In the 1970s, discussion of the international economy frequently turned to the emergence of a “new protectionism” among the industrial countries after the accomplishments of trade liberalization in the 1960s. International organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) documented an increase in trade barriers erected against imports of manufactures. The protectionism was “new” in two respects: (1) it was directed against dynamic exporters of manufactured goods (especially Japan and the newly industrializing countries) that had recently become important elements in world trade; (2) the means of protection were nontariff barriers —quotas, voluntary export restraints, and a host of governmental impediments to competitive trading practices.1

What is today in the United States conventionally known as international relations is a subject different in content and emphasis from its counterpart of even two decades ago. Much of what seemed important in 1929 seems irrelevant, and some of it even trivial, in 1949. Another twenty years may perhaps bring a similar judgment on work now being done. But we ought at least to be aware of the direction in which we have been moving if we are to control the future development of the field.

In 1930 the following statement passed unchallenged in a discussion among some of Ameria's leading social scientists: “The emotional drive is so highly developed in the kind of person who goes into the international relations field that it often leads to unclear thinking.” The implication that no one without this drive could conceivably be persuaded to enter the field is a commentary on the disesteem with which international relations research was then regarded.

This article integrates insights from different veins of historical institutionalism to offer an analytical framework that specifies how ideas, institutions, and actors account for key aspects of judicial decision-making, including change over time. To the extent that ideas are widely distributed, highly salient, and stable among actors in the judicial field, they can affect patterns of rulings in a particular issue area. The distribution, salience, and stability of norms, however, may change over time for reasons embedded in the institutional structures themselves. Existing policies, laws, or treaties create the potential for new actors to enter the judicial field through processes that theorists of institutional change have identified as intercurrence, displacement, conversion, layering, and drift. New actors can shift the relative salience of ideas already rooted in the judicial field. This ideational salience amplification can alter patterns of judicial decision-making without the fundamental and often costly battles involved in wholesale paradigm change. French high court hate speech decisions provide the context for the development of this framework and serve to illustrate the dynamic. The author uses evidence from an original dataset of every ruling by the French Court of Cassation regarding racist hate speech from 1972 through 2012 to explain the varying propensity of the high court to restrict speech that targets majorities compared to minorities.

The point of view from which this article is written is that the world-wide trend toward increased use of oil involves Western Europe in greater risks of interruption of supplies than it does the other major world consumers (the United States and the USSR), who produce most of their own oil; and that the implications of permitting the trend to continue to develop at its present rate should be seriously reconsidered. The trend toward increased use of oil in Western Europe has been clear for some years, as it was for the United States a bit earlier and has become for the USSR more recently. What is somewhat alarming at the present time is that the process is speeding up in Western Europe and that resistance to it is weakening.

The decision to use and develop a low-status language in translations and creative works is often based on a desire to provide symbols that will assist the efforts of political leaders to challenge existing national and ethnic frontiers and to create new groups loyal to different institutions. New frontiers alter the relationships between peoples and also affect patterns of access to power and wealth within a group. Writers, translators, dictionary makers, and other literary figures who innovate for this reason should be called “language strategists.” Although primarily moved by a creative and artistic spirit, these persons are often intimately associated with national and ethnic movements because they share the interests of the political elites who lead them. This conscious or unconscious alliance is essential in the creation of ethnic and national identities.

This article extends recent work on a comparative theory of retrenchment in social policy by asking whether the politics of retrenchment travels well across policy areas, with policy feedback remaining a crucial variable for explaining government success or failure. The article analyzes policy change in agriculture in the United States and France, a natural choice for an extension of retrenchment theory because agricultural policy resembles social policy in some respects but also provides telling points of contrast. The article finds that the call for new theories focusing on retrenchment is justified: the politics of agricultural retrenchment differs from that of expansion, and success at retrenchment varies by program.

