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1678 results in South-East Asian government, politics and policy

Page 36 of 84

  • Parties in the Periphery: Organizational Dilemmas in Indonesia's Kepri Province

  • Ulla Fionna
  • Book:
    Parties in the Periphery
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    26 December 2017, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    Executive Summary

  • • Political parties in Indonesia's Kepri (Kepulauan Riau, or Riau Islands) Province suffer from low organizational capacity. The set-up of their branch offices is barely adequate, with cadres and volunteers acting as the main administrators, while activities, funding and recruitment remain erratic, insufficient and disorganized.

  • • Rather uniquely, the province's capital Tanjungpinang is not its commercial centre, resulting in discrepancies in the organizational priorities of political parties present there. Instead, it is Batam, the commercial capital, that receives greater attention and is more attractive as a location for crowd-intensive events.

  • • Electoral trends and the parties’ lack of organizational capacity have allowed for local figures to exercise greater influence, particularly during elections. In contrast, the parties themselves take a back seat during elections while their ground teams take charge.

  • • The parties’ organizational incapacity in Kepri Province also translates into failure at the local level, and not much change can be expected in the near future.

  • Parties in the Periphery: Organizational Dilemmas in Indonesia's Kepri Province

  • Ulla Fionna
  • Book:
    Parties in the Periphery
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    26 December 2017, pp 1-23

  • Summary

    Introduction

    This paper investigates political parties in Indonesia's Kepulauan Riau (Kepri) Province, as a case of local politics occurring in decentralized Indonesia's periphery. As one of Indonesia's outermost provinces, Kepri Province's political dynamics are a significant indicator of how parties are faring in localities with typically limited infrastructure and little attention from central party offices.

    Although case studies of local politics and elections in Indonesia have proliferated since the commencement of decentralization (e.g., Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009), the investigation of parties in this particular region has so far been limited mainly to Choi Nankyung's work (2007, 2009). In her study on Batam elections, she pointed to the weaknesses of the parties, particularly regarding recruitment and election management. This Trends issue examines the parties’ overall organization at the provincial level, with particular attention being paid to how their activities are managed, and uses the 2015 gubernatorial election as a case study.

    The political and economic gaps between the provincial capital of Tanjungpinang and the commercial centre of Batam have created problems in organizational capacity for political parties in the province. While branches in Tanjungpinang co-ordinate the overall organization in Kepri, there is a strong need for the parties to focus their attention on the more populated and vibrant Batam. The provincial branches have consequently become largely inactive and undermanaged, and their activities infrequent and erratic. Local politics have thus come to be dominated by local figures who — although having party affiliations — gain popularity and public standing, first and foremost as individuals instead.

    KEPRI PROVINCE: SMALL YET STRATEGIC

    Kepri Province was established in 2002 as Indonesia's 32nd province (under Law No. 25, 2002), following increasing demands for secession from Riau Province. The idea had strong opposition from the provincial government in Riau at first for fear of loss of revenue from manufacturing, tourism, and natural resources (Amri 2016). Indeed, it was the combination of resentment caused by the inadequate size of revenues from local resources that were redistributed back to the region, dissatisfaction with the Riau provincial government in general, along with Malay cultural subnationalism, which inspired the idea to form a new province (Kimura 2010, p. 437).

  • Malaysia's Electoral Process: The Methods and Costs of Perpetuating UMNO Rule

  • Kai Ostwald
  • Book:
    Malaysia's Electoral Process
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    24 November 2017, pp 1-34

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Malaysia will hold its 14th general election before August 2018. Though it is not a foregone conclusion, few analysts expect an outcome different from the prior 13 general elections held since independence in 1957: a victory by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. UMNO's unbroken electoral dominance has several reasons. Many stem from the country's exemplary developmental performance under the helm of UMNO, with Malaysia having enjoyed relative social stability, seen substantial improvements in the living conditions of its citizens, and joined the ranks of upper middle-income economies. Yet Malaysia's electoral process has also played a central role, as it is manipulated in ways that confer fundamental advantages to the BN.

