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Mechanistic modeling for the masses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2022

Matthew A. Turner  and
Paul E. Smaldino Open the ORCID record for Paul E. Smaldino [Opens in a new window]
Matthew A. Turner
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA95343, USA. [email protected]; [email protected]; http://mt.digital, http://smaldino.com
Paul E. Smaldino
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA95343, USA. [email protected]; [email protected]; http://mt.digital, http://smaldino.com
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Abstract

The generalizability crisis is compounded, or even partially caused, by a lack of specificity in psychological theories. Expanding the use of mechanistic models among psychologists is therefore important, but faces numerous hurdles. A cultural evolutionary approach can help guide and evaluate interventions to improve modeling efforts in psychology, such as developing standards and implementing them at the institutional level.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e33
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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