Many states, almost invariably among those most ignored in international relations theory, exhibit some inconsistent and initially incoherent behaviour on the world stage. In particular, some of them have appeared to invite international scrutiny of domestic practices on which their governments rely to stabilize domestic affairs and to stay in power, but for which they could be punished, often by the very state or organization whose attention they request. The introduction provides an overview of the book’s argument and its implications for international relations theory and practice, especially when these states are miscoded as strong supporters of the norms they in fact violate as part of their domestic stabilization. When powerful actors make concessions in order to acquire a success case within their global missions of rights promotion, democratization or good governance reforms, they may also contribute to a slow erosion of those same norms.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) brought to greater prominence a question that has long vexed Australian foreign policy-makers: could they avoid choosing between the US security alliance and Australia’s complementary economic ties with China? Given the immense political capital invested in the BRI by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, it was perhaps inevitable that Australia – like many other countries – had to declare its position. By so doing, however, Australia was forced to reckon with an issue that pitted its security interests directly against its economic ones. This chapter traces Australia’s evolving position on the BRI from 2016 to 2020, its interrelated justifications for rejecting the BRI, and the political and economic consequences of the decision. We show that debate over the BRI disrupted a longstanding consensus about the centrality of free trade and investment to Australian foreign economic policy. The BRI, we argue, signified a turning away from Australia’s previously enthusiastic support for global free trade to a more qualified security-sensitive approach.

Between 2016 and 2020 the Australian government established a regional health security diplomacy project, known as the Indo–Pacific Centre for Health Security. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the initiative looked prescient. Its roots, however, could be traced back to Australia’s engagement with health security in the early 2000s. Then, as now, the government aligned its foreign policy agenda with health – specifically emerging infectious diseases – as a ‘scaled up’ approach comprising diplomatic, aid, and research and development. To explain Australia’s evolving relationship with health security this chapter proceeds in four parts. First, health security is situated with the recent tradition of ‘non-traditional security’. The second part examines the establishment of health security as a core theme in Australia’s response to global challenges. The third part turns to the government’s strategy and especially the Indo–Pacific Centre for Health Security both before and during the COVID-19 era. Finally, the chapter examines how Australia conceptualised its leadership role in regional health security.

This chapter argues that in the period under review, Australia’s foreign-policymaking faced a number of challenges, most notably in its handling of bilateral relations with China, which took a significant turn for the worse. Unfortunately, this was also a time when Australians of Chinese heritage made little contribution to foreign policy. Despite Australia’s multicultural identity and a professed embrace of the strength and diversity of its growing migrant populations, low numbers of Chinese Australians were working in government and politics. By drawing on data from the 2019 Lowy Institute Poll on Australian attitudes towards the world, this chapter argues that Asian Australians had different views on foreign policy compared to those born in Australia. If Australia is to truly embrace its growing migrant population to engage confidently with its Asian neighbours, the chapter concludes, the views of Asian Australians in political debates and policymaking matters need to be formally recognised through greater representation.

The concluding chapter sums up the existential crisis of the peripheral-patronage state and reasserts its methodological and practical importance, particularly in analyses that presume to derive intention from action and see this as evidence of internalization of, even consent to, norms of human rights and good governance. It then explores the possibility of significant international change, especially from the rise of states whose domestic authority skews more towards patronage than Weberian bureaucracy, and who style themselves as respecters of aid-recipient governments’ sovereignty rather than imposing rights-based conditionalities. China's potentially transformative role receives most attention. Ultimately, because allegedly rising powers may want different rules but are unlikely to advance a rule-free global order, peripheral-patronage states’ need to strategize is unlikely to undergo radical change. This is suggestive of a functionally differentiated hierarchy of states, albeit one whose proper functioning hinges on pretending that hierarchy does not exist.

From 2016 to 2020 Australia put in place new legislation to counter perceived threats to Australia’s security, including the National Security (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (Cth) (‘Foreign Interference Act’), Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Cth) (‘FITS’) and Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020 (Cth) (‘Foreign Relations Act’). These domestic laws, which are enforced by the police and other security agencies, were presented as a response to foreign interference in Australian politics and democracy, especially by the People’s Republic of China. During the same period, Australia’s relationship with China deteriorated markedly, including a freeze on high-level contacts and trade retaliation. This chapter focuses on the impact of these new domestic laws on Australia’s international relations and assesses whether they were a significant factor in the worsening of Australia–China relations during this period.

Values and gender are an increasingly established part of Australian foreign policy. This chapter explores their role in Australia’s engagement in the world from 2016 to 2020. We argue that gender equality continued to serve as a tangible expression of Australian identity and values in foreign policy, informing Australia’s key international alliances and relationships. First, we analyse the construction and expression of national identity through the values Australia projected in its foreign policy and international relations, and how these values evolved. Next, we focus on who represented Australia and how Australia was represented in foreign policy through its diplomacy, security and development relationships. We also analyse how Australia distinguished itself from other states, which we illustrate with reference to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Third, we critically examine the soft power aspect of Australian foreign policy, and how values and gender equality principles were used to enhance Australia’s reputation.

Between 2016 and 2020 Australia’s foreign and strategic policy became more tightly focused on South-East Asia and the Pacific, which it identified as its ‘immediate region’. This reflected the government’s concern about the strategic consequences of emerging great-power competition, and particularly the assumption that China’s presence in these subregions equated to greater influence. While this assumption influenced Australia’s strategic and foreign policy choices, it was largely untested. Australia responded by increasing its engagement in both subregions to solidify its relationships, bolster its influence, and reassure its regional partners of its continued commitment. But Australia had different geostrategic perceptions and interests than South-East Asia and the Pacific. Its failure to acknowledge the agency of these neighbours sometimes led to counterproductive strategic and foreign policy decisions.

The period from 2016 to 2020 was dominated by the rivalry between China and the United States, and by Australia’s relative position amid this rivalry. At the same time, a debate about how to combat climate change and its role in foreign affairs took place in the backdrop to this great-power rivalry. In this chapter we examine the interaction of political and public commentary around these three issues – the United States, China and climate change – with the insights available from polling data. We also examine how opinion on these issues fed into ongoing and longstanding debates. Our results suggest that there was both continuity and change in public opinion on international affairs between 2016 and 2020. Trust in the two great powers declined significantly. At the same time, support for Australia’s military alliance with the US remained strong. In terms of threat perceptions, concerns around climate change remained high, reflecting a lack of policy certainty and a failure to act decisively at the federal level. Accompanying this steady trend of high concern around climate-based security risks was a sharp increase in the perception of China as a potential threat to Australian security interests.