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Stress and imagining future selves: resolve in the hot/cool framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 April 2021

Janet Metcalfe
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, [email protected]://psychology.columbia.edu/content/janet-metcalfe
William James Jacobs
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ85721. [email protected]://psychology.arizona.edu/users/w-jake-jacobs

Abstract

Although Ainslie dismisses the hot/cool framework as pertaining only to suppression, it actually also has interesting implications for resolve. Resolve focally involves access to our future selves. This access is a cool system function linked to episodic memory. Thus, factors negatively affecting the cool system, such as stress, are predicted to impact two seemingly unrelated capabilities: willpower and episodic memory.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Creative Commons
The target article and response article are works of the U.S. Government and are not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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