Chapter 12 examines the DNVP’s record as a member of the Marx’s coalition government from its initial successes from the passage of the Work Hours Law and the Unemployment Insurance Act in the spring and summer of 1927 through its failure to develop an adequate legislative response to the increasingly desperate situation in which the German farmer found himself to its awkward embrace of The Law for the Protection of the Republic in May 1927. The DNVP’s situation in the Marx cabinet was further complicated by a virtual mutiny in the Stahlhelm against collaboration with the existing system of government and a revolt in the countryside spearheaded by regional RLB affiliates RLB that were no longer satisfied with the DNVP’s defense of agriculture’s economic welfare. Increasingly desperate to salvage something of its second experiment in governmental participation, the DNVP staked everything on the passage of a Reich School Law that encountered such strong opposition from the DVP that not only was the bill rejected but the governmental coalition collapsed.

The chapter explains why the EU explicitly decided not to intervene in private fair trade governance on two separate occasions, in 1999 and in 2009. The chapter starts by comparing private fair trade governance schemes, including Fairtrade International, Rainforest Alliance, and UTZ Certified. It then discusses why EU policymakers in the 1990s focused on Fairtrade only and declined to intervene because of the specific North–South trade dynamics of this issue area; the lack of concrete productive opportunities in the EU; and institutional constraints of the international trade regime. The Fair Trade movement’s successful harmonization of complementary private governance schemes also contributed to the EU’s non-interventionist approach. The broadening of the policy domain beyond Fairtrade in the early 2000s did not lead to fragmentation concerns, since differences among the schemes were framed as commercial and economic-ideological in nature and not problematized as a fragmentation issue. Active lobbying by and on behalf of private governance schemes ensured this outcome, resulting in a market for private governance that remains free of public intervention.

Chapter 16 explores the tensions within the DNVP that culminated in the secession of twelve moderates from the DNVP Reichstag delegation in December 1929. It begins with an examination of Christian-Social dissent in the DNVP and moves from there to a discussion of Hugenberg’s efforts to unify a badly divided party behind the mantra of anti-Marxism at the annual party congress in Kassel in late November. These efforts were to little avail, and in the vote on the controversial imprisonment paragraph of the so-called “Freedom Law” twenty-three DNVP deputies either voted No or were absent for the vote. In the aftermath twelve DNVP deputies left the party. While the young conservatives around Treviranus struggled desperately to preserve a modicum of unity among the secessionists, they were foiled both by the CNBLP’s determination to effect a realignment of the German party system along vocational and corporatists lines and by the decision of the Christian-Socials to launch a new party of their own. In the meantime, Hugenberg continued to enjoy strong support at the local and regional levels of the DNVP party organization and experienced little difficulty in retaining control of the party.

The final chapter of the book compares the findings from the four issue areas and links them with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. The chapter then asks: Given the EU’s interventions, what have been the impacts on the functioning of private governance and the larger policy field? The chapter argues that the regulatory impacts are twofold: The interventions have both restructured the field of private governance and largely retained private actors’ governing authority and private governance space. The interventions impose baselines that cannot be undercut and that arguably have resulted in some sustainability improvements. At the same time, the interventions are relatively limited since the standards and procedural regulations are minimum baselines with several evident gaps. This situation allows for policy exports and spillovers from private to public governance, both within the EU and beyond, which can potentially strengthen public policy. The chapter then discusses the generalizability of the theory by discussing examples of public interventions at both the international and the domestic level beyond the EU. The book concludes with avenues for further research.

The chapter explains why the EU has so far failed to intervene in private fisheries governance. The chapter starts with comparing private governance schemes since the 1990s. It then analyses EU policy discussions until late 2017, showing that until very recently all involved stakeholders agreed that the fragmentation of the private governance market needed to be addressed. Differences of opinion on the desirability of publicly supporting product differentiation, however, have continued to exist. While most stakeholders consider the costs such differentiation would impose on European producers too high and therefore support procedural regulation, the European Parliament has consistently favored both standards and procedural regulations in the form of an EU-level certification and eco-labeling scheme. Attempts to create a policy failed in 2008–2009 when a legislative proposal for procedural regulation was abandoned, and in 2013 when the discussion was integrated in the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. A 2016 report on feasible policy options, moreover, questioned the fragmentation of the private governance market, casting further doubt on the likelihood of public intervention.

