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Daw Suu's National League for Democracy (NLD) government marked its first anniversary in office on 30 March 2017. There are differing “key performance indicators” set by analysts in assessing the administration's performance. National reconciliation and the peace process, constitutional reform, and better living standards are the top priorities highlighted in the inaugural address of President U Htin Kyaw. Of these three priorities, the NLD has emphasized the importance of the peace process towards national reconciliation. Many observers have pointed out other deserving issues including the overall performance of both the executive and legislative, and the relations between NLD and the Tatmadaw (military). While the NLD continues to have wide public support, concerns over a possible return to military rule and over ineffective executive and legislative performance have emerged.
Daw Suu has emphasized political considerations as the most important aspect of her agenda. She maintains that the country's development can only be smooth when Myanmar has genuine peace. But this prioritization of the domestic political agenda may come at the cost of economic performance. Additionally, much hinges on Daw Suu's health and ability to manage a punishing schedule as Myanmar's de facto leader; she was already 70 when the NLD won a landslide victory in the 2015 elections, making her as the most senior leader (in age) to take office.
Popular support — from both the Myanmar diaspora and the citizenry — is still high despite the fact that the 2017 by-elections saw lower voter turn-outs and more votes going to locals or ethnic-party candidates. There is a popular desire, despite any setbacks or dilemmas during the NLD's first year of administration, to avoid another military-led government in Myanmar.
Though not a declared campaign promise, the NLD has prioritized peace since taking office. Long-time watchers of Myanmar politics had observed that Daw Suu's intention for peace was not clear but she has openly stated that although the NLD did not participate in the NCA process formulated by the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) government, it would as an elected ruling party continue with this process, including the Union Peace Conferences that are meant to be held every six months. The NLD-led peace conferences have adopted the additional title of 21st Century Panglong, and the first under this dual title (the second since the first Union Peace Conference in October 2015) was convened on 31 August to 3 September 2016.
• Peace and political considerations are priorities in Myanmar as indicated by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's frequent pronouncements.
• While 2017 would not easily become the “year of peace”, stakeholders including ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) appear willing to engage further at the negotiating table although the Tatmadaw (military) has stuck to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) route reiterated by the National League for Democracy (NLD) government at the 21st Century Panglong Conference.
• The Tatmadaw has softened its views on federalism, and although military operations drew criticisms, inter-elite relations especially between the NLD and the Tatmadaw appear to be improving.
• Economic development is not high on the government's agenda as yet, and civil servant responses to the government-led reforms remain unchanged.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
• The rise of Iskandar Malaysia as a regional hub has profoundly altered the domestic landscape, generating a knock-on effect on Johor's housing development, both economically and politically.
• Housing policy and development in Johor, as illustrated in the formation of Iskandar Malaysia, is riddled with conflict along two dimensions — “bumiputra versus non-bumiputra” and “federal government versus state government”. The first one is entangled with international real estate development and foreign investment, while the latter has more to do with the rise of sub-national autonomy in Johor.
• Particularly in southern Johor, housing policy has increasingly been influenced by foreign investment through implementations of mega projects (e.g., Forest City). These mega housing projects not only boost the state's coffers, but also change the way housing is produced, financed and governed.
• Given the importance of sub-national governments in many large-scale housing projects in Iskandar Malaysia, the changing political conditions urge us to rethink the long-standing practice of national-centric development policy in Malaysia. Taking housing as a point of departure, the timing is ripe to revisit the role of state government in policy-making and urban governance.
Housing development in Johor has undergone profound transformation in the last decades. High-rise apartments are now a common sight in the downtown area close to Singapore. Luxurious enclaves, complete with gated security and leisure facilities, encroach on waterfront land along the Straits of Johor. Foreign developers build new townships on reclaimed land, exhorting international buyers to invest their future in these projects as well as the rest of Johor.
This paper attempts to explore the political economy underwriting such development, analysing the housing policies and development goals of both the Malaysian government as well as its Johorean counterpart. It does so by focusing on Iskandar Malaysia, a special economic zone (SEZ) earmarked as a high-impact project since 2006 by Malaysia's economic planners. Despite some commercial success, this paper argues that Iskandar Malaysia is bogged down by tensions along two dimensions: bumiputra versus non-bumiputra interests; and federal government versus state government priorities. The paper unpacks such tensions by analysing the case of Forest City, one of the most high-profile projects in Iskandar Malaysia in recent years.
