We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Affiliation with different religions can have different effects on practitioners’ trust in state institutions and in social actors. Based on a survey of 3,740 residents in Hong Kong in 2021, we examine the relationship between religious affiliation and believers’ trust in the political authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong and in civil actors in the city. We find that affiliation with traditional Chinese religions and Eastern religions has a positive and significant effect on believers’ trust in the political authorities, whereas belief in Western religions does not have such an effect. Affiliation with Western religions, however, has a stronger positive and significant effect on interpersonal trust and on tolerance for unconventional behaviour. These findings shed light on the interaction between the government and religious groups in Hong Kong after 1997.
Most public opinion research in China uses direct questions to measure support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government policies. These direct question surveys routinely find that over 90 per cent of Chinese citizens support the government. From this, scholars conclude that the CCP enjoys genuine legitimacy. In this paper, we present results from two survey experiments in contemporary China that make clear that citizens conceal their opposition to the CCP for fear of repression. When respondents are asked directly, we find, like other scholars, approval ratings for the CCP that exceed 90 per cent. When respondents are asked in the form of list experiments, which confer a greater sense of anonymity, CCP support hovers between 50 per cent and 70 per cent. This represents an upper bound, however, since list experiments may not fully mitigate incentives for preference falsification. The list experiments also suggest that fear of government repression discourages some 40 per cent of Chinese citizens from participating in anti-regime protests. Most broadly, this paper suggests that scholars should stop using direct question surveys to measure political opinions in China.
This Element shows China has assumed a historical role in shaping a new turn in globalization. It has assertively engaged in the open globalizing process through its Belt and Road Initiative as well as in the clandestine process through its shadow networks. These networks have incorporated millions of common people who are unwitting agents of transnational exchange in a global shadow economy. In contrast to the neoliberal phase, the shadow turn in globalization is driven by a plurality of individual, corporate, and state actors with unique divisions of labour, hierarchies of control and domination, and modes of operation. By virtue of being a nodal centre for shadow operations, China is exerting its shadow power in regrouping global city networks, redefining global value chains, and reconfigurating state borders and power.
The Chinese Communist Party has been increasing its control over village elections since the early 2010s, yet this move has not triggered any widespread popular resistance. Drawing on ethnographic evidence from village elections held in 2017 in a county in Hunan province, I conceptualize a form of electoral manipulation I term “consensus elections,” in which the Party engineers a pre-electoral consensus with ordinary villagers on whom to select while deterring challenges from village elites. Consensus elections are rooted in the Chinese political elites’ ideal that favours electoral participation over competition. While participation increases regime legitimacy, competition threatens regime authority. Propaganda promoting this electoral ideal shapes the views of ordinary villagers, laying a basis of legitimacy on consensus elections. The villagers embraced voting as being oriented by a unitary common interest and developed a cynicism whereby campaigning was equated with corruption. Comparison of the processes involved in engineering consensus elections in five villages suggests popular support for such elections. Whereas popular resistance was mounted against the lack of participation, popular complicity helps the Party to deter challenges from village elites. Consensus elections have facilitated the fall of Chinese village elections without undermining the Party's legitimacy, but consensus elections will also encourage more political challenges from village elites through non-institutionalized channels.
While China's efforts to maintain social stability by recruiting social elites and establishing Party branches in pre-existing social and market organizations have been thoroughly explored, much less attention has been devoted to how grassroots Party organizations (GRPOs) have proactively incubated society and constructed coherent, interrelated and systematic stability maintenance strategies to identify and eliminate social instability in its early stages and prevent its escalation. Using qualitative data gathered from local areas in China, we uncovered three major strategies used by GRPOs to manufacture society: incubating quasi-bureaucratic organizations, co-opting community elites and embedding Party organizations in market and social organizations. In general, GRPOs manufacture society for three reasons: to revitalize the mobilization capacity of the party-state; to increase the available social resources for grassroots authorities; and to establish an input mechanism for citizens. This study not only provides empirical data on how China's stability maintenance regime works in practice but also calls for a rethinking of the capacity of authoritarian resilience.
Chapter Two identifies the current legal and regulatory arrangements related to China’s electricity sector by examining the institutions and governing authority, pricing and tariff regulations, and investment approval. These regulatory aspects often determine the market features and characteristics of an electricity system. This chapter provides the foundation for understanding the design of critical supporting mechanisms adopted by the Renewable Energy Law and their implementation, which are discussed in the subsequent chapter.
