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1678 results in South-East Asian government, politics and policy

Page 41 of 84

  • 1 - A Brief Political History and Cast of Characters

  • Matthew J. Walton, St Antony's College, Oxford
  • Book:
    Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar
    Published online:
    22 December 2016
    Print publication:
    17 November 2016, pp 22-35

  • Summary

    This chapter provides a short account of Burmese political history from about the middle of the nineteenth century to the present. Although it necessarily gives a broad-brush overview, the purpose is to provide context for the actors and events in the following chapters. It also includes short descriptions of some of the individuals whose ideas about politics are analyzed throughout the book.

    To the best of current knowledge of Burmese history, the region during the precolonial era consisted of a succession of kingdoms and smaller political units, whose nebulous areas of control expanded and contracted through warfare and intermarriage. The Burman king Anawrahta founded the Pagan Dynasty in the early eleventh century and Theravāda Buddhism and Burman language and culture gradually became dominant over the next few centuries. The rulers of the final Konbaung Dynasty (founded by King Alaungpaya in 1752) were forced to contend with the incursions of the British, losing territory in stages beginning in 1824 and ending with the British deposition of King Thibaw in 1885 and the formal annexation of the entire country in 1886.

    The penultimate king of the Konbaung dynasty, Mindon, instituted a series of reforms in the economic, political, and religious spheres, designed to strengthen the Burmese state against the colonial threat, but was unsuccessful in this respect, especially as by that time he only directly controlled upper Burma (Koenig 1990 and Myo Myint 1987). Mendelson describes Mindon as “something of a bridge between the old royal order and the new world of the Europeans, and there is evidence that he was amply conscious of this” (Mendelson 1975, 83). Indeed, there were a number of innovative policies enacted during his reign that support this characterization, including an attempt to have greater control over the flow of information by publishing a newspaper (Charney 2006, 199).

    Faced with a severely weakened political base, Mindon sought to shore up his religious standing through reforms in that field as well, although this should not be seen as a purely instrumental move, as most descriptions of Mindon present him as a genuinely pious and religiously engaged ruler. However, Mendelson suggests the possible explanation that, in seeking to enhance his direct control over monastic activities, Mindon engaged in a divide and rule strategy that allowed the previously central monastic authority to be dispersed and connected more directly to him (Mendelson 1975, 112–114).

  • Appendix - Glossary of Burmese and Buddhist Terms

  • Matthew J. Walton, St Antony's College, Oxford
  • Book:
    Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar
    Published online:
    22 December 2016
    Print publication:
    17 November 2016, pp 200-205

  • Summary

    Abhidhamma (Bur. Abidama) Along with the suttas and the vinaya, one of the three groupings of the Tipitaka, the Pāli scriptures; philosophical discussion of the characteristics of phenomena.

    Abidama See abhidhamma.

    Agati (Bur.) Bias, partiality, corruption; the four agatis are desire, anger, fear, and ignorance.

    Aggañña Sutta Buddhist text from the Digha Nikaya; tells the story of human moral decline due to unrestrained craving and the subsequent installation of an authority figure to provide adjudication on conflicts; some Burmese Buddhists have interpreted it as providing legitimation for political authority, while others have seen it as evidence of the Buddha's endorsement of democratic elections.

    A-kutho (Pāli a-kusala) Unwholesome action; demerit; opposite of kutho/kusala.

    Anattā (Bur. Anatta) The common English translation is “no self,” although another Burmese understanding is “no control”; refers to the belief that what we commonly call the “self” is merely a collection of physical and mental processes that follow immediately after one another, creating the illusion of coherence; or that we can ultimately have no control over those physical and mental processes; along with dukkha and anicca, one of the three characteristics of existence according to Buddhist teachings.

    Aneitsa See anicca.

    Anicca (Bur. aneitsa) Impermanence; relates to an unavoidable entropic process that will affect all life but can also refer to a more specific understanding where all of existence comes into being and passes back into non-being in every successive moment; along with dukkha and anattā, one of the three characteristics of existence according to Buddhist teachings.

