary Myanmar. Since the political transition installed a quasi-civilian government in March 2011, the rhetoric of political figures not only in the opposition but also from the government and military has been suffused with references to democracy, yet what these groups have in mind when they speak of democracy is sometimes less clear. Because these varied (and sometimes overlapping) Burmese conceptions of democracy do not always clearly map onto Western, English language democratic models, an understanding of the logical framework of the moral universe is necessary in order to fully appreciate their nuances and implications.

Political discourse in Burma during the first half of the twentieth century was lively, with people espousing varying conceptions of democracy, drawing from Buddhist teachings, Marxism and liberalism. In contrast, during almost fifty years of military rule, the authorities severely curtailed public discourse and debate; until 2011, Burmese people had limited opportunities and outlets to discuss their ideas about democratic politics. Those who have talked about democracy since the beginning of the twentieth century have drawn from Western models, emphasizing freedom, participation, and the protection of basic human rights. However, they have also crafted their arguments using Buddhist concepts and values, with some attempting to cast democratic practice as an inherent part of Buddhist teachings. Others have developed arguments to limit democracy, couched either in skepticism of the ability of people to effectively govern themselves (explored in the previous chapter) or concerns regarding the negative effects of too much freedom. Even those who have explicitly espoused a more secular democracy have usually done so in ways that I argue are consistent with the logic and reasoning of the Theravāda moral universe they inhabit.

Summary

In the 1950s and 1960s, the political scientist John Badgley conducted research on politics in Burma at regional and local levels. He found that villagers were reluctant to use the phrase nain ngan ye (the common term for “politics”) to describe political activities in their own communities (1965, 71). Instead, they referred to traditional practices of cooperative action, compromise and reconciliation as a-yu a-hsa (beliefs) or a-tway a-hkaw (ideas). On the one hand, many of them saw national politics in the 1950s as sufficiently partisan and dysfunctional that they chose to disassociate themselves from nain ngan ye and its increasingly negative connotations. But additionally, most saw nain ngan ye as a state-centric, elite-level practice in which they were not included and that did not mirror their own daily practices, although many outside observers would likely classify them as “politics.”

Particular and bounded understandings of nain ngan ye still persist in Myanmar today. When conducting a discussion on the differences between politics and nain ngan ye with a class of Burmese university freshmen in July 2014, I asked them if there were any groups in the country that were not supposed to engage in nain ngan ye. Expecting the first answer to be monks (about which more in Chapter 5), I was taken aback when someone responded by saying “government workers.” These students understood nain ngan ye to inherently mean party politics, from which public servants were discouraged from participating. Over the course of our subsequent discussion, we identified many practices that they acknowledged might easily be classified as “politics” yet were certainly not understood by most people to be included in the category of nain ngan ye.

The idea that the word nain ngan ye inherently connotes party politics can also be seen in contrast with another popular term, a-myotha nain ngan ye, or “national politics.” It has been in circulation at least since the 1940s and it was common throughout the period of military rule for leaders to insist that this was the type of politics the military engaged in. Senior General Saw Maung, who led the State Law and Order Restoration Council after the 1988 coup, repeatedly said that he did not “know politics,” meaning the party politics that the military despised (Houtman 1999, 69).

This is the first book to provide a broad overview of the ways in which Buddhist ideas have influenced political thinking and politics in Myanmar. Matthew J. Walton draws extensively on Burmese language sources from the last 150 years to describe the 'moral universe' of contemporary Theravada Buddhism that has anchored most political thought in Myanmar. In explaining multiple Burmese understandings of notions such as 'democracy' and 'political participation', the book provides readers with a conceptual framework for understanding some of the key dynamics of Myanmar's ongoing political transition. Some of these ideas help to shed light on restrictive or exclusionary political impulses, such as anti-Muslim Buddhist nationalism or scepticism towards the ability of the masses to participate in politics. Walton provides an analytical framework for understanding Buddhist influences on politics that will be accessible to a wide range of readers and will generate future research and debate.

Summary

In conducting initial field work in Myanmar between 2007 and 2011 for the dissertation on which this book is based, I was struck by the fact that I encountered very few people who were at all familiar with the textual tradition that has formed the basis for a large part of my analysis. This was true with regard to the Buddhist texts and commentaries that I have analyzed, but also true of more mundane sources such as articles and speeches from political figures in Myanmar's history. While in any culture the formal texts of political philosophy are probably not widely read beyond a small scholarly community, people in Myanmar have been particularly disconnected from most of their recent political and intellectual history.

The disastrous education policies and restrictions on speech and the press that former military regimes enacted are in large part to blame for this lack of connection. Very few of the non-scholars I interviewed for this book had read the work of the thinkers who figure prominently in it, simply because most of the writings that make up the intellectual tradition of Burmese Buddhist political thought have been virtually unavailable in Myanmar since the military coup in 1962. Among younger generations (those who were young children or not yet born in 1988), individuals such as U Hpo Hlaing and Thakin Kodaw Hmaing are little more than vague historical figures. Even the works of General Aung San, the hero of Burmese independence, had been tucked away in used bookshops as the former military regime disassociated from him in an attempt to counter Aung San Suu Kyi's claims to his political heritage. One veteran student activist from the 1988 protests who fled to Thailand related to me the revelatory experience of reading a book of Aung San's political writings given to him by a Western researcher. Most of the Burmese university faculty who participated in a political science curriculum development seminar I conducted in 2014 had read biographies of Aung San but had never read anything he had written. They were shocked when I suggested that his writings and speeches, along with those of U Nu and Aung San Suu Kyi (not to mention lesser-known but still insightful figures), could be read as examples of political thought.

South-East Asian government, politics and policy

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Foreword

Summary

Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua

Summary

Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua

Foreword

Summary

The Johor Sultanate: Rise or Re-emergence?

Summary

The Johor Sultanate

Frontmatter

New Context of Vietnam's National Security Challenges

Summary

Frontmatter

New Context of Vietnam's National Security Challenges

The Johor Sultanate: Rise or Re-emergence?

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Foreword

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New Context of Vietnam's National Security Challenges

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6 - Discipline, Rights, and Morality: “Democracy” in Contemporary Myanmar

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Dedication

A Note on Language and Usage

Index

3 - On Human Nature and the Nature of Politics

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Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar

Conclusion

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South-East Asian government, politics and policy

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Summary

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Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua

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The Johor Sultanate

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New Context of Vietnam's National Security Challenges

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Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar

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