    This paper acts as a primer on elections in Malaysia by providing a systematic assessment of how the electoral process is strategically manipulated to secure the political dominance of UMNO and its coalition partners. It is divided into four parts. The first provides a brief overview of Malaysia's institutional structure and electoral history. The second brings Malaysia's electoral process into comparative perspective using recent data from the Electoral Integrity Project (Norris and Grömping 2017a). By these and other measures, Malaysia manipulates its electoral system more significantly than other countries with comparable levels of development and institutionalization. This has strong implications for our understanding of Malaysia's domestic politics; it also illustrates the importance of Malaysia as a case in the growing body of research on electoral integrity. The third section uses a theoretical framework from Birch (2011) to provide a structured overview of manipulations in each phase of Malaysia's electoral process. The pre-election period is the most significant, as extensive institutional bias creates a fundamentally uneven playing field for political competition by inhibiting challengers and shaping the preferences of voters towards the BN. The final section briefly discusses the range of costs entailed by the electoral manipulations. These are both direct in nature, for example, inefficient budgetary allocations and resultant fiscal burdens, as well as indirect, including disillusionment and subsequent disengagement with the political system among a substantial portion of the electorate.

    Ultimately, these costs impede Malaysia's efforts to attain higher levels of development.

  • Malaysia's Electoral Process: The Methods and Costs of Perpetuating UMNO Rule

  • Kai Ostwald
  • Book:
    Malaysia's Electoral Process
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    24 November 2017, pp vii-vii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Malaysia will hold its 14th general election before August 2018, bringing renewed focus on the nature of political competition in the country. This paper provides a systematic overview of the electoral process and an assessment of how it shapes the country's political environment.

  • • Political competition in Malaysia is extensively manipulated to provide the incumbent government substantial advantages in elections. Most of the manipulations are a result of institutional bias during the pre-election phase. They create a fundamentally uneven playing field that has entrenched the political dominance of the UMNO-led coalition.

  • • Electoral manipulations impose numerous costs. These include direct costs like the inefficient allocation of resources, as well as indirect costs like the exacerbating of ethnic divisions. Both channels hinder Malaysia's efforts to reach further developmental milestones.

  • • The high degree of electoral manipulation in Malaysia, juxtaposed against its successful developmental record and relative social stability, makes the country an important case for the growing body of research on electoral integrity and malpractice.

  • Foreword

  • Kai Ostwald
  • Book:
    Malaysia's Electoral Process
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    24 November 2017, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period

  • Puangthong R. Pawakapan
  • Book:
    The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    20 November 2017, pp 1-34

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Thailand's intransigent political crisis and polarization, marked by two military coups d’état and debilitating mass demonstrations since 2006, has been recognized as the orchestrated work of the anti-democratic alliance of the old powers against the rise of electoral politics. The alliance is conceptualized as “the network monarchy” by Duncan McCargo (2005), the “parallel state” by Paul Chambers (2015), and “the deep state” by Eugénie Mérieau (2016). Despite their differences in some aspects, these authors agree that the monarchy is the bedrock of the alliance while the military is its least popular component, especially after the violent crackdown of the popular uprising in May 1992 by the military government led by General Suchinda Khraprayun (7 April – 24 May 1992). The military's legitimacy comes from the claim that it is the major defender of the three pillars of Thailand — Nation, Religion and Monarchy. It lost much of its popularity following the May 1992 crackdown, however, and it had been perceived to have retreated to its barracks (Surachart 1998, p. 17). In other words, only putsches and military governments came to be considered political intervention on its part.

    Eugénie Mérieau (2016) noted the significance of the ideological apparatus of the deep state, her works tended to focus though on the role of the Constitutional Court, the apparent tip of this deep state. A study of the Thai military's civil affairs programmes, however, holds better potential for improving our understanding of the phenomenon.