    Arahant (Bur. yahan) Fully enlightened individual.

    Aw-ga-tha (Bur.) Daily supplication of Burmese Buddhists affirming faith in the Buddha, dhamma, and sangha, and asking for protection from harm.

    Bhāvanā (Bur. bawana) Meditation; can also refer to moral practice more generally.

    Bawana See bhāvanā.

    Bodhisatta See hpaya-laung.

    Brahmavihāras (Bur. byama-so taya) The four sublime attitudes: mettā, karunā, mudita, and upekkhā.

    Byama-so taya See brahmavihāras.

    Cakkavatti (Bur. Setkya Min) Universal monarch; common figure in Theravāda tradition who will usher in the golden age of the future Buddha.

  • 2 - Building Blocks of a Moral Universe

  • Matthew J. Walton, St Antony's College, Oxford
  • Book:
    Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar
    Published online:
    22 December 2016
    Print publication:
    17 November 2016, pp 36-64

  • Summary

    “Democracy means acting in accordance with taya.”

    (Ashin Eindaga, public sermon, Yangon, January 31, 2011)

    The Burmese word taya has multiple layers of meaning that can refer to justice, law, truth, the Buddha's teachings or a combination thereof. Not only this, there are also multiple conceptions of “truth” that operate within Theravāda doctrine, as well as different levels on which people can grasp the Buddha's teachings, dependent on their moral and spiritual progress. The above quote from a Burmese monk's sermon illustrates the impossibility of parsing Burmese Buddhist views on, for example, democracy, without reference to the Buddhist concepts that they use to describe political beliefs and practices or to the overarching Theravāda moral framework within which those concepts are understood.

    This chapter lays out the basic components of the modernist Buddhist worldview which anchors the Burmese political thinking analyzed in this book. I consider this “moral universe” to be a relatively consistent set of beliefs and concepts within which many Buddhists in Myanmar cognitively organize and engage with their social and political worlds. This framework draws from Burmese sources and I occasionally note areas where Burmese interpretations of these basic components may differ from the more general conceptions that scholars designate as “ Theravāda.” I also point toward some of the ways in which Burmese thinkers have understood these principles to be relevant in navigating the social and political spheres, which are developed in later chapters. While Burmese Buddhists usually work with ideas that are part of the common conceptual framework of Theravāda Buddhism, the unique aspects of their perspectives on politics can come from several factors, including a stronger emphasis on a particular concept, a distinct interpretation of a common idea, a discussion or debate specific to Burmese society, or a response to a particular political and economic event or context.

    As noted in the Introduction, this particular iteration of a Theravāda moral universe is not itself universal, although I would argue that it has provided the framework for the dominant tradition of Buddhist political thought in Myanmar over the last 150 years and specifically for those writers, thinkers, and preachers whose ideas are examined here.

  • 4 - Order and Freedom/Liberation: Purposes of Politics

  • Matthew J. Walton, St Antony's College, Oxford
  • Book:
    Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar
    Published online:
    22 December 2016
    Print publication:
    17 November 2016, pp 96-126

  • Summary

    In the previous chapter, I argued that the conception of human nature provided by the moral universe contains two distinct perspectives on the conditions of human existence. On the one hand, being pu htu zin (Pāli puthujjana), beings intrinsically driven by desire and craving, humans are destined for lives filled with conflict, harming each other and engendering a perpetual cycle of violence. From another perspective, however, humans are capable of controlling and even overcoming their enslavement to desire, living morally worthy lives and (for a select few) stepping completely out of the cycle of suffering and continued existence (Pāli samsāra, Bur. thanthara). While it is analytically useful to separate these two perspectives, they are not mutually exclusive; in fact, the conception of human nature in the moral universe necessarily encompasses both points of view. However, when looking at Burmese Buddhist arguments regarding the end goals of politics, these twin aspects of human nature inform ideas that fall into two broad categories.

