Chapter 5 tackles the question of the applicability of belligerent reprisals in non-international armed conflict. After assessing the merits and difficulties associated with previous reflections on the topic, it devises a new methodology to approach the issue. Then, it puts the notion of belligerent reprisals in relation with the two features of inequality of status between States and non-State armed groups, and equality of rights and obligations for parties to non-international armed conflicts. A careful reading of the travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions upholds an interpretation that links belligerent reprisals with the latter principle, and that places reciprocity at the basis of both the applicability and the purpose of the measure in non-international armed conflicts. The chapter concludes with the impact of this formalization on such key questions as the requirement of imputability to a State of the original IHL violation and the actual features of the principle of equality. It suggests that the focus be shifted to the idea of equilibrium of rights and obligations, and that belligerent reprisals be seen as a key enabler of it.

This chapter empirically analyzes how portfolios of external finance impact aid agreements. The chapter integrates data on external debt and foreign aid to establish a comprehensive picture of developing countries' portfolios of external finance, demonstrating that these have become less reliant on traditional donors over time. The analysis tests if a greater share of finance from Chinese or private sources is associated with favorable terms from traditional donors, using measures of aid volume, infrastructure project share, and conditions attached to World Bank projects. The findings indicate that as countries draw a greater share of their external finance from nontraditional sources, they are more likely to receive aid on preferred terms. The relationship is stronger for countries of strategic significance to donors and, especially, those with higher donor trust.

Chapter 3 focuses on the figure of the jihadist in the context of the Syrian Civil War. Outlawed as a terrorist by the Security Council and perceived as a security threat in home states, this latest version of the enemy of humanity seems to have nothing in common with previous foreign fighters. The aim of the chapter is to re-inscribe this actor within the longer history of foreign volunteering. It shifts from domestic debates to national courtrooms, showing how the jihadist combatant gets constantly split in two: idealist and fanatic, hero and villain, martyr and freedom fighter. Based on previous images of the foreign fighter, these dichotomies highlight different conceptions of freedom and hence problematize its current conflation with terrorism. The chapter ends with a digression on the laws of war, revealing the persisting cultural bias used against certain foreign combatants through the domestic application of IHL.

This chapter explores how the conceptual shift from ‘tribes’ to ‘ethnic groups’ contributed to the dismantling of the standard of civilisation. Whereas the binary distinction between civilised nations and primitive tribes reinforced the imperial hierarchy between European and non-European peoples, the concept of ethnicity is characterised by a cultural relativism that acknowledges the formal equality of all peoples. The chapter also shows how these conceptual changes enabled the reimagining of the international order as an ‘anarchical’ system populated by sovereign nation-states: at the very moment that anthropologists were moving away from colonial notions of ‘primitive society’ and ‘ordered anarchy’, IR theorists were adopting this vocabulary to conceptualise their own object. In this way, IR effectively accumulated the functions of colonial anthropology as the scientific vehicle for the study of the modern state’s primitive ‘other’. The chapter wraps up with a discussion of indigenous rights and their relationship to minority rights.

It must be remembered, too, that the belief in spirits and ghosts, and the return of the dead is far from having disappeared among educated people, and that many who are sensible in other respects find it possible to combine spiritualism with reason. A man who has grown rational and sceptical, even, may be ashamed to discover how easily he may for a moment return to a belief in spirits under the combined impact of strong emotion and perplexity.

Chapter 3 highlights several instances of State practice where the reciprocity paradigm continues to influence belligerent reprisals. Its bearing emerges from those formalizations of the mechanism that stress the purpose of restoring the balance in rights and obligations unduly disturbed by a breach of the laws of armed conflict. The chapter will first retrace this interest in several positions expressed by States before, during, and in the aftermath of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference that led to the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It will then focus on the provisions of military manuals, with a particular focus on US practice and the latest Department of Defense Law of War Manual. Finally, it will provide an extensive and, under many respects, unprecedented analysis of the Italian case-law on World War II atrocities: this judicial practice, which has been revived only recently, has brought to the fore several elements that are strongly associated with reciprocity. The chapter will thus highlight notable examples in which the reciprocity paradigm contributes to defining the purpose and function of belligerent reprisals.

Chapter 8 analyzes East Asian regionalism projects, which demonstrate that the choices of governments and non-state actors constitute the structure of East Asian international relations, albeit within evolutionary constraints. East Asian countries are not integrating in a European Union sense, but their desire for and efforts at regional cooperation remain strong. East Asian regionalism was underdeveloped compared to Europe and some other developing regions, but an economic regionalism open to non-East Asian countries emerged when the Cold War ended. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis trigged greater East Asian efforts at creating more exclusive economic and financial groups, but East Asia has shifted to mega regionalism since the early 2010s, reflecting growing great power rivalries between Japan, China, and the United States. Other East Asian countries, particularly those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have their own agency and drive the process in more immediate terms.

Chapter 2 explores the figure of the white mercenary in the context of decolonization by analysing the outcome of the Luanda trial and the response of the UK government to the indictment of its nationals in Angola. This is essential to highlight the fundamental distinction between these foreign fighters and the volunteers of the Spanish Civil War: fighting for personal profit as opposed to fighting for a noble cause, respectively. However, Western soldiers of fortune seem to be moved by certain political ideals: namely, to avoid a communist takeover of the African continent. The figure of the adventurer encountered in the interwar period reappears here, illustrating the ambivalent passions underlying attempts to ban or endorse mercenarism. The chapter ends with an analysis of the travaux of Art. 47 of API which frames the eventual exclusion of mercenaries from prisoner of war status in international armed conflicts.

This chapter considers Ghana's use of debt-based financial statecraft, describing the country's early embrace Chinese loans and substantial borrowing in international bond markets. Despite diversifying its sources of external finance, the government had limited success leveraging its reduced reliance on traditional donor funds in aid negotiations. Based on interviews with government and donor officials, the chapter demonstrates that, while the Ghanaian government initially secured some negotiation wins, it ultimately struggled to achieve its preferred outcomes with donors on either economic policy or financial management. The chapter attributes these difficulties to donors' diminished perception of Ghana's significance and a lack of donor trust, underscoring the complexities of using alternative finance as leverage in aid negotiations.