Chapter 11 covers the period from the DNVP’s resignation from the first Luther cabinet in October 1925 to its reentry into the national government in January 1927. In particular, this chapter examines the deteriorating situation in the German countryside and increased pressure from organized agriculture for the DNVP to rejoin the national government in order to protect the domestic market against agricultural imports from abroad. Industry, too, had become frustrated with the DNVP’s absence in the national government and intensified its pressure on the party for a reassessment of its coalition strategy. But the patriotic Right – and particularly the Stahlhelm, which had fallen more and more under the influence of Theodor Duesterberg and the militantly anti-Weimar elements on its right wing – strongly resisted any move that might presage the DNVP’s return to the government. Shocked by the impressive showing of middle-class splinter parties in the Saxon state elections in late October 1926, the DNVP responded to overtures from the DVP and Center to explore the possibility of reorganizing the government and entered into negotiations that ended with its entry into the fourth Marx cabinet in January 1927.

Chapter 17 examines the repercussions of the December secession from the DNVP Reichstag delegation upon the fate of the Müller cabinet and the decision to appoint Heinrich Brüning as the head of a new government based upon the parties of the middle and moderate Right. The architect of the Brüning cabinet was military strategist Kurt von Schleicher, who hoped either to force Hugenberg’s resignation as DNVP party chairman or trigger a second secession on the party’s left wing that was more extensive than the one that had taken place the preceding December. But the support that Hugenberg enjoyed at the base of the DNVP organization was unassailable, with the result that the dissidents within the DNVP Reichstag delegation found themselves increasingly isolated within the party. Consequently, when Hugenberg decided to support Social Democratic efforts to force the dissolution of the Reichstag in July 1930, their only recourse was to leave the party in a second secession that was, to be sure, more extensive than the first but failed to shake Hugenberg’s control of the party.

Chapter 1 offers a brief overview of right-parties in the late Second Empire, including the German Fatherland Party, before moving to a more thorough analysis of the way in which the German Right reacted to Germany’s defeat in World War I and the revolutionary upheaval it left in its wake. It focuses in particular to unify the various factions of the German Right that had existed before World War I into a new political party, the German National People’s Party (DNVP), in preparation for the elections to the Weimar National Assembly and the Prussian Constitutional Assembly in January 1919. It also examines the reluctance with which the leaders of the German Conservative Party – in particular its parliamentary leader Count Kuno von Westarp – embraced the new party and the problem this posed for the DNVP’s future political development.

Chapter 5 focuses on the various patriotic associations that stood outside the orbit of organized political conservatism and that represented an important counter-point to the way in which organized economic interests sought to use the DNVP and other non-socialist parties to promote their own agenda. The most important of these organizations was the Pan-German League, which along with its client organization, the German National Racist Protection and Defense League, espoused a particularly virulent brand of racial antisemitism that found a warm reception in many quarters of the DNVP. The patriotic Right also included the civilian defense leagues, or Einwohnerwehren, that played an important role in the suppression of revolutionary Marxism in the immediate postwar period as well as veterans’ organizations like the Stahlhelm and Young German Order. Efforts to unite these organizations in an umbrella organization known as the United Patriotic Leagues of Germany (VVVD) were only partly successful.

Chapter 4 explores the ways in which the DNVP tried to reach out to groups that had stood outside the orbit of the prewar conservative parties, namely Catholics, youth, and women at a time when it adopted an increasingly hard line against Germany’s republican system and the foreign policy of the Fehrenbach and Wirth governments. Under Helfferich’s leadership, the DNVP was able to exploit the inflationary spiral of the early 1920s and the distress that this created in diverse sectors of German society, but particularly among the German middle strata. It was also able to solidify its position in the German agricultural community by virtue of its outspoken opposition to the continuation of war-time controls over farm prices and production quotas. The DNVP was thus able to build upon the organizational growth of the previous year and a half and to consolidate its position as the political agent of Germany’s conservative milieu.

We have arrived at economics, even though this is a book about politics. Therefore, lest we forget, here again is the overall objective. In our populist age, some political scientists should start paying special attention to a matter that I have not yet explicated, but which I have already described several times as the destruction caused by what economists call creative destruction.