    If one takes human beings to be fundamentally fallible and unable to control their desires, the purpose of politics is to create an authority that has power over human actors, managing their conflicts, punishing them when appropriate, and constraining them to act in accordance with both moral and mundane laws. I call this the argument for order, most apparent in the tale of human decline in the Aggañña Sutta. Order not only implies political control over subjects, it also refers to the proper arrangement of society according to the laws of nature, which results in balance and harmony.

    The alternative end goal of politics is freedom/liberation. Although it is cumbersome to use this term, the two words have specific connotations in the Buddhist context and it is important to distinguish between them while also understanding how Burmese thinkers have connected mundane understandings of freedom to moral/spiritual freedom and liberation. “Freedom” would include a moral/spiritual understanding based on human potential to realize the overcoming of desire as well as more lawki (mundane or worldly, Pāli lokiya) understandings such as freedom from political and economic oppression or enslavement.

  • 5 - What is “Politics” and What Constitutes “Participation”?

  • Matthew J. Walton, St Antony's College, Oxford
  • Book:
    Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar
    Published online:
    22 December 2016
    Print publication:
    17 November 2016, pp 127-162

  • Summary

    There is no word or phrase in Burmese that approximates the meanings and implications of the English phrase “political participation.” The English term can include activities such as voting, running for office, contributing time or money to a campaign, organizing or attending a rally, signing a petition, or attending a public forum. It can also refer to actions that make the political aspects of everyday life recognizable as such, including debating a political issue with a neighbor, challenging racially biased hiring practices at a company, or insisting on more gender equity in housework. Chapter 3 included discussion of the multiple interpretations of the Burmese word nain ngan ye, which is almost universally used for “politics.” To most Burmese, the words for “politician” (nain ngan ye thama) and to “do politics” (nain ngan ye louk de) are associated almost completely with electoral or legislative politics and for many they also have strong negative connotations. Chapter 3 also noted the distinction between a more bounded and self-centered “party politics” as opposed to “national politics” (a-myo-tha nain ngan ye), which is what the military claims it engages in.

    In the 1940s, political figures such as General Aung San attempted to raise the status of nain ngan ye, to change people's perceptions of the practice, and to expand it to include every aspect of human interaction, yet found mixed success. After independence, political leaders failed to construct a system hospitable to broader citizen participation, an atmosphere that military leaders used to their advantage. The political dysfunction of the parliamentary period in the 1950s paved the way for the military to rule for almost fifty years while paradoxically claiming that it was not “doing politics.” During that period the only opportunities for most citizens to “participate” in “politics” were through government-controlled civic organizations or occasional campaigns to oppose the military government.

    Since 2011, Myanmar appears to be entering an era of renewed citizen participation in a system that is at least semidemocratic, decades after the failed 1988 uprising and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's claim that “people's participation in social and political transformation is the central issue of our time” (1994).

  • Introduction

  • Matthew J. Walton, St Antony's College, Oxford
  • Book:
    Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar
    Published online:
    22 December 2016
    Print publication:
    17 November 2016, pp 1-21

  • Summary

    On September 24, 2007, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks marched down the main thoroughfares of Yangon, a sea of dark maroon robes creating the lasting image of what the media would deem the “Saffron Revolution,” after the color commonly associated with monks’ robes in the country. This was the sixth day of monastic demonstrations in downtown Yangon, the culmination of a wave of dissent that had begun with citizen protests against the removal of fuel subsidies the month before and had escalated after reports that the Burmese military had violently subdued monks demonstrating in the northern city of Pakokku earlier in September. Beginning on September 18, the ranks of the monks had swelled each day and similar actions were taking place in urban areas across the country. This day they marched along with tens of thousands of lay people, although the monks had initially asked the laity not to join the demonstrations. Gradually, however, lay people did join, linking hands to create protective barriers around the monks as they marched and raising the banners of opposition groups, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and even the long-outlawed student union.