The paper begins with an analysis of Johor's housing situation. It examines statistical data from the relevant authorities to make sense of the demand and supply of houses in the state. The paper then focuses on Iskandar Malaysia, unearthing its origins and subsequent growth trajectory. In particular, it sheds light on the tension between the federal government and the Johor government in managing the development of Iskandar Malaysia. The next section analyses the changes and deviations of Johor's housing policy. In particular, it investigates the provision mechanisms of low-cost housing. A probe into such issues enables a better understanding of the state's long-term housing challenges and solutions. Thereafter, a case study of Forest City is presented for its utility in underlining the inherent conflict of housing development in Johor. The paper concludes with a summary of the main arguments.
OVERVIEW OF HOUSING DEVELOPMENT IN JOHOR
Johor is a state located at the southern end of Peninsular Malaysia. With a total land area of 19,016 km and total population of 3.66 million, Johor is the fifth largest and second largest state respectively in physical and population terms (Department of Statistics 2017). According to the Town and Country Planning Department of Johor (2017), the state's population will reach 6.06 million by 2030.
• In 2015, a new party called Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) was formed following the departure of progressive Islamists from the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), leaving the latter to be a party dominated by conservative Islamists.
• Much of the groundwork for the formation of Amanah took place in Malaysia's southern state of Johor. A prominent Johor PAS activist, Mazlan Aliman, was among the first to propagate the idea that a new, progressive platform needed to be formed. This eventually led to the “Bakri Declaration” which forms the basis for the establishment of Amanah.
• Working in the Pakatan Harapan national opposition coalition, Amanah is eyeing for around a third of the state legislative assembly seats in Johor. It has potential in constituencies with mixed-ethnicity voter demographics, especially those with 30–45 per cent Chinese voters.
• Johor PAS is badly affected by the crossing over of a sizeable portion of their active members and leaders to Amanah. In the next election, it is likely that PAS will be decimated in the state if it refuses to partner with any other mainstream parties.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
Islam has always been an important factor in Malaysia's politics. Even political parties whose members are mainly non-Muslims cannot run away from debating the role of Islam in public policy. Since its establishment in 1951, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) has dominated the discourse on political Islam, and many others have had to respond and compete with it. It would not be wrong to say that the deepening Islamization in Malaysia over the years is the result of political competition between PAS and the ruling coalition. However, a new development took place in 2015 when a group of senior PAS leaders left the party to form Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah). PAS suddenly found a competitor who is also staking a claim on the right to define and shape the discourse on political Islam in the country.
This essay looks into the break-up and its implications on the politics in the southern state of Johor, since this was the state where much of the groundwork to form Amanah took place. Following this introduction, a brief history behind the break-up is provided. Attention is then given to Johor, with a discussion on the role of activists in the state that led to the formation of Amanah, the party's current organization, and their likely electoral potential. The essay concludes with a discussion on how the emergence of Amanah may affect PAS in Johor.
FROM PAS TO AMANAH
To understand how Amanah came to be, a brief review of the evolution of Islamist thoughts in Malaysia is useful, as it has heavily influenced PAS’ own evolution. The history behind PAS’ establishment in 1951 is a contested one. Arguably, it was closely tied to the strategy of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) which was founded six years earlier, especially to the latter's desire to widen its support base. UMNO at that time was worried that it was losing support from conservative Malay Muslims and wanted therefore to reposition itself as a champion of Islam. Thus, UMNO sponsored two Ulama Congress (Perjumpaan Alim Ulama Tanah Melayu), on 20–22 February 1950 and 23 August 1951. The purpose was to bring together conservative Muslim scholars to discuss, among others, steps that they could take to bring the country towards independence.
