Why is China's household registration system so resilient, and why are migrant workers consistently excluded from equal urban welfare? By disaggregating the hukou and land components of the rural–urban dualist regime, this article argues that dualist land ownership, formalized in China's 1982 Constitution, perpetuates the hukou system and unequal welfare rights. On the one hand, dualist land ownership results in an abundance of low-cost, informal housing in urban villages. This reduces the cost of short-term labour reproduction and diminishes migrants’ demands for state-defined urban rights. On the other hand, dualist land ownership enables local governments to amass significant revenues from land sales. The prominence of land-based revenues prompts local governments to link urban welfare rights with formal property ownership and residency, obstructing substantive reforms to the hukou system. For comparison, this article highlights Vietnam, a communist country with a unitary land ownership system, which has made greater strides in reforming its household registration system.

This article seeks to provide further insights into understanding the construction of Chinese identity by bringing the West/white into the picture of Afro-Sino racial relationships. It contends that the Chinese have internalized Western/white superiority through a long historical process, starting with the Western invasion in the 19th century and continuing with the construction of the contemporary historical narrative of the “century of humiliation.” This internalization and its ramifications can be observed in Chinese public discourses as well as diplomatic practices. Together with Western/white superiority, the Chinese also adopted a social Darwinist, competitive world view, using Western modernity as the yardstick by which to rank different peoples and societies in a racial hierarchy. Chinese racism against Africans is thus a projection of a harsh self-judgement. Unlike white supremacy in Western racial thinking, “Chinese supremacy” is often coupled with an inferiority complex.

This paper examines the career mobility and performance evaluation of the leaders of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the central, provincial and prefectural levels. Using data on executive turnover within publicly listed SOEs, we find that central and local SOE leaders have a similar career flow pattern. Specifically, vertical mobility within the same business group is common and more than 60 per cent of SOE leaders leave their office within three years. Only a minority of SOE leaders achieve political promotion. We also find that performance evaluation criteria are different across central and local SOEs. The leaders who provide better economic outcomes for central SOEs obtain a higher evaluation score, while close political connections boost the promotion prospects of local SOE leaders. Overall, our findings provide granular evidence on the personnel management of China's SOEs from a comparative perspective.