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Psychological frameworks augment even classical decision theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2023

Matthew Charles Ford Open the ORCID record for Matthew Charles Ford [Opens in a new window]  and
John Anderson Kay
Matthew Charles Ford
Affiliation:
St John's College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3JP, UK. [email protected] [email protected] www.johnkay.com
John Anderson Kay
Affiliation:
St John's College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3JP, UK. [email protected] [email protected] www.johnkay.com
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Abstract

Johnson, Bilovich, and Tuckett set out a helpful framework for thinking about how humans make decisions under radical uncertainty and contrast this with classical decision theory. We show that classical theories assume so little about psychology that they are not necessarily in conflict with this approach, broadening its appeal.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e92
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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