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Why do some candidates prefer to use clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters while others do not? Building on existing explanations that highlight the importance of voters’ demand for particularistic goods and parties’ capacities to supply goods and monitor voters, this article focuses on candidates’ political careers. It argues that how candidates begin mobilizing voters to participate in rallies and elections becomes crucial in explaining their preferences to use clientelism. Candidates who receive a salary based on their ability to mobilize voters—paid party activists—are more likely to use clientelism than candidates who are not paid for their political work, unpaid party activists.
This article examines the nature of the emerging regional economic regime in the Americas and argues that the dominant approach to economic governance is one defined by the assertion of U.S. power in the region and oriented toward distinctively U.S. interests and preferences. This has been clearly evident in the evolution of the Free Trade Area of the Americas but also, with the deceleration and fragmentation of that process during 2002 and 2003, in the growing prioritization of bilateralism. The leverage afforded by the bilateral negotiation of trade agreements acts to situate primary influence in shaping the rules that constitute the regional economic regime, and the primary functions associated with governing in this context, firmly within the agencies of the U.S. state. This essay therefore explores how the hegemonic power of the United States manifests itself in the substance of the hemispheric project and the shape of the economic regime associated with it.
Using Canada's relations with the Americas as a case study, this article seeks to better understand the link between identity and foreign policy. It argues that there is a gap between the Canadian government's recent efforts to construct a state identity increasingly turned toward the Americas and Canadians' national identity as it is expressed through public opinion. It concludes that the most plausible explanation for this gap probably has to do with Canada's European cultural heritage. The analysis shows that the projection of national identity into foreign policy is a much more complex process than the projection of state identity.
Using an innovative survey of protest participants and nonparticipants from five major street demonstrations in Mexico City in 2011 and 2012, this study tests the assumption that influences on protest participation vary across different types of events; namely, ritual demonstrations and reactive protests. The comparison is based on two assumptions: that these are two of the dominant forms of protest in contemporary Latin America, and that specifying the context for different types of social movement participation provides a better understanding of the individual mobilization process for groups seeking to defend their rights or gain new benefits. The comparative analyses reveal some crucial differences. Political interest and previous political experience are more influential in the decision to take part in reactive demonstrations. For ritual demonstrations, the decision to participate tends to be driven more by personal and organizational connections.
This article addresses the relationship between institutionalized citizen participation at the municipal level and clientelism. It argues, contrary to what the literature has suggested, that the institutionalization of local citizen participation does not necessarily lead to the erosion of clientelism. Drawing on a comparative case study of participatory experiences in two Mexican municipalities, León and Nezahualcóyotl, this study argues that participation does matter, but that not all types of participation have the same effect on state-society relations. Institutional design is important in assessing the significance of popular participation in defining the relationship between the state and its citizens, but informal practices are even more important determinants of citizens' level of autonomy in institutionalized participatory mechanisms. This level of autonomy, in turn, determines the potential for such local institutions to become a means to overcome clientelism as the mechanism traditionally characterizing state-society relationships in Mexico.
Brazil's conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família (Family Allowance) has gained a worldwide reputation as an effective antipoverty program. However, studies applying the dominant headcount poverty measure, which counts the percentage of households falling below a given poverty line, only credit the program with a first-order reduction in poverty (and extreme poverty) of 0.15 to 1.88 percentage points. This raises the puzzle of how such a modest impact could lead to Bolsa Família's political popularity. This article argues that Bolsa Família does dramatically reduce poverty, but measuring this impact requires thinking of poverty as how far a household is from meeting its basic human needs; choosing a continuous variable; and using income gap, intensity, and ordinal measures that reflect this conceptualization. The more substantial reduction of poverty intensity helps explain the program's reputation.
The sequencing of transitions to democracy and to a market economy shaped the outcome of labor law reform and prospects for expanded labor rights in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Argentina and Brazil experienced democratic transitions before market economic reforms were consolidated in the 1990s. During the transition, unions obtained prolabor reforms and secured rights that were enshrined in labor law. In posttransition democratic governments, market reforms coincided with efforts to reverse earlier labor protections. Unable to block many harmful reforms, organized labor in Argentina and Brazil did conserve core interests linked to organizational survival and hence to future bargaining leverage. In Chile this sequence was reversed. Market economic policies and labor reform were consolidated under military dictatorship. During democratic transition, employers successfully resisted reforms that would expand labor rights. This produced a limited scope of organizational resources for Chilean unions and reduced prospects for future improvements.