The prospect of a European federation has aroused great enthusiasm in the United States, but at the same time the difficulties encountered in its realization have generated a host of frustrations. It is not unusual, after five years of costly effort, to hear that the moment of crisis has arrived; that we must either push ruthlessly toward the goal, or abandon not only integration but possibly assistance to Europe as well. Perhaps these are the only alternatives that confront the United States. But before we fasten on to them irrevocably, it may be well to ask once more: What is the nature of the area that we are attempting to integrate, and how has our thought on the subject developed? Some appreciation of the recent history and problems of Europe, and of the circumstances that inspired postwar American policy, may help to determine whether or not the range of choice is as narrow as it looks at present to the United States.

In 1983 two events focused international attention on East and West Germany. One was the collapse of talks on intermediate range missiles in Geneva and the consequent deployment of the missiles by NATO. The other was the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther. The Luther anniversary cast the spotlight particularly on communist East Germany, which revised its previously negative interpretation of Luther and not only marked his birth with elaborate festivities but also extended unprecedented assistance to the Lutheran church for its celebration. Yet, just as many wondered if inter-German detente would survive the I.N.F. deployment, so, too, many wondered at the nature of the church-state cooperation in the G.D.R., and if it would survive the Luther Year. The present analysis examines the character and direction of this churchstate relationship, using the Luther Year experience as evidence.

After an eclipse of nearly two centuries, the ancient doctrine of Yst war has received renewed attention and interest in the twentieth century, primarily as the result of two conditions in the contemporary world. First, a new international system has come into being, replacing the European balance-of-power system of the recent past; and, secondly, modern technology has created military weapons without precedent in destructive capabilities, thereby radically altering the techniques and even the rationale of warfare. It will be the purpose of this article to examine the current status of the doctrine of just war to determine its viability for modern international politics and law. Specifically, the intent is to determine how relevant the doctrine may be to the two characteristic political conditions of our era just noted. A very brief historical review of the doctrine's development and demise will permit a fuller discussion of modern attitudes toward the subject.1

Where are we now in the study of new nations? Three books that are the product of nineteen experienced minds should help to establish our present position. Nation-Building grew out of a panel discussion at the 1962 meeting of the American Political Science Association organized by Karl W. Deutsch. Old Societies and New States reflects the work of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations at the University of Chicago. New Nations represents the thinking of that British school of social anthropologists who, beginning with Radcliffe-Brown, have been especially interested in problems of process, authority, change, and conflict in society.

The two major and interrelated questions this study poses are: (1) How has Soviet naval doctrine developed and adapted to the demands of the nuclear age?; and (2) How do the changes in Soviet naval doctrine relate to the context of Soviet foreign policy and domestic politics? The article demonstrates that Soviet doctrine has accommodated to the challenges of the nuclear age by combining the tenets of traditional and modern warfare. Changes in naval doctrine have come about because of a need to meet the competition of the United States in world politics, and as a response to active interest-group pressure within the Soviet political system. Soviet naval doctrine does not necessarily “mirror” Western doctrine, but reflects a distinct, Soviet view of naval utilization.

Reflecting the general concern about international relations felt in this country, social scientists have written a great deal recently about the images of Americans and of the United States which are held by foreigners. It is generally agreed that the attitudes of foreigners toward us are important factors in the success or failure of American foreign policy in the struggle against the threat of world communism. The quantity of material which is now available is drawn from diverse sources, including the informed judgments of experts, content analyses of newspapers, opinions of foreigners who are studying in the United States, polls of students and of the general populations of foreign countries, and interviews with political and other leaders in various countries.

Critics of research in political socialization have asserted that the field has been more descriptive than theoretical, overly concerned with socialization to party identification, and too implicit with regard to underlying cultural patterns. At the same time, the study of moral development, largely addressed by psychologists but increasingly of interest to other social scientists and philosophers, has become a focal point of academic inquiry. After a brief discussion of concepts, a model of moral development is presented that integrates existing approaches within a more inclusive theoretical structure. An interrelationship is suggested between the nature of political and social institutions and the form and degree of individual moral development, and some findings show how moral development as an aspect of political socialization can aid in understanding the political behavior of both leaders and followers. Finally, it is suggested that moral development may be an appropriate bridge, within political science, between philosophers and behavioralists.

THE influence of ideological conceptions upon the men who make Soviet policy has been frequently and rightly emphasized. Some observers are so deeply impressed by this influence that they tend to regard the Soviet system as a kind of ideocracy. It is undeniable that ideology has been one powerful factor in the shaping of Soviet policies and actions from the time of the October Revolution to the present. But one must not lose sight of the fact that, in Soviet Russia, the relationship between ideology and policy is one of mutual interaction. It is a two-way process in which theoretical conceptions affect the making of policy and practical considerations affect the content of the ideology. The ideological system is not a completely static thing. It has evolved over the years, and the realities of Soviet politics have been the driving force behind this evolution.

Ever since Plato advocated his ideal of a philosopher-king, the intellectual has sought to guide the destinies of state. Sometimes he has been openly explicit in articulating advice, as with Machiavelli. More often, however, the intellectual has abjured so crass a role. Instead, he has sought to influence through private persuasion or has rendered counsel indirectly through scholarly essays. Only in China did the dichotomy between scholar and statesman disappear some two thousand years ago with emergence of a political system that monopolized bureaucratic control in the hands of the literati, that infinitesimally small proportion of the population that could master the classical adages which comprised the examinations for entrance into government. Elsewhere the sword proved to be mightier than the pen, at least in determining affairs of state.

