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We live in a populist age; it threatens vital elements of American democracy; it encourages us to reconsider fundamental political principles; some scholars should relate to those principles in their work, and some political scientists should do that by focusing especially on the destructive side of creative destruction.
What have we seen so far? (1) That we live in the Age of Populism, which is an era of dangerous trends and forces. (2) That public life in that era is churned by painful conflicts and polarizations, some of them generated by a market-based economy that creates winners and losers who are not necessarily more or less meritorious than each other. (3) That on the advice of economists in the (metaphorical) Temple of Science, politicians, opinion leaders, and ordinary citizens are strongly committed to economic growth, which emerges from creative destruction, which entails constantly changing social and economic practices leading to pockets of prosperity but also to the One Percent problem of inequality. (4) That, among other consequences, inequality gives rise to political contributions that, in the name of free speech, confer political power on dollars along with voters, to the point where, in effect, a marketplace based partly on moneyed activism has come to influence all branches of government. (5) That, in that marketplace, many people increasingly believe that institutions and other people are not telling them the truth. (6) That, against a backdrop of all these factors, resentment grows and encourages populism. And so forth and so on.
For scholars to respond to the Age of Populism is a complicated business, because every academic discipline has its own principles, procedures, and goals, in which case to take into account a large and important set of new conditions and characters requires considerable professional adjustment. However, the American Political Science Association, with over 12,000 members, embraces more than sixty fields and sub-fields about people, institutions, issues, and research methods, and we share a signature concern for the exercise and impact of power relationships. Therefore, we are equipped to deal with this challenge if some of us will want to do that.
By focusing on the legislative process underpinning marriage equality in the American states, this article identifies the combinations of conditions under which attempts at institutional displacement succeed or fail. Hitherto, few scholarly works have empirically examined displacement and whether, and how, actors can preserve institutional stability in the face of organized efforts to change institutions. Taking causal complexity into account, the analytical model factors in the resources of both change and status quo actors as well as the political context that enables or constrains their strategies. The results of the comparative analysis show that states have followed different paths to the displacement of heterosexual marriage in favor of marriage equality. Yet, most crucially, the findings pinpoint that the inclusion of religious exemption clauses is a condition sine qua non for marriage equality laws to be effectively passed, thus challenging the widely accepted notion that morality policies are foreign to compromise.
While much ink has been spilled as to how economics impacts election outcomes, existing scholarship has concentrated on the valence model, which focuses on assessments of incumbent administration’s handling of the economy. Recently, however, there has been an appreciation that economic voting is multidimensional. Nonetheless, the impact of positional economics – voters’ views of economic policy – on the vote remains less explored, especially from a cross-national perspective. In this contribution, we examine the impact of economic policy preferences regarding income redistribution and spending preferences on the vote in 32 states. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4 data and hierarchical models, we show that voters’ economic policy preferences directly impact vote choice in many states. We also show that positional economic voting is more likely to take hold in mature democracies. However, support for the idea that ideological polarization contributes to macro-diversity concerning positional economic voting is mixed at best. Our research breaks new ground regarding positional economic voting and highlights how context impacts the extent of positional economic voting.
This study examines how characteristics of participatory processes affect citizens’ evaluations of such processes and thereby establish what kind of participatory process citizens demand. The literature on democratic innovations has proposed different criteria for evaluating participatory innovations. What remains unclear, however, is how citizens evaluate these participatory mechanisms. This is here examined in a conjoint analysis embedded in a representative survey of the Finnish population (n = 1050). The conjoint analysis examines the impact of inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment, transparency, efficiency, and transferability on citizens’ evaluations of participatory processes. Furthermore, it is examined whether the evaluations differ by the policy issues and process preferences of the respondents. The results show that people want transparent participatory processes with face-to-face interaction among participants and expert advice to deal with complicated issues. The participatory processes should also be advisory and should not include too many meetings. These effects appear to be uniform across policy issues and do not depend on the process preferences of citizens.
This paper examines the concept “career politician.” It seeks to clarify, systematize, and measure this ambiguous multidimensional concept in order to facilitate testing theories and hypotheses associated with it. We argue that career politicians are full-time politicians who lack significant experience in the wider world and have other distinguishing attributes for which they are both appreciated and criticized. From claims and critiques put forward by political scientists, journalists, publics, and politicians, we extract four principal dimensions: Strong Commitment, Narrow Occupational Background, Narrow Life Experience, and Strong Ambition. These dimensions and their indicators fit Wittgenstein’s family-resemblance conceptual structure, which is how we analyze, measure and validate them with data from a longitudinal study of British MPs spanning 1971–2016.