    While some monks began the march each afternoon at their home monasteries, eventually converging on Sule Pagoda in downtown Yangon, growing numbers gathered at the foot of the iconic golden dome of the Shwedagon Pagoda, a mile or so north of the city center. These monks met to chant protective prayers before marching, but the significance of the location was not lost on any Burmese observers. In addition to being the most revered Buddhist site in the country (strands of the Buddha's hair are allegedly buried beneath it), it has also been a focal point of political activity since the colonial period. The martyred leader of the independence movement, General Aung San, gave speeches in front of the pagoda in the 1940s and over forty years later, his daughter, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, invigorated the democracy movement of 1988 with a speech in the same location. The rhetoric and protest repertoire of the monks in 2007 perfectly mirrored the Shwedagon Pagoda's combination of religious and political symbolism.

  • The Geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream: Problems and Prospects

  • David Arase
  • Book:
    The Geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    07 November 2016, pp 1-31

  • Summary

    By now it should be clear that Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049 involves an ambitious geopolitical agenda. This discussion begins with a macrohistorical overview of East Asian geopolitics to provide a slightly different perspective on the motivations and constraints that shape China's desire for great power predominance in East Asia today. It then summarizes the main features of current Chinese geostrategy and concludes by noting certain dilemmas and limitations.

    Geopolitics refers to the contest among states to control geographic space in order to gain security against potential enemies, increase power and influence over others, and assure access to markets and resources. The geopolitical strategy of a state traditionally relies upon military power and alliance arrangements, making geopolitics an arena traditionally dominated by great powers.

    In the study of geopolitics it is axiomatic that major developments in the balance of power cause states to alter their geostrategies and change the geopolitical status quo. There is no greater development in the balance of power than when a state is added or subtracted from the number of great powers, and today we see China asserting a great power identity and challenging the post-cold war unipolar structure of global politics. Offensive realists argue that when a state reaches for great power status, the desire for security from other great powers compels it to seek hegemony in its home region. If successful, security motivations drive it to weaken other great powers in their respective home regions (Mearsheimer 2014). Thus, few realists would be surprised if China's great power aspirations require strategic dominance in East Asia. The question is whether it develops a suitable geostrategy.

    THE GEOPOLITICS OF EAST ASIA IN MACROHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

    Continental vs. Maritime Spheres

    Since the dawn of civilization, the geopolitical heartland or core of East Asia has been the vast fertile region bounded on the north by the Yellow River, the coastal seas to the east, the Pearl River in the south, and the Tibetan plateau and deserts to the west. The rich land and labour resources of the core permitted the rise of East Asian civilization and it became the seat of successive empires.

  • Foreword

  • David Arase
  • Book:
    The Geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    07 November 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • The Geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream: Problems and Prospects

  • David Arase
  • Book:
    The Geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    07 November 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Viewing China's current relations with neighbours in the East Asian littoral from geopolitical and macrohistorical perspectives enables us to evaluate China's current prospects for advancing its “peaceful rise”.

  • • Today the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) articulates a Chinese Dream that envisions a new age of Asian predominance to match China's memory of past golden ages. To realize this dream, China seeks geopolitical predominance in the East Asian littoral.

  • • Judging from the foreign policy goals and behaviour pursued by Xi Jinping, China appears likely to govern the region according to its core interests even when this may require other states to give up their lawful sovereign rights and prerogatives.

  • • Ever since the East Asian core region birthed Chinese civilization, this core has experienced cycles of political consolidation and disintegration. Although large swathes of the continental periphery were incorporated into the core, geopolitical factors that remain relevant today prevented the conquest of the maritime periphery.

  • • Peninsular and archipelagic states in East Asia's maritime periphery are again individually hedging or counterbalancing against Chinese efforts. This aids U.S. rebalancing strategy and frustrates China's effort to remove U.S. strategic influence from the region.

  • • Faced with mounting resistance, China must attempt to overcome this resistance with stepped up forcefulness or modify its ambitions. Domestic political constraints may make it difficult for Beijing to compromise, even though pushing harder for geopolitical predominance promises only greater costs and risk without improving prospects for ultimate success.

