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Conviction Narrative Theory gains from a richer formal model
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 May 2023
Abstract
Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) is a convincing descriptive theory, and Johnson et al.'s formal model is a welcome contribution to building more precise, testable hypotheses. However, some extensions to the proposed model would make it better defined and more powerful. The suggested extensions enable the model to go beyond CNT, predicting choice outcomes and explaining affective phenomena.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Conviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty
Related commentaries (27)
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Conviction Narrative Theory gains from a richer formal model
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Author response
Narratives, probabilities, and the currency of thought