    Despite warnings from Suchit Bunbongkarn (1987, p. 53) and Surachart Bamrungsuk (1998, pp. 76–77) about the military's involvement in civil affairs projects at the end of the counter-insurgency period, there has been no serious study on the matter. The Thai military's civil affairs programmes, especially in the post-counter-insurgency period, have drawn little attention from scholars, and studies of the Thai armed forces tend to focus on internal factionalism; conflict between elected civilian governments and military leaders; networks of cliques and classes; and personal ties between military leaders and the palace (Chambers and Napisa 2016; Surachart 1998, 2016; Yoshifumi 2008). At the same time, it is well known that since the toppling of the absolute monarchy in 1932, the Thai military has never restricted itself to an exclusively military role.

  • The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period

  • Puangthong R. Pawakapan
  • Book:
    The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    20 November 2017, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • The Thai military's Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) was in charge of a wide range of civil affairs projects during the country's struggle with the communist insurgency between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s.

  • • These projects — including rural development programmes, mass organizations and mobilization campaigns, and psychological operations — provided justification for the military to routinely penetrate the socio-political sphere.

  • • Since the Cold War drew to a close, little attention has been paid to ISOC's role and power within the state apparatus.

  • • Since the coups of September 2006 and May 2014 that toppled the elected governments, ISOC has been dangerously empowered and increasingly employed by the military regimes to dictate the country's political direction.

  • • The power of the Thai military is exerted not only through its use of force but also by means of its socio-political arms. ISOC represents a potent tool with which conservative elites can undermine and control electoral democracy and through which the military can maintain its power.

  • Foreword

  • Puangthong R. Pawakapan
  • Book:
    The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    20 November 2017, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Foreword

  • Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    The Growing "Strategic Partnership" between Indonesia and China Faces Difficult Challenges
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 November 2017, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • The Growing “Strategic Partnership” between Indonesia and China Faces Difficult Challenges

  • Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    The Growing "Strategic Partnership" between Indonesia and China Faces Difficult Challenges
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 November 2017, pp 1-25

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Indonesia established diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1950 soon after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Relations began steadily but experienced a hiccup in 1959–60 due to Jakarta's ban on retail trade, which affected many ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. This resulted in a Chinese Indonesian exodus to China, but cordial relations were quickly restored when Sukarno returned to power. As the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) grew to become a major actor, Sukarno moved further to the left: Sukarno's Indonesia and Mao Zedong's China eventually established the Jakarta–Hanoi–Beijing Axis during the 1962–65 period.

    The struggle between the PKI and the Army led to the 1965 abortive coup and the dissolution of the PKI, followed by the fall of Sukarno and the triumph of the Army represented by General Suharto. Suharto considered the PRC, which supported the PKI, a major threat, and he froze diplomatic ties for twenty-three years until 1990. Tensions remained, however, and it was only after the fall of Suharto in 1998, and especially after the departure of President B.J. Habibie, that the relationship between Jakarta and Beijing became cordial again. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gur Dur) and Megawati Sukarnoputri started the improvement in relations. Both presidents were in office only for a short period, however, and more significant improvement took place only during the Yudhoyono presidency, which lasted for ten years, and in the subsequent Joko “Jokowi” Widodo period.

    Indonesia today is a populous and resource-rich country but has a weak state with major economic and political problems. The Jokowi government has been eager to develop Indonesia's economy, while China now is an emerging superpower with surplus capital, goods and labour in need of overseas markets and development opportunities. It is obvious that there is mutual need between Indonesia and China. However, various issues in this cooperation remain, but in the short term, it appears that there will be more cooperation than competition.

    THE YUDHOYONO PRESIDENCY (20 OCTOBER 2004 TO 19 OCTOBER 2014)

    China in the twenty-first century has been eager to improve relations with Indonesia. Even before Yudhoyono was officially sworn in as president, the PRC had sent a high-level trade delegation to meet him at his residence in Bogor to discuss future cooperation.

Governing Taiwan and Tibet
  • Democratic Approaches
  • Baogang He
  • Published by:
    Edinburgh University Press
    Published online:
    25 October 2017
    Print publication:
    08 July 2015
  • China is facing a national identity crisis. This is compounded by Tibet and Taiwan, where significant proportions of both populations do not identify with the Chinese nation-state. Could democracy realistically address the problems in China's national identity? Chinese nationalists argue it cannot; Chinese liberals remain unduly silenced. Baogang He opens up a dialogue in which Chinese liberals can offer viable alternatives in defence of key democratic principles and governance. He upholds the search for a political space in which democratic governance in China can feasibly be developed.

  • Foreword

  • Micah F. Morton
  • Book:
    The Rising Politics of Indigeneity in Southeast Asia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    25 October 2017, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • The Rising Politics of Indigeneity in Southeast Asia

  • Micah F. Morton
  • Book:
    The Rising Politics of Indigeneity in Southeast Asia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    25 October 2017, pp 1-29

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Throughout much of Southeast Asia and beyond, we are witnessing a resurgence of identity politics framed around notions of “nativeness” or “indigeneity” in opposition to “foreignness” or “otherness” (Dominguez and Metzner 2017). For example, in Myanmar and Thailand there is a rising trend among some members of the ethnic Burman and Thai Buddhist majorities towards the heightened politicization of Buddhism as an exclusive marker of the borders of national belonging (Hutt 2016; Jerryson 2011; Keyes 2016; Than 2015; Walton et al. 2017). In Indonesia, some groups are reviving an earlier public discourse of “pribumi-ism” (“indigenism”) alongside “political Islam” in order to address what are perceived as the ethnic roots of growing social inequalities in the country (Suryadinata 2017; Burhani 2017). Meanwhile, in Malaysia ethnic Malay nativism is on the rise as the ruling party attempts to shore up its support among the majority-Malay population (Lim 2016; Millar 2017). On the other side of the Straits of Johor in Singapore some nativists are making public assertions of “Singapore for Singaporeans” (Fenn 2014).

    These resurgences of “nativism” are occurring at a particular juncture in history when states in the region are attempting to, first, exert more direct control over hitherto peripheral regions within their territorial borders, and, second, promote greater transregional economic integration within the utopian community of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These two processes of national and regional economic integration, while highly uneven and contested, are occurring hand in hand. In addition, while state-driven economic growth is generating great wealth throughout Southeast Asia, it is doing so in a highly uneven manner, leading to rising rates of inequality. On a more global scale, this resurgence is occurring amidst rising concerns over the ascendance of China and India to positions of global supremacy, and the waning of U.S. imperialism.

    In the midst of these resurgences of “nativism” on the part of various national publics throughout Southeast Asia another related yet distinct movement being framed around altogether different notions of “Indigeneity” is occurring on the national and regional scale among diverse ethnic groups that have long experienced marginalization and oppression by more dominant ethnic groups during periods of European colonialism and post-colonial nationalism.

  • The Rising Politics of Indigeneity in Southeast Asia

  • Micah F. Morton
  • Book:
    The Rising Politics of Indigeneity in Southeast Asia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    25 October 2017, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Amidst rising trends of “nativism” and “xenophobia” throughout Southeast Asia, a related yet distinct movement framed around altogether different notions of “Indigeneity” is occurring among various long-oppressed ethnic minorities.

  • • These groups and their distinct claims of Indigeneity and linkages with the regional and global Indigenous movements are all arising in response to the heightened incorporation of their communities and territories into expanding nation states.

  • • The Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) Foundation based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, is playing a key role in promoting solidarity, networking and capacity-building among Indigenous Peoples in Asia as well as linking local communities with international funders and advocates.

  • • As highly marginalized communities residing predominantly in the region's natural-resource-rich areas, Indigenous Peoples are bearing the brunt of the downside of ASEAN's “ambitious investment plan” and “resource-extractive model of development”.

  • • Regardless of ASEAN's overall stance of non-recognition of Indigenous Peoples as a distinct community, Indigenous Peoples in the region are increasingly identifying in solidarity with a larger, distinctive collectivity of Indigenous Peoples within the framework of ASEAN.

Page 36 of 84