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Shared intentionality and the representation of groups; or, how to build a socially adept robot

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2022

Ben Phillips Open the ORCID record for Ben Phillips [Opens in a new window]
Ben Phillips*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, School of History, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85281, [email protected]://www.bensphillips.com/
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Abstract

Pietraszewski provides a compelling case that representations of certain interaction-types are the “cognitive primitives” that allow all tokens of group-in-conflict to be represented within the mind. Here, I argue that the folk concept GROUP encodes shared intentions and goals as more central than these interaction-types, and that providing a computational theory of social groups will be more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e115
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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