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Let us be careful with the evidence on mentalizing, cognitive biases, and religious beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 March 2016

Marjaana Lindeman  and
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen
Marjaana Lindeman
Affiliation:
Institute of Behavioural Sciences, University of Helsinki, FI-00014 University of Helsinki, [email protected]@helsinki.fihttp://blogs.helsinki.fi/everyday-thinking/
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen
Affiliation:
Institute of Behavioural Sciences, University of Helsinki, FI-00014 University of Helsinki, [email protected]@helsinki.fihttp://blogs.helsinki.fi/everyday-thinking/
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Abstract

Norenzayan et al.’s theoretical synthesis is highly plausible and commendable. However, the empirical evidence for the arguments on mentalizing, cognitive biases, and religious belief is currently not as strong as the writers suggest. Although certainly abundant and compelling, this evidence is indirect, contradictory, and weak and must be acknowledged as such. More direct studies are needed to support the theory.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e18
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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