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There is no generalizability crisis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2022

Daniël Lakens Open the ORCID record for Daniël Lakens [Opens in a new window] ,
Duygu Uygun Tunç Open the ORCID record for Duygu Uygun Tunç [Opens in a new window]  and
Mehmet Necip Tunç Open the ORCID record for Mehmet Necip Tunç [Opens in a new window]
Daniël Lakens
Affiliation:
Human-Technology Interaction Group, Eindhoven University of Technology, Atlas 9.402, 5600BM, Eindhoven, The [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/lakens2
Duygu Uygun Tunç
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Middle East Technical University, Üniversiteler Mahallesi, Dumlupınar Bulvarı No:1, 06800Çankaya/[email protected]://uyguntunc.com/
Mehmet Necip Tunç
Affiliation:
Social Psychology Department, Tilburg University, Simon Building Room 405 Warandelaan 2 5037 AB, Tilburg. [email protected]
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Abstract

Falsificationist and confirmationist approaches provide two well-established ways of evaluating generalizability. Yarkoni rejects both and invents a third approach we call neo-operationalism. His proposal cannot work for the hypothetical concepts psychologists use, because the universe of operationalizations is impossible to define, and hypothetical concepts cannot be reduced to their operationalizations. We conclude that he is wrong in his generalizability-crisis diagnosis.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e25
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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