Chapter Ten provides an overall evaluation of China’s energy law and regulation and its effectiveness in achieving the carbon neutrality goal. The analysis of the book indicates that China’s energy laws and regulations have significantly evolved due to the energy market reform and the government’s policy emphasis on low-carbon development. The evolving energy law and regulation have created legal obligations towards energy decarbonisation from different sources of law and regulation, which can be interpreted and applied effectively. However, despite the progress made, the book’s analysis highlights several shortcomings of China’s current energy laws and regulations in facilitating the energy transition and achieving carbon neutrality. To address these challenges, Chapter Ten suggests areas for further legal development and research.
Korea existed as an independent country longer than most countries in the world, within the great tradition of East Asia. However, Korea fell behind Europe with the "great divergence" in the modern era, evolving into a state most remote from Europe’s warfare states. The country also lagged behind neighboring China and Japan economically and socially, and the elites did not carry out reform from above in time. Korea thereby failed to adapt to the tectonic changes of the international environment in the nineteenth century and became a colony of Japan. The Japanese colonial rule transformed the Korean economy with a strong state capacity, enabling the Koreans’ per capita GDP as well as their total GDP to increase. However, the living standard stagnated, suggesting that landlords benefited disproportionately from the growth. The growth was eventually unsustainable because of the war. The colonial rule left a negative as well as a positive legacy for the country’s future.
Chapter Seven focuses on China’s domestic policy imperatives and regulatory/policy support to enhance its dominance in the lithium supply chain. It examines incentive regimes designed to support EVs and the policy transition from government-led to market-oriented approaches. Given the increasing demand for EV power batteries and the supply shortage for lithium resources and products, this chapter critically analyses whether and to what extent China can achieve greater lithium supply chain sustainability. It highlights the need for sustainable material consumption through harmonised circularity standards and indicators such as recyclability, efficiency, environmental protection, carbon footprint, corporate due diligence, and accountability.
South Korea is facing a tectonic change of international environment. The original advanced countries are undergoing a stagnation never seen after 1945, while the growth of China and other developing countries is offsetting it globally. South Korea benefited much from the rise of the Chinese economy, the most remarkable benefit being the trade surplus; however, it is disappearing with China’s catch-up in technological capability. The rise of China poses a challenge to the US hegemony, undermining the rule-based order and making East Asia the arena of a hegemony contest, which is most threatening to countries like South Korea. The country needs the ability to manage relationships with the great powers to cope with it, but whether it has the ability is unclear. Compared with the nineteenth century, when Korea failed to adapt to a tectonic change, the overall ability has improved remarkably, but the ability to form domestic cohesion remains the least improved.
In 1997, a domestic financial crisis broke out with mass chaebol bankruptcy, and then a currency crisis broke out as Japanese banks suddenly pulled short-term loans out with a liquidity crisis at home. Japan was willing to provide the liquidity to cope with the situation; however, the United States brought the case to the IMF to open up South Korea’s capital market and realize its broader national interests in East Asia after the Cold War. South Koreans yet accepted the IMF conditionality willingly to utilize it as a momentum for the reforms they thought desirable. The country carried out thoroughgoing reforms while failing to consider the complementarities between the new and existing institutions. The reforms improved corporate governance and purged the system producing non-performing loans, but they undermined the mechanism of the high economic growth. They also led to the massive layoff of workers and the sale of assets to foreigners.
Chapter Four lays the groundwork by discussing the critical components of coal sector regulation in China, including pricing, investment approval, and capacity control. While the coal sector in China has been steered towards marketisation, government intervention, primarily through pricing regulation and investment approval, has created regulatory ambiguities and complexities for implementation. This chapter also discusses the implications of the capacity control mechanism on coal production and consumption, raising essential questions about the scope of fuel switching under the existing legal and regulatory arrangements.
Chapter Three provides an overview of the supporting mechanisms under China’s Renewable Energy Law and their effects in driving large-scale renewable energy investment in China. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the contributing factors, mainly from legal and regulatory perspectives, to the curtailment of renewable energy in the Chinese context. It also discusses newly adopted administrative measures to facilitate the integration of renewable energy. This chapter sheds light on the limited role of market reform in achieving large-scale renewable energy penetration in China and highlights the future direction of market development based on the latest reform objectives.