Serious literature about foreign policy, when it is not primarily historical, can be classed in three ways. It is either pragmatic, attempting to solve specific problems through a mastery of specific data; or it is what I will call unitary, arguing for comprehensive solutions on the basis of some general vision of the truth; or it is pluralistic, asserting the value of many approaches and denying the certainty of any one.

In an effort to explain U.S. ocean policy making, four analytical perspectives are applied: statism, international interdependence, bureaucratic politics, and domestic politics. In each of these perspectives, structures, processes, and actors are singled out that may have an impact on the policy-making process. The statist perspective can explain the importance of security interests and of access to resources, but it cannot account for some of the major changes in U.S. ocean policy during the 1970s. The perspective of international interdependence introduces some of the international constraints and explains the use of linkage strategies. But only domestic politics, which played an increasingly important role during the period, can explain the enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. One of the general conclusions is that the policy-making system is structurally biased toward subnational and parochial interests. For this reason, policies of the world-order type are likely to be frustrated.

The United Nations involvement in the Congo crisis can be viewed in various perspectives. It is a significant example of the UN's peace-keeping activities and a formidable test of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjùld's concept of preventive diplomacy. From the viewpoint of legal analysis, it shows the flexibility of the Charter. In terms of the UN's institutions, it demonstrates both the potentialities and the perils of the development of the executive capacity of the SecretaryGeneral. In addition, in the Civilian Operations of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (abbreviated as ONUC, the initials of Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo), it has another, less widely known facet Alongside efforts to contain, ease, and ultimately eliminate the political-military crisis in the Congo, the United Nations has undertaken through ONUC's Civilian Operations emergency and longer-term functions which can most appropriately be called “statepreserving” and “state-building.”

INDIA'S experiment with democratic institutions is still only an experiment. Although India adopted a parliamentary system when she achieved independence in 1947 and has thus far been able to maintain her democratic institutions with much more success than some other newly independent Asian nations, no observer can have complete confidence in their stability. Indians have had to adjust from the role of natives in a country occupied by an imperialist power to that of citizens in a democracy, and the adjustment has not been easy. Traditional attitudes have a way of persisting and are not always readily accommodated to a parliamentary system of government.

Historians and some scholars of international relations have long argued that historical contingencies play a critical role in the evolution of the international system, but have not explained whether they do so to a greater extent than in other domains or why such differences may exist. The authors address these lacunae by identifying stable differences between war and other policy domains that render the evolution of the international system more subject to chance events than those other domains. The selection environment of international politics has produced tightly integrated organizations (militaries) as the domain’s key players to a much greater degree than other policy domains. Because there are few players, no law of large numbers holds, and because militaries are tightly integrated, microshocks can reverberate up to macro-organizational levels. The anarchic character of the international system amplifies the impact of these shocks. The authors explore these phenomena in a range of historical examples.

Macro-Quantitative Analysis, edited by John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold, should be welcomed by students of cross-national empirical theory and research. It places important reference materials at the fingertips of the analyst, and should stimulate him to take stock of the state of his art. Moreover, it should prove a boon to teaching. I find it hard to conceive of an undergraduate or graduate course on cross-national theory and research which would not benefit from this volume.

The past decade has witnessed a general advancement in comparative studies of communism. Yet, in comparing the conceptual development of the Soviet-East European and Chinese Communist fields, one is struck by the peculiarly arrested state of the Chinese side. By comparison, the “Kremlinologists” have produced a veritable storehouse of analytical tools with which they have contributed to the explanation of the nature and functioning of the Soviet political process and Soviet-East European interrelationship. Relatively little conceptual development is discernible in the China field. In this brief essay on comparative developments in the study of communism, I will attempt to compare the concepts which Western scholars have evolved to analyze the politics of the Communist world, account for different approaches, and analyze Chinese political history to determine the most meaningful approach. I speak of the nature and functioning of the political process in a restricted sense—the ways in which leaders interact, how political positions are attained and maintained, and, in general, the structure of leadership politics in the Communist world.

The outstanding characteristic of the French political system is its historical instability. Constitutional monarchy was overthrown by a revolution, replaced by a republic, which in turn quickly evolved into a dictatorship, and when it too was dismissed by an armed uprising, the interminable squabbles among the monarchist factions allowed another republic to come into existence by default. But for an “accident” of history this republic too would have given way to a dictatorship through the bloodless medium of the coup d'état, but while the republic tottered on in the interwar period the life-span of its governments was calculated in terms of months rather than years, and with its “collapse” under the coup de grâce of military defeat a new dictatorship immediately sprang up to take its place, to be succeeded by another republic lasting for thirteen years amid constantly recurring cabinet crises, then falling in the wake of an eminently successful revolution, out of which emerged the present regime. Here we have what sociologists might label the “institutionalization of instability”, interpreted by a number of leading writers on French politics as the product of a deep-seated conflict between the “two Frances”, whether these two political subcultures are viewed as the parties of mouvement and of I'ordre établi, or as the “administrative and representative traditions.”