The analysis shows, as well, that retrenchment has been significant both in the U.S. and in France and the European Union. Variations in policy feedback help explain why these policy changes occurred. Moreover, the France-U.S. comparison highlights how systemic institutional factors shape the politics of retrenchment. Finally, focusing on agriculture, a policy sector in which international developments have a greater direct importance than they do in social policy, the article identifies an additional systemic retrenchment strategy: constraining domestic programs through international agreements.

The consequences that flow from the collapse of empires have never been easily predicted. Seldom, however, has the demise of an imperial system been accompanied by as many systematic analyses and projections as has the current period of decolonization. Much of the recent discussion concerning the newer members of the international system has made reference to their so-called artificial political boundaries. It has been predicted, among other things, that the political boundaries of Asia and Africa, by virtue of their presumed artificiality, harbor the seeds of “many a troublesome irredenta in the future.” Frequent references are made, in the growing literature on nation-building and political modernization, to the “natural” or “unnatural” qualities of these boundaries, and the absence of careful general studies of this topic has been noted. This article proposes to examine the dominant characteristics of African political boundaries and the circumstances under which disputes over their location have so far been generated, and to deduce some general propositions about their conflict potential. The thrust of the argument to be presented is that there is a low conflict potential in contemporary African boundaries and that earlier predictions of instability are not likely to be borne out.

Discussion of troop requirements and weaponry for NATO is much concerned with the battlefield consequences of different troop strengths and nuclear doctrines. But the battlefield criterion is only one criterion, and when nuclears are introduced it is secondary. The idea that European armament should be designed for resisting Soviet invasion, and is to be judged by its ability to contain an attack, is based on the notion that limited war is a tactical operation. It is not.

For years, mainstream international relations (IR) theorists have essentially ignored reconciliation as a special—and perhaps the most difficult—form of cooperation building in international politics. This review article seeks to make the study of reconciliation a more visible field for further inquiry in IR, comparative politics, and sociology for both theoretical and practical reasons. After summarizing important themes emerged from the recent literature on reconciliation, the author addresses four issues for understanding interstate reconciliation: the interplay of group emotions and group politics, the interplay of domestic politics and international politics, the institutionalization of memories, and methodological issues. Better understanding of these issues also contributes to broadening the scope of inquiry in IR, comparative politics, and the sociology literature.

A“political” explanation of collective political activity is examined in the light of 58 varied historical cases. The cases support a description of these activities as largely rational, collectively arrived at, and heavily influenced by recent changes in motives and opportunities.“In” groups are most likely to act collectively when newly threatened,“out” groups when new opportunities present themselves. Emotion and frustrated expectations do not seem to be the best variables on which to base predictive hypotheses. Violence is not strongly associated with communal groups or with emotion as such, but it does seem to be associated with“bad times.” While action is usually based on collectively made decisions, its occurrence does not depend on strong organization; the latter seems, however, to be a condition of continuing and durable effectiveness.

Why do repressive states create human rights institutions that cost them money and political capital but fail to silence international criticism? The academic literature assumes that states engaging in disingenuous human rights behavior are hoping to persuade (or deceive) liberal Western states and international advocates. But if human rights promoters in the West are the target audience for the creation of these half measures institutions, the strategy appears puzzlingly miscalculated. It reveals that the repressive state is sensitive to international opinion, and often results in increased pressure. The author argues that states engaging in human rights half measures are playing to a different, previously overlooked audience: swing states that can act as veto points on multilateral efforts to enforce human rights. The article illustrates these dynamics with a case study of Sri Lanka’s response to international pressure for postwar justice. The author shows that although the creation of a series of weak investigative commissions was prompted by pressure from Western governments and ngos, it was not an attempt to satisfy or hoodwink these actors. Instead, it was part of a coalition-blocking strategy to convince fellow developing states on the UN Human Rights Council to oppose the creation of an international inquiry and to give them the political cover to do so.

