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Narratives, probabilities, and the currency of thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2023

Samuel G. B. Johnson Open the ORCID record for Samuel G. B. Johnson [Opens in a new window] ,
Avri Bilovich  and
David Tuckett Open the ORCID record for David Tuckett [Opens in a new window]
Samuel G. B. Johnson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK. [email protected] Centre for the Study of Decision-Making Uncertainty, University College London, London W1CE 6BT, UK. [email protected] [email protected] University of Bath School of Management, Bath BA2 7AY, UK Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada
Avri Bilovich
Affiliation:
Centre for the Study of Decision-Making Uncertainty, University College London, London W1CE 6BT, UK. [email protected] [email protected]
David Tuckett
Affiliation:
Centre for the Study of Decision-Making Uncertainty, University College London, London W1CE 6BT, UK. [email protected] [email protected] Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK
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Abstract

Whereas most commentators agree about the centrality of narratives in decision-making, the commentaries revealed little consensus about the nature of radical uncertainty. Here we consider thirteen objections to our views, including our characterization of the uncertain decision environment and associated cognitive, affective, and social processes. We conclude that under radical uncertainty, narratives rather than probabilities are the currency of thought.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e110
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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