The emergence of digital platforms has been viewed in scholarly narratives as a “technological fix” of global capital, to use Beverly Silver's classic term. That is, capital continues to devise innovative strategies to restructure the labour process and avoid employer legal liabilities. This study reveals an important but somewhat overlooked “financial fix” aspect of the platform economy. Through a case study of a Chinese food delivery platform, the author shows that global speculative capital and its cash-burning games have generated a form of market-value fetishism in this sector. In response, platform companies have devised innovative labour acquisition strategies to expand their market share that have profoundly shaped the work and employment dynamics within the sector. In particular, the platform companies engaged in a subsidy rivalry with their competitors in order to attract crowdsourcing/gig workers for their regular services and at the same time established a highly structured subcontracting system to secure a more reliable and committed workforce to target the relatively high-end consumer market. The author argues that the interaction between global financialization and local capital's strategic choices accounts for the peculiar structure and employment dynamics in the Chinese platform economy.

The Chinese government promotes cooperation between colleges and companies in vocational education to improve the supply of skilled workers and increase labour productivity. This study employs the concept of positive coordination – negotiations concurrently addressing productive and distributive questions – to analyse the advantages and limitations of voluntary cooperation embedded in networks. In terms of production, many projects focus on updating, narrowing and deepening curricula to lower the costs of initial training borne by companies and the risk of labour turnover. In terms of distribution, however, the deep and narrow curricula are at odds with students’ preference for general and transferable skills; and the mutual commitments of both companies and students are uncertain. The solutions provided by cooperation are partial and unstable. Overall, they reduce skill mismatches but cannot control turnover or overcome market failure, which undermines tertiary vocational education's contribution to labour productivity.

China's need for skilled workers to upgrade its industrial system is increasingly urgent due to global economic competition. Despite massive expansion of its Vocational Education and Training system over the past two decades, a significant skilled labour deficit remains. Current debates on the inefficacy of vocational education focuses on the lack of institutional synergies between education and industry but often overlooks the inherent conflicts within the vocational education system and micro-level skill formation processes. Our ethnographic research in two upper-secondary vocational schools unveils a disturbing trend: the rapid massification of vocational education, which prioritizes student enrolment numbers over educational quality, fails to address the demand for skill formation and skilled labour. It inadvertently generates adverse consequences for both administrative management and classroom instruction. Skill development frequently falls to after-school professional associations and an exclusive group of elite students. Meanwhile, reform initiatives, such as the craftsmanship campaign and skill competitions, benefit only a few without improving the employment prospects for the wider student population. These findings call for greater attention to the inherent tensions within China's Vocational Education and Training system. Only when there is a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of ineffective skill formation in vocational schools can China achieve its national goal of industrial upgrades.

Affiliation with different religions can have different effects on practitioners’ trust in state institutions and in social actors. Based on a survey of 3,740 residents in Hong Kong in 2021, we examine the relationship between religious affiliation and believers’ trust in the political authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong and in civil actors in the city. We find that affiliation with traditional Chinese religions and Eastern religions has a positive and significant effect on believers’ trust in the political authorities, whereas belief in Western religions does not have such an effect. Affiliation with Western religions, however, has a stronger positive and significant effect on interpersonal trust and on tolerance for unconventional behaviour. These findings shed light on the interaction between the government and religious groups in Hong Kong after 1997.

Most public opinion research in China uses direct questions to measure support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government policies. These direct question surveys routinely find that over 90 per cent of Chinese citizens support the government. From this, scholars conclude that the CCP enjoys genuine legitimacy. In this paper, we present results from two survey experiments in contemporary China that make clear that citizens conceal their opposition to the CCP for fear of repression. When respondents are asked directly, we find, like other scholars, approval ratings for the CCP that exceed 90 per cent. When respondents are asked in the form of list experiments, which confer a greater sense of anonymity, CCP support hovers between 50 per cent and 70 per cent. This represents an upper bound, however, since list experiments may not fully mitigate incentives for preference falsification. The list experiments also suggest that fear of government repression discourages some 40 per cent of Chinese citizens from participating in anti-regime protests. Most broadly, this paper suggests that scholars should stop using direct question surveys to measure political opinions in China.