On 18 and 19 May 2017, the Indonesian military conducted a large-scale training exercise in the Natuna Seas, known as Latihan Perang Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat (War Exercise of the Rapid Reaction Attacker Troops). This exercise was witnessed by all the governors from the twenty-three provinces of Indonesia. On 19 May President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) came to Tanjung Datuk, Kabupaten Natuna (Natuna Regency) to observe the display of military weapons. He delivered a speech to 1,500 personnel there, advising the Indonesian military to upgrade their skills and defence system. Earlier he had conveyed his condolences to the families of the soldiers killed on 17 May during the military exercise due to a malfunctioning artillery cannon. The military exercise garnered increased attention from the Indonesian government to the Natuna Islands, following last year's tensions in the area.
In early 2016, three incidents took place in the Natuna Islands (Natunas) over the span of three months involving Indonesia and the People's Republic of China (hereafter, China). These took place on 19 March, 27 May and 17 June, when Chinese fishermen and their vessels encroached into Indonesian waters.
On 19 March, the Chinese fishing boat Kway Fey strayed into the Natunas’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and was arrested by the Indonesian navy for illegal fishing. A high-capacity Chinese coast guard vessel suddenly emerged and succeeded in freeing the fishing boat. Eight crew members were detained by the Indonesian authorities.
On 27 May, a Chinese fishing vessel entered the EEZ again, but this time, the Indonesian navy was better prepared. Not only did the Indonesian coast guard/navy detain the fishing vessel, but the Chinese patrol boat accompanying the vessel also refrained from intervening. Unsurprisingly, China's Foreign Ministry demanded the release of the fishermen, and its spokesman also said that Beijing and Jakarta “have different views” on the waters where the Chinese vessel was detained.
The third incident occurred on 17 June where a Chinese fishing vessel was again intercepted by an Indonesian patrol boat. According to a Chinese media report, one fisherman was injured but was rescued by a Chinese patrol boat, while the fishing vessel and seven fishermen were detained by the Indonesian authorities. The Chinese patrol boat failed to liberate the fishing vessel primarily because three Indonesian warships had reportedly arrived in the vicinity to stop the rescue effort.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
•In May 2017 the Indonesian military conducted a large-scaleexercise in the Natuna Islands. This was in the wake of threeincidents in 2016 that involved Chinese fishing boats. Jakartaaccused the vessels of “stealing fish” within the IndonesianExclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but Beijing considered these boatsto be carrying out “regular activities in Chinese traditional fishinggrounds”.
•Both Beijing and Jakarta acknowledge that the Natuna Islandsbelong to Indonesia. But while the Chinese avoid mentioning theissue of the islands having an EEZ, Jakarta openly claims that theislands definitely do have an EEZ.
•The two countries are “strategic partners”, and while Chinaneeds Indonesia to help realize some of its “One Belt One Road”ambitions, Jakarta eyes funding from Beijing to help its “MaritimePower Dream”.
•Indonesia has adhered to its claim of being an Archipelagic Stateand has relied on the United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea (UNCLOS) to support its territorial claims. China has alsoopenly stated that the South China Sea issue would be resolved withreference to UNCLOS.
•However, Indonesians are divided over the issue. There are thosewho wish to bring the problem to an international tribunal, becausethey have no faith in bilateral negotiations as a possible path to asolution. The rise of hardline Muslims in recent months and their critical view of Chinese investments in Indonesia may also affect Jakarta–Beijing relations.
• While the Natunas is likely to remain a perennial issue between Indonesia and China in the short to medium term, it is unlikely to derail the bilateral relationship as economics is likely to continue trumping politics in Sino-Indonesian relations, at least under Indonesian President Jokowi's administration. It is also unlikely to bring about an outright naval confrontation between Indonesia and China.
Historically, few topics have proven to be so controversial in international intellectual property as the protection of geographical indications (GIs). The adoption of TRIPS in 1994 did not resolve disagreements, and countries worldwide continue to quarrel today as to the nature, the scope, and the enforcement of GI protection nationally and internationally. Thus far, however, there is little literature addressing GI protection from the point of view of the Asia-Pacific region, even though countries in this region have actively discussed the topic and in several instances have promoted GIs as a mechanism to foster local development and safeguard local culture. This book, edited by renowned intellectual property scholars, fills the void in the current literature and offers a variety of contributions focusing on the framework and effects of GI protection in the Asia-Pacific region. The book is available as Open Access.