We show that an infinite group G definable in a $1$-h-minimal field admits a strictly K-differentiable structure with respect to which G is a (weak) Lie group, and we show that definable local subgroups sharing the same Lie algebra have the same germ at the identity. We conclude that infinite fields definable in K are definably isomorphic to finite extensions of K and that $1$-dimensional groups definable in K are finite-by-abelian-by-finite. Along the way, we develop the basic theory of definable weak K-manifolds and definable morphisms between them.

We estimate a recreation demand model for warmwater fishing in Delaware and then use it to measure welfare gains associated with improved fishing quality as measured by catch rate of fish, diversity of species, and clarity of water. We use a “linked” site choice – trip frequency model with data gathered by the Delaware Division of Fish and Wildlife. Our site choice model includes 118 rivers and lakes in the state with detailed characteristics of each. We develop hypothetical scenarios of fishing quality improvement involving combinations of fish catch, fish diversity, and water clarity and apply it to individual water bodies, water basins, selected water body groupings, and statewide. Values are reported in seasonal per angler and aggregate terms.

This article addresses contemporary art as a means to investigate how, and to what extent, financial logic impacts upon the socio-cultural sphere. Its contribution is twofold: on the one hand, the article shows that contemporary art's valuation practices increasingly reflect the logic of capitalization; on the other hand, it assesses the emancipatory potential of blockchain technology for the cultural sphere. In relation to the latter I argue that, in spite of the technological novelty of blockchain-based art projects, these nonetheless fail to challenge a received logic of finance. This exposes the limitations to technological determinism as a means of countering financial power in the socio-cultural sphere, and points to new problems for art's valuation methods in relation to the liquid logic of algorithmic finance.

Infrastructure in several economies in the Global South has rapidly undergone financialization, aided and abetted by governments opening-up their infrastructure assets to global institutional investors in search of stable, predictable revenue streams. This account of financialization could be the end of the story were it not for the fact that Christophers (2015) and others have shown that institutional investors are not simply in the game of ‘finding’ value or ‘harvesting it’ from obliging states, rather they actively construct it. What often catches the eye, however, are the more overt forms of financial engineering (Ashton et al., 2012), whereas what tends to go unnoticed are the ways in which infrastructure assets are routinely ‘worked’ to generate value over time. Here, we draw attention to a slower-paced financialization of infrastructure assets where, following Chiapello (2015, 2020), investors are engaged in a continual process of evaluation and revaluation of their assets to add value over and above prevailing benchmarks. Taking the example of Canada's Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) and its extensive investments in Chilean water infrastructure, this article considers how a global investment fund draws on financial practices developed in the advanced economies to add value to long term infrastructure assets in the Global South. Such practices, we argue, enact a routine form of financial subordination which does not match the familiar image of wholly subservient and dominated dependent economies. Rather, the power asymmetries involved equate less to a zero-sum game and more to a game where the benefits are unequally shared between asset managers in the Global North and states in the Global South, where effectively the latter cooperate in their own submission in ways that are not always acknowledged as such.

Clare McAndrew is a leading analyst of the global art market. Here the guest editors of this special issue interview McAndrew on the structures of the art market, its sectorial and regional arrangements, and transformations in its historical, technical, and monetary operation. Their discussion highlights the rapid increase in prices for art and the global extension of the art market since the early-to-mid 2000s, as well as further changes to its operation wrought by the rise of online trading in the early 2010s.

International property consultants (IPCs) have become key intermediaries in the globalization of property markets by providing a range of services that generate transparency and comparability in land and property-based investments. While their role in generating standardized information on local markets is well known, what is less is known is how IPCs help turn property into an income-yielding asset in less developed economies. This article investigates the contested diffusion of financialized valuation approaches in São Paulo's local property market. Through a qualitative inquiry into large IPCs and their main clients in the city, we show that IPCs have promoted valuation approaches that are tailored to the needs of financial market investors, thus affecting key investment decisions taken by diverse actors. Though these financialized techniques have at times clashed with more traditional views of property ownership prevalent in the country, we show that most often they co-exist with long-established valuation techniques that reflect the social and economic circumstances of Brazil's economy. The socially contingent nature of property valuation raises theoretical issues concerning the complexity of attributing value to fixed capital, as well as several policy issues.

