In the 1950's, as in the 1930's, there are Congressional efforts to limit executive discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. Senators Taft and Wherry have generated a debate over the President's authority to send armed forces abroad, which is reminiscent of the debate over the neutrality legislation of the earlier decade. The time has therefore come when a more just appreciation of President Roosevelt's leadership in foreign affairs may be possible and when such an evaluation may be useful.

Until recently, most of the literature on political development has centered primarily on nation building. Relatively little expenditure of time and energy has been directed toward some of the most gnawing political problems that confront leaders in industrializing societies: how to remain at the apex of power; what steps must be taken to create and then preserve public authority; and by what means leaders mobilize support and secure compliance with policy decisions when their brittle governmental structure is simultaneously confronted with crises of integration, mobilization, and distribution. The imperative need is to raise questions concerning (i) how authority is built and maintained, and (2) the means by which political leaders implement policy when they are confronted with a skeptical and volatile population. Those are the ends toward which this article is directed.

The problem of economic development was among the main preoccupations of the classical economists; and Karl Marx, Max Weber, and their followers continued to be interested in it. The Anglo-Saxon economists and their followers, however, during the century preceding the Second World War, all but forgot about economic development—perhaps because they took it for granted. The growth of most of the advanced economies was impressive enough to be taken for granted; as for the underdeveloped areas, next to nothing was known about their rates of growth, although economists (at least in the advanced countries) seem to have supposed that the magnitude of capital exports to these areas gave them a chance to develop even faster than, and ultimately to catch up with, the more highly developed Western economies. Only England's development received some attention and mild doubts were occasionally raised as to whether her rate of economic growth was as fast as it could and should have been. From the turn of the century onward, blue books and white papers appeared, uneasily comparing British with German and American industrial production, questioning the wisdom of exporting quite so much capital, stressing the need for more aggressive export drives—but next to nothing was done about all this. For one thing, the philosophy of laisser faire still ruled supreme; for another, business fluctuations obscured and rendered difficult a true assessment of the situation; for a third, Britain's continued political supremacy may have lulled concern over the deterioration of her relative economic position. The problem of development came to the forefront of economic discussion only with the Second World War, as a result of two important changes. In the West, political power shifted across the Atlantic; in the East, Russia's war record established her both as an important center of political attraction and as a shining example of the success of planned industrialization and development.

Dialectics about NATO strategy have become tiresomely repetitious. One wishes they were unnecessary, ideally because a military threat had assuredly disappeared, or because a strategic nearconsensus had emerged. At least the strategic debate should have become more specific. But doctrine in the end is paramount, however unfortunate the consequences of trying to settle upon it ex cathedra. Quantitative analyses that are not systematically related to possible doctrines can lose critical issues in a welter of data, while analyses confined to ways to implement a single doctrine are too constricted. If within NATO one or more nations insist that the mid-1950 doctrine fits the logo's, official alliance planners can be stifled.

A Characteristic of warfare is that it has changed with the arrival of new weapons and concepts to produce a series of distinct pasts, each of which in its time proved surprising in terms of the past once removed. Although critics have generally been able to observe that the generals were prepared for the last war, they might with greater insight have noted that the generals were prepared not just for the last war, but for all the past wars, and hence were seldom at a loss except on encountering foes better equipped than themselves. Cortez was prepared for Montezuma; Montezuma, up against new notions and gadgets, was not prepared for him.

Schwarz's study Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik is, in the opinion of this reviewer, the single most important book on the occupation studyperiod in Germany after World War II that has yet appeared. It is not an ordinary narrative history—indeed, it presupposes a good deal of prior knowledge—but is rather a topical analysis of the following problems: the various possible solutions to the German question in the years after 1945; the policies toward Germany of the four victorious powers—Russia, France, Britain, and the United States; the development of German attitudes on the future political orientation of one or two Germanies; and finally, the factors that led to the voluntary acceptance of Western integration by most West Germans even though this integration meant the partition of Germany.

Some economists argue that high population density and rapid population growth are not in themselves impediments to economic development. On the basis of a quantitative analysis of historical data, Simon Kuznets, for instance, concludes that, historically, rates of economic development have not significantly correlated, either positively or negatively, with rates of population growth. Similarly, E. E. Hagen observes that “nowhere in the world has population growth induced by rising income been sufficient to halt the rise in income. … The historical record indicates that rise in income in these societies has failed to occur not because something thwarted it, but because no force has been present to cause income to rise.

Over a period of many months, both before and since the abdication of King Farouk, responsible heads of government in Egypt have been voicing a claim to the entire Nile Basin, although practical measures to convert the claim into control have been pointed chiefly toward that part of the Basin included in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

It is the fashion nowadays, especially in the United States, to assume that river basins are coherent, nature-given units of the earth's surface, without questioning their fitness for unified political administration or sovereignty. According to that fashion, even the extreme Egyptian claim seems cogent. The Nile Basin is a drainage unit and clearly appears so on the map (Fig. 1)

The Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) was established by the USSR in 1949 to co-ordinate the economic activities of its newly acquired empire in Eastern Europe. CEMA's true role in intra-Bloc relations has undergone significant changes since the death of Stalin. These changes, and their implications for Soviet foreign and domestic policies, are the subject of speculation in this article.

Self-Criticism has been a characteristic of NATO ever since it was established. We are perhaps too inclined to pull up our institutions by the roots from time to time to see how they are growing. But whether this is a good habit in the ordinary way or not, it is something that was virtually bound to happen in 1957, after the most critical twelve months that the Western nations had experienced since the Second World War. Nineteen fifty-six began with a widespread feeling of relief that the danger of a major war in Europe (the only kind of war that seemed possible) had greatly receded. Before this feeling of relief had time to wear off, there supervened a series of crises that shook NATO to its foundations. There was a virtual state of war in Algeria (itself a part of the NATO area), and many of France's best troops were withdrawn from Europe to fight it; there was an increasingly bitter dispute involving three members of NATO over the future of Cyprus; there was the Suez crisis, which also involved both NATO interests and troops from the NATO area; and there was the Hungarian revolution, which greatly damaged, if it did not destroy, the hesitantly re-emerging belief in Soviet good faith.