  • Foreword

  • Deepak Nair
  • Book:
    Learning Diplomacy
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 October 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Learning Diplomacy: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam Diplomats in Asean

  • Deepak Nair
  • Book:
    Learning Diplomacy
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 October 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • For nearly two decades, ASEAN has served as a vehicle for the postsocialist states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) to seek diplomatic recognition and enmesh their economies with the dominant discourses, structures, and visions of post-Cold War capitalist modernity.

  • • In scholarly and lay understandings of how CLMV states “integrate” through ASEAN, attention has been firmly on the political, security, and economic outcomes of ASEAN-CLMV interactions, with diplomacy viewed as a passive instrument to pursue such outcomes. Such a static view of diplomacy, I argue, obscures a vital mechanism in and through which these broader macro-social changes are being sought and accomplished.

  • • As they pursue modernist state projects, diplomats too must yield to experiences of learning and redefinition to express (and enable) the project of international “integration”.

  • • This paper examines such processes of learning and redefinition by studying the effects and consequences of immersion in English-based ASEAN multilateral work for the diplomats of CLMV states.

  • • It delves into the Attachment Officers Programme for CLMV diplomats at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta as an illustrative case to tease out the skills CLMV diplomats gain from their stints in ASEAN work. These skills — the ability to draft quasi-diplomatic documents in English, facility with speaking English, and an embodied ease in interacting with foreigners (both Asian and Euro-American) — are generic but also transposable as these junior diplomats embark on representational and negotiating roles for their countries.

  • • The paper demonstrates how stints in ASEAN multilateral diplomacy have emerged as a channel for exposure and grooming for CLMV diplomats as they themselves “integrate” with an English-based global (yet Eurocentric) diplomacy.

  • Learning Diplomacy: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam Diplomats in ASEAN

  • Deepak Nair
  • Book:
    Learning Diplomacy
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 October 2016, pp 1-32

  • Summary

    For nearly two decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has served as a vehicle for the postsocialist states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) to seek diplomatic recognition and enmesh their economies with the dominant discourses, structures, and visions of post-Cold War capitalist modernity. Notwithstanding the ambivalent consequences of CLMV membership for ASEAN, existing studies suggest that the benefits of membership for these newer and poorer states have been starkly apparent: from gaining entry to a panoply of ASEAN driven diplomatic arrangements spanning the Asia-Pacific, and securing leverage in managing their involvements with the Great Powers, to restructuring their regulatory and tariff regimes to accede to the WTO, and, cumulatively, consolidating the bases of regime security. In both scholarly and lay understandings of how CLMV states benefit from ASEAN, then, attention has been firmly on the political, security and economic outcomes of these processes, with diplomacy viewed as a passive instrument to pursue these ends. Such a static view of diplomacy, I argue, obscures a vital mechanism in and through which these broader macro-social changes are being sought and accomplished.

    Diplomats and their foreign ministries are not the only actors in the gamut of CLMV-ASEAN involvements and nor are they the final arbiters of foreign policy decision-making. That said, it is instructive to foreground diplomats and diplomacy in the context of ASEAN-CLMV interactions on two counts. First, ASEAN has historically been a prerogative of diplomats and the foreign ministry — from its early beginnings as an exclusively foreign ministry-led process, to contemporary tussles in the age of expansive “community building” where an otherwise weaker foreign ministry wrestles with, if not asserts itself over, other powerful ministries (Defence, Finance) by keeping watch over the procedures and coordination of ASEAN activities.

    Second, and more importantly, it is worth emphasizing the irreducibly diplomatic quality of the varied interactions through which official “ASEAN” is produced. Be they diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), trade representatives and officials from various other ministries, or leaders at Summits, individuals performing the state must be sited around a meeting table with table-top flags, room flags, and country place cards; must advance “national positions”; and must learn — if not cope — with a putatively “ASEAN Way” of negotiation and decision making.

Page 41 of 84