Narratives and conventions have received considerable attention in recent discussions of the valuation of financial assets. Narratives and conventions, however, can only be effective to the extent that they attract and persuade audiences, and this article makes the case for paying more attention to those audiences. In particular, the article argues that financial assets can only be established as assets if there is a group of potential investors that has been persuaded to accept them as such: to take them seriously as potential investments. The article coins the term asset circles to refer to such groups and supports the argument with a discussion of venture capital and its role in the production of unicorns: private companies with extraordinary valuations. Venture capital firms may be thought of as value entrepreneurs, and much of the venture capital process is oriented towards constructing both value narratives for the companies they invest in and asset circles prepared to accept those value narratives. Their aim in these processes is a profitable exit, in which the venture capital firm converts its investment back into cash at a considerable profit through either an acquisition or a flotation.

This article examines the issue of prices from a sociological standpoint. We show that, contrary to popular belief, price setting is always the result of social practices. We identify two main perspectives in the relevant literature. The first deals with the central notion of quality: price setting is a matter of judgement, arbitration and equipment. The second focuses on measurement practices, such as valuation and pricing, which occur before or during the transaction. These two complementary perspectives reveal a variety of processes that both determine prices and can be used to construct a typology based on two criteria: the moment of price setting, and the level of competition. Four different types of pricing mechanisms are distinguished: self-regulated, administered, composed, and bargained. We use examples to describe these different pricing types, and to show how such an approach contributes to our understanding of the economy.

This article comments on the paper “Less-expensive long-term annuities linked to mortality, cash and equity” by Kevin Fergusson and Eckard Platen, appearing in this issue of the Annals of Actuarial Science. It adds two perspectives to their thought-provoking contribution. The first is a similarity to some recent work in quantitative finance on “deep hedging” that leverages machine learning models to find the cheapest replication strategy for a derivative payoff in a largely model-free setting. The second perspective engages with some of the interesting implications of their approach and draws parallels to literature in asset pricing and macro-finance. These perspectives point to the potential need for more fundamental shifts than the authors of the paper are advertising.

Anchoring has been shown to influence numeric judgments in various domains, including preferential judgment tasks. Whereas many studies and a recent Many Labs project have shown robust effects in classic anchoring tasks, studies of anchoring effects on preferential judgments have had inconsistent results. In this paper, we investigate the replicability and robustness of anchoring on willingness-to-pay, which is a widely used measure for consumer preference. We employ a combination of approaches, aggregating data from previous studies and also contributing additional replication studies designed to reconcile inconsistent previous results. We examine the effect of differing experimental procedures used in prior studies, and test whether publication bias could contribute to the inconsistent findings. We find that different experimental procedures used in previous studies do not explain the divergent results, and that anchoring effects are generally robust to differences in procedures, participant populations, and experimental settings.

A core principle in decision science is that people choose according to theirsubjective values. These values are often measured using unincentivized scaleswith arbitrary units (e.g., from 0 to 10) or using incentivizedwillingness-to-pay (WTP) with dollars and cents. What is unclear is whetherusing WTP actually improves choice predictions. In two experiments, we comparethe effects of three different subjective valuation procedures: anunincentivized rating scale, the same scale with incentives, and incentivizedWTP. We use these subjective values to predict behavior in a subsequent binaryfood-choice task. The unincentivized rating task performed better than theincentivized WTP task and no worse than the incentivized rating task. Thesefindings challenge the view that subjective valuation tasks need to beincentivized. At least for low-stakes decisions, commonly used measures such asWTP may reduce predictive power.