Populism and authoritarian-populist parties have surged in the 21st century. In the United States, Donald Trump appears to have become the poster president for the surge. David M. Ricci, in this call to arms, thinks Trump is symptomatic of the changes that have caused a crisis among Americans - namely, mass economic and creative destruction: automation, outsourcing, deindustrialization, globalization, privatization, financialization, digitalization, and the rise of temporary jobs - all breeding resentment. Rather than dwelling on symptoms, Ricci focuses on the root of our nation's problems. Thus, creative destruction, aiming at perpetual economic growth, encouraged by neoliberalism, creates the economic inequality that fuels resentment and leads to increased populism. Ricci urges political scientists to highlight this destruction meaningfully and substantively, to use empirical realism to put human beings back into politics. Ricci's sensible argument conveys a sense of political urgency, grappling with real-world problems and working to transform abstract speculations into tangible, useful tools. The result is a passionate book, important not only to political scientists, but to anyone who cares about public life. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Although the advantage that incumbents may have over challengers has been extensively studied, less is known about how incumbency advantage is affected by the adoption of voluntary voting. In this paper, I study incumbency advantage in Chile, a country that adopted voluntary voting in 2012. I find that incumbency advantage substantively decreases with voluntary voting. The primary mechanism explaining such reduction was the entry of high-quality challengers, who invested their campaign resources much more efficiently compared to office-holders. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature on electoral accountability by identifying how sensible is incumbency advantage to voluntary voting and the entry of high-quality challengers. Indeed, as incumbency advantage decreases when capable challengers compete for office, it suggests that “scaring-off” skilled candidates is one of the drivers of such advantage.
Previous research finds that privileged citizens have more influence on democratic decisions than less advantaged citizens. One explanation put forward is unequal voting participation between socioeconomic groups. This paper contributes by studying how such inequalities are reproduced in couple formation. It sets out to answer two questions using British panel data. First, to what extent does assortative mating vs social influence account for correspondence in turnout behavior of couples? Second, does assortative mating and social influence contribute to social inequalities in turnout? The results show that the relationship between living with a partner and turnout is highly dependent on the voting participation of the partner, and that, regardless of individuals’ own previous voting participation, individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to enter relationships with potential voters. The unequal selection into relationships with voters and nonvoters shows that unequal voting participation between socioeconomic groups can be self-reinforcing through assortative mating.
Representative democracies are supposed to be uniquely virtuous in that they ensure that public preferences drive public policy. Dynamic representation is the outcome of a recurring interaction between electorate and parties that can be observed at the macro level. Preferences can shape government policy via two possible mechanisms. ‘Policy accomodation’ suggests that governments respond directly to the electorate’s preferences. ‘Electoral turnover’, on the other hand, assumes that preferences shape policy indirectly. Parties pursue their ideological goals, and public preferences respond ‘thermostatically’ by moving in the opposite direction to policy. This causes voters to switch votes and eventually leads to a turnover of power from one ‘side’ to ‘the other’. In this paper, we estimate preferences for government activity (‘the policy mood’) in Spain between 1978 and 2017. We show that mood responds ‘thermostatically’ to policy. Variations in mood are associated with support for parties. Policy is driven by party control but is not thermostatically responsive to mood. It appears that in Spain – like Britain – dynamic representation can only be achieved by electoral turnover. We consider the implications of this for our understanding of how representation works.
Real-world political discussions usually mix reason-giving and storytelling in complex ways, but the interplay between these practices remains essentially unexamined. This article builds a theoretical argument based on a systemic approach for investigating such forms of communication in institutionally organized forums and informal settings alike. It contends that generalizations should not be made about the role of giving reasons and telling stories for good deliberation. A distinctive analytical framework is developed for examining these practices when deliberation is high quality, low quality, or changing (high to low or low to high). Drawing on data about discussions on reducing the criminal responsibility age in Brazil in legislative public hearings and face-to-face groups, the analysis uncovers variations in the structure of reasons and stories and shifts in their functions in optimal and suboptimal moments of deliberation. By incorporating the pragmatic dimension of interactions into the analysis, this paper contributes to advancing comparative analyses in different contexts.
Attempts by extremist right-wing parties to grow organizational roots in local societies mobilize a diverse array of societal groups against them. The organizational effect of this mobilization has received some scholarly attention but, for the most part, it has defied systematic empirical investigation. This chapter brings together an array of evidence to systematically trace societal mobilization against extremist right-wing parties and to assess the effects of these societal responses on their local organizational development. The first part of the chapter examines how the literature treats societal reactions to extremism to generate various hypotheses about how such reactions shape organizational outcomes. The second section provides an overview of societal responses to the Golden Dawn (GD) in the past decade. It focuses on the diverse array of antifascist actors, their varied organizational resources and their wide range of tactics. The third section seeks to provide a systematic examination of the effects of societal reactions on the organizational evolution of various local branches of the GD.
Extremist right-wing parties pose one of the most notable challenges to liberal democratic systems. This book breaks new ground by examining the organizational development of some of the most extreme parties in Europe at the local, rather than the national, level. The systematic analysis of evidence from hundreds of local branches and thousands of local activities demonstrates that even these highly centralized parties display notable subnational variation in how they develop. In some local settings, these really extreme parties have been particularly successful, and in others they have miserably failed. To account for the remarkable differences in local organizational life, this study explicates and then tests an analytical framework for understanding the local organizational development of extremist rightwing parties. It systematically examines how endogenous and environmental factors affect the capacity of these parties to penetrate local societies. This book builds on and pushes beyond the voluminous literature on the European far right parties and contributes to the broader literatures on political parties, social movements and militant democracies.