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Drawing up the balance from the literature, case law, and interviews, one must conclude the communication between courts in the preliminary reference procedure does not represent a dialogue going (much) beyond one side asking questions, while the other side tries to answers them. Procedural mechanisms in the procedure that could enhance cooperation and communication are scarcely used to facilitate co-actorship. There are not only practical reasons for this. The lack of dialogue also partly results from a lack of faith in each other’s competence, reliability, and intentions. CJEU judges sometimes lack faith in the competence and reliability of national highest courts and do not seem to believe in the idea that national highest courts could actually provide an authoritative opinion about the correct interpretation or validity of EU law. Judges from Supreme Administrative Courts, on the other hand, are sometimes frustrated that the CJEU does not seem willing to listen to their explanation of the facts of a case, to their concerns about the potential consequences of preliminary rulings and to their views on how EU law should be interpreted. Few judges, however, seem to feel the need to openly express their discomfort, because it could also make things worse.
Studies of party system size have looked at institutional and sociological factors in their attempt to explain what determines the number of parties. While some recent studies contend that party laws, beyond the district magnitude, have a significant impact on, among others, new party entry, we know very little about whether certain rules matter more in some societies than they do in others. In this paper, we study the extent to which various party finance rules affect party system size and differentiate the effect between new and established democracies. Specifically, we focus on direct and indirect public subsidization and limits on private donation and campaign expenditure. We hypothesize that compared to established countries, new democracies tend to have a larger party system size when the political finance rules create more equal conditions for electoral competition. Using data from 43 Europe democracies, the empirical analyses support our hypothesis.
This paper investigates the role of gender in shaping attitudes towards the European Union (EU) among young people living in Polish cities – the so-called ‘winners of European integration’. Previously, little attention has been given to gender as an influence on views on the EU. Most studies apply the gender-based perspective on Western Europe, while Central and Eastern European countries remain understudied. Based on theories on public opinion, I employ a mixed-methods approach, conducting a survey among 815 MA students living in Polish cities, followed by 27 semi-structured interviews. This analysis of gender-related attitudes towards the EU offers nuanced insights into transitions within post-communist societies. My findings posit that the sampled well-educated women are more likely to support EU integration than men. Education, gender-based individual cost-benefit analyses, and the perceptions of national politics are possible explanations for the positive attitudes towards the EU among the sampled women.
This paper studies the relationship between incumbent MPs’ activities and their electoral fortune. We address this question in the context of the French political system characterized by an executive domination, a candidate-centered electoral system, and an electoral schedule maximizing the impact of the presidential elections. Given the contradictory influence of these three institutional features on the relationship between MPs’ activities and electoral results, the overall link can only be assessed empirically. We test the effects of several measurements of MPs’ activities on both their vote share and reelection probability in the 2007 legislative election. We show that MPs’ activities are differently correlated to both the incumbents’ vote shares in the first round and their reelection. Despite the weakness of the French National Assembly, several parliamentary activities, especially bill initiation, have a significant effect on MPs’ electoral prospects.
Currently, at least three approaches to judicial governance coexist in the European continent: the judicial council model, the courts service model, and the Ministry of Justice model. Although doctrinal and case-specific literatures abound on this topic, examples of cross-country studies explaining choices on these models of judicial governance are rather scarce. More particularly, we lack so far knowledge on how different factors interact in leading to the implementation of the judicial council model. This is striking, given the importance of judicial councils for the operation of the rule of law. Furthermore, explanations on the choices of models of judicial governance are essential to understanding the intricate issue of the political rationalities underlying macrolevel design of judicial institutions. Using qualitative comparative analysis and focusing on European liberal democracies, this article contributes to the literature in the field. It is shown that judicial councils are created when postauthoritarian countries implement new constitutions either in romanistic law countries or in countries subject to Europeanizing pressures.
The rise of Euroscepticism and populist backlash pose a dramatic challenge to the EU and highlight the EU's growing legal powers over core areas of state sovereignty. Authored by leading academics and policymakers, this book provides a comprehensive and cutting-edge analysis of the fields of EU law at the heart of contemporary political debates - economic policy, human migration, internal security, and constitutional fundamentals at the national level. Following the specialist contributions, the conclusion draws out critical, cross-cutting lessons for improving legitimacy and advancing the rule of law, rights and democracy in sovereignty-sensitive areas of EU law. Accessible to students, this volume is an invaluable resource for researchers and scholars of EU law and politics.
In the late eighteenth century, Swiss Cantons had been ruled by privilege, inequality, and conflicts; yet thirty years later a modern political nation was born that quickly caught up with developed England. Was this an internally-driven miracle or the most successful improvement in governance known in history following an external intervention? Chapter 1 deconstructs the transformation of Switzerland during the French Revolution and Empire, to inquire why a similar Napoleonic ambition seems to have met with less success in our own times.
Chapter 5 examines what subverts trust in elites in the European Union, which reached unpreceded lows after the last economic crisis, and finds a strong link between trust and perceived public integrity. European mechanisms to enhance integrity are poor and hypocrisy is high, even in the traditionally best-governed part of the continent. Two long-time member states, Greece and Italy, are the best examples of the limitations of European influence. This chapter traces the indicators of change and stagnation in both countries and explains why Europeanization has not made the Italian South more like the North or Greece more like Bavaria.
Why should countries improve on controlling corruption? While many theories exist to explain economic development, the trendier ones just attribute merit or blame to the quality of governance. But the question of how governance can change to become less corrupt is seldom studied. Chapter 3 reviews the most frequently proposed theories of change and the evidence in favor of the primacy of politics, as opposed to economic development, in the control of corruption. It also looks at how trade and globalization affect corruption and what role international factors play, from trade to global regulation in the form of treaties or anti-bribery conventions. A model of transformation is offered alongside a discussion on how international factors play into it.