Three types of thought approach the question of future world order: the naturalrational, positivist-evolutionary, and historicist-dialectical. The normative criterion in the natural-rational approach has, in recent times, most commonly been bound up with the view that liberal pluralism in polities is the condition for a just world order. This view has, however, succumbed both under the critique of positivist-evolutionary political science which argues that authoritarianism is characteristic of early stages of political development, and to the manipulation of “pluralism” in poor countries by powerful external forces (investment, trade union, and intelligence). The positivist-evolutionary approach has two main currents. One is functionalism, of which the transnational and transgovernmental relations versions are currently fashionable. The other is the notion of a global ecological system. Both versions take existing structures of power and social relations as implicit givens from which future trends are extrapolated; they provide no basis for considering the possibility of changes in these structures. The historicist-dialectical approach offers the possibility of understanding change in these basic structures of power and social relations by searching out points of emerging conflict and the alternative conceptions of order which the forces in conflict express.

Is consent a sure foundation upon which to build a stable world order? Under what conditions is it achieved? The burgeoning literature on international regimes and regime change is beginning to address the issue E. H. Carr raised over forty years ago. Hegemonic stability theory argues that a preponderance of power provides the basis for international order. Recent observers, however, have noted that order can break down even when the hegemon exercises dominance. Furthermore, stable collaboration can be achieved in the face of declining hegemony. The exercise of power alone cannot lead to a stable international order.

“Future revolutions will doubtless be directed against the admin- JL istration and not against the political system.” Thus states one writer in the opening sentence of his book on l'Administration au pouvoir. There is little doubt that the institution in France that today bears the brunt of attacks coming from the entire range of the political, economic, and social spectrum, is the French administration—the state bureaucracy that, since the early part of the nineteenth century, has been charged with directing most of the state's affairs. Today, the parties of the Left, Right, and Center; big business, small business, and the propertyless; the privileged and the underprivileged; the in-tellectuals, the students, and the unions—all these groups, that is to say, the French people, are agreed on what they regard to be the excessive and nefarious role that the bureaucracy plays in French life. Few Frenchmen would agree with Francois Gazier, former Director of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, when he writes in his preface to Belorgey's book that “the French administration, thriving under praise and criticism alike, can at least be credited with one success: it has known how to keep in tune with its times” (p. 7). One is tempted to say that were these words not merely the manifestation of hyperbolic tendencies sometimes common in preface-writing, some courage would have been needed to write them. It is hard to conceive in present-day France of an attempt to sustain the thesis that the administration is in tune with its times.

Specialists in the study of Soviet foreign policy increasingly feel torn between the positivist culture of political science departments and the holistic traditions of the Soviet area-studies programs. In fact, these approaches are largely complementary. Examples taken from literature on Soviet security policy and on the domestic sources of Soviet expansionism show how positivist theories and methods can be used to clarify holist (or traditionalist) arguments, to sharpen debates, to suggest more telling tests, and to invigorate the field's research agenda.

Significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions are observed. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting effects on legal systems, political institutions, and trade in former controlled territories. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. The author uses the case of Poland to investigate the long-term effects of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Historically, Poland was split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey of more than 650 Polish public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.

Existing theories of change in campaign strategies predict cross-national convergence in candidates' linkages to voters and the degree of policy focus and cleavage priming in their appeals. However, the prevailing national patterns of electioneering in Chile, Brazil, and Peru have actually diverged from one another since their transitions from authoritarian rule. Based upon content analysis of television advertising, interviews with campaign staff, and case studies of specific elections in these three countries, this article develops a theory of success contagion that can explain the evolution of presidential campaign strategy in third-wave democracies. The author argues that the first politician to combine a victorious campaign with a successful term as president establishes a model of electioneering that candidates across the ideological spectrum are likely to adopt in the future. Such contagion can occur directly, through politicians' imitation of each other's strategies, or indirectly, with communities of campaign professionals playing an intermediary role. Strