The introduction states the premise that an essential precondition for the smooth transition from authoritarian to democratic government was the existence of a strong, resilient party on the Right that was committed to pursuing its objectives within the framework of the new democratic system and then asks why a party like the Conservative Party in Great Britain never succeeded in establishing itself as a durable political force in pre-Nazi Germany. It then focuses on the disunity of the German Right as a defining feature of the German party system and as it evolved in the late Second Empire and Weimar Republic. After a brief discussion of the milieu thesis as a theoretical point of departure for the study of the German Right, the essay then examines conservatism and its relationship to the German Right, the history of right-wing parties and organizations in the late Second Empire, and the role of antisemitism in the self-definition of those who identified themselves with the Right.

Under which conditions will a public authority intervene in private governance such as certification and eco-labeling schemes for sustainably produced goods? This chapter introduces this research question by presenting the empirical puzzle the book addresses: Why has the European Union (EU) intervened in private governance that deals with organic agriculture and biofuels, but has not intervened in private governance dealing with fair trade and fisheries? The chapter distinguishes between a public authority intervening with standards regulation that involves creating a public definition of sustainable production, and with procedural regulation that addresses the way private governance schemes are organized. The argument the book develops is that whether a public authority intervenes with standards and/or procedural regulation depends on the interplay of two variables: the domestic benefits of product differentiation by a public authority and the fragmentation of the private governance market. The chapter situates the book in the current state of the literature on the interactions between public and private governance and explains the research design and research contributions.

Chapter 6 deals with the crisis year of 1923 and examines the German Right’s response to the hyperinflation of 1922–23, the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, the increasingly palpable fear of Bolshevism, and threat of Bavaria’s secession from the Reich. After a discussion of the DNVP’s relationship to the Cuno government that assumed office in November 1922, the chapter takes a particularly close look at its opposition to the Stresemann cabinet that assumed power at the height of the crisis in August 1923. Following the termination of passive resistance in the Ruhr, many DNVP leaders began to embrace the idea of a “national dictatorship” under the tutelage of the army commander-in-chief Hans von Seeckt as the only way out of the crisis in which Germany found itself. But movement in this direction was cut short not only by Seeckt’s ambivalence but more importantly by Hitler’s abortive “Beer Hall Putsch” in Munich. As the Stresemann government moved to consolidate its position in the aftermath of the putsch, any chance of replacing the Weimar Republic with a more authoritarian system of government had vanished.

Chapter 2 examines the infrastructure of the German Right with particular attention on the integration of industry, agriculture, Christian labor, and the different sectors of the German middle class into the organizational structure of the DNVP. It also deals with the way in which industry, agriculture, Christian labor, and the German middle classes organized themselves in order to represent their special interests within the framework of Germany’s new republican order. The high degree of interest articulation that this involved, however, subjected the DNVP to centrifugal pressures that were sometimes difficult contain and that posed a threat to the party’s unity and political effectiveness. Still, the DNVP was remarkably successful in anchoring itself in Germany’s conservative milieu since its founding a year and a half earlier and was well on its way to developing into a socially heterogeneous conservative Sammelpartei. Interest articulation that this involved, however, subjected the DNVP to centrifugal pressures that were sometimes difficult contain and that posed a threat to the party’s unity and political effectiveness. Still, the DNVP was remarkably successful in anchoring itself in Germany’s conservative milieu in the short period since its founding and was well on its way to developing into a socially heterogeneous conservative Sammelpartei.

Chapter 7 examines the DNVP’s reaction to the stabilization of Germany’s republican system under the auspices of a new government formed by the Center Party’s Wilhelm Marx in January 1924. In the campaign for the May 1924 Reichstag elections, the DNVP not only did its best to dissociate itself from the anti-social consequences of stabilization, but moved racism and antisemitism to the forefront of its campaign in an attempt to preempt attacks from the racists that had bolted the party in 1922. The result was a stunning victory at the polls that made its delegation the largest in the Reichstag. But with success comes responsibility, and the DNVP was suddenly faced with the task of voting for the Dawes Plan, a plan that in the campaign it had denounced as a “second Versailles.” In the decisive vote in August 1924, the Nationalist delegation to the Reichstag split right down the middle in a dramatic turn of events that only highlighted how deeply divided the DNVP was as it faced the prospect of governmental responsibility.

The chapter explains how and why the EU has intervened with both standards and procedural regulations in the case of biofuels production, first in 2009 and again in 2015. The chapter begins with an analysis of the emergence of private biofuels governance since the early 2000s. It then discusses how in 2003 the EU established a policy stimulating the development of a domestic crop-based biofuels market based on the expected economic and environmental benefits of biofuels, while not directly addressing private governance. Once it became clear that the sustainability of biofuels needed to be regulated, the EU established standards and procedural regulations in the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive. Developing sustainability criteria was considered necessary to further support the economic opportunities of farmers and biofuels producers. The diversity of biofuel certification schemes also warranted EU-level control, with policymakers considering them useful instruments to verify compliance with public sustainability criteria in the form of a meta-standard approach. Continued problems with the diversity of private schemes resulted in additional procedural regulation in the 2015 ILUC Directive.

The chapter develops a theory of public intervention in private governance. It examines the conditions under which a public authority will intervene and the form this intervention will take: standards and/or procedural regulations or the absence of intervention. The chapter explains that the type of public intervention depends on the interplay of two variables: the domestic benefits of product differentiation and the fragmentation of the private governance market. On the one hand, a pubic authority may intervene in the market for sustainably certified goods to improve the competitive position of domestic producers, who are the main rule targets of private governance schemes. On the other hand, a public authority can intervene to structure a fragmented private governance market in order to overcome problems such as supply chain confusion, a lack of credibility of existing private governance schemes, and trade and competitive distortions. The chapter further conceptualizes private governance schemes as interest groups that engage in lobbying. It also explains the dynamics of the theory in the context of the EU policymaking process and how the interventions may evolve over time.

Chapter 12 examines the DNVP’s record as a member of the Marx’s coalition government from its initial successes from the passage of the Work Hours Law and the Unemployment Insurance Act in the spring and summer of 1927 through its failure to develop an adequate legislative response to the increasingly desperate situation in which the German farmer found himself to its awkward embrace of The Law for the Protection of the Republic in May 1927. The DNVP’s situation in the Marx cabinet was further complicated by a virtual mutiny in the Stahlhelm against collaboration with the existing system of government and a revolt in the countryside spearheaded by regional RLB affiliates RLB that were no longer satisfied with the DNVP’s defense of agriculture’s economic welfare. Increasingly desperate to salvage something of its second experiment in governmental participation, the DNVP staked everything on the passage of a Reich School Law that encountered such strong opposition from the DVP that not only was the bill rejected but the governmental coalition collapsed.

The chapter explains why the EU explicitly decided not to intervene in private fair trade governance on two separate occasions, in 1999 and in 2009. The chapter starts by comparing private fair trade governance schemes, including Fairtrade International, Rainforest Alliance, and UTZ Certified. It then discusses why EU policymakers in the 1990s focused on Fairtrade only and declined to intervene because of the specific North–South trade dynamics of this issue area; the lack of concrete productive opportunities in the EU; and institutional constraints of the international trade regime. The Fair Trade movement’s successful harmonization of complementary private governance schemes also contributed to the EU’s non-interventionist approach. The broadening of the policy domain beyond Fairtrade in the early 2000s did not lead to fragmentation concerns, since differences among the schemes were framed as commercial and economic-ideological in nature and not problematized as a fragmentation issue. Active lobbying by and on behalf of private governance schemes ensured this outcome, resulting in a market for private governance that remains free of public intervention.

Chapter 16 explores the tensions within the DNVP that culminated in the secession of twelve moderates from the DNVP Reichstag delegation in December 1929. It begins with an examination of Christian-Social dissent in the DNVP and moves from there to a discussion of Hugenberg’s efforts to unify a badly divided party behind the mantra of anti-Marxism at the annual party congress in Kassel in late November. These efforts were to little avail, and in the vote on the controversial imprisonment paragraph of the so-called “Freedom Law” twenty-three DNVP deputies either voted No or were absent for the vote. In the aftermath twelve DNVP deputies left the party. While the young conservatives around Treviranus struggled desperately to preserve a modicum of unity among the secessionists, they were foiled both by the CNBLP’s determination to effect a realignment of the German party system along vocational and corporatists lines and by the decision of the Christian-Socials to launch a new party of their own. In the meantime, Hugenberg continued to enjoy strong support at the local and regional levels of the DNVP party organization and experienced little difficulty in retaining control of the party.

The final chapter of the book compares the findings from the four issue areas and links them with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. The chapter then asks: Given the EU’s interventions, what have been the impacts on the functioning of private governance and the larger policy field? The chapter argues that the regulatory impacts are twofold: The interventions have both restructured the field of private governance and largely retained private actors’ governing authority and private governance space. The interventions impose baselines that cannot be undercut and that arguably have resulted in some sustainability improvements. At the same time, the interventions are relatively limited since the standards and procedural regulations are minimum baselines with several evident gaps. This situation allows for policy exports and spillovers from private to public governance, both within the EU and beyond, which can potentially strengthen public policy. The chapter then discusses the generalizability of the theory by discussing examples of public interventions at both the international and the domestic level beyond the EU. The book concludes with avenues for further research.

The chapter explains why the EU has so far failed to intervene in private fisheries governance. The chapter starts with comparing private governance schemes since the 1990s. It then analyses EU policy discussions until late 2017, showing that until very recently all involved stakeholders agreed that the fragmentation of the private governance market needed to be addressed. Differences of opinion on the desirability of publicly supporting product differentiation, however, have continued to exist. While most stakeholders consider the costs such differentiation would impose on European producers too high and therefore support procedural regulation, the European Parliament has consistently favored both standards and procedural regulations in the form of an EU-level certification and eco-labeling scheme. Attempts to create a policy failed in 2008–2009 when a legislative proposal for procedural regulation was abandoned, and in 2013 when the discussion was integrated in the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. A 2016 report on feasible policy options, moreover, questioned the fragmentation of the private governance market, casting further doubt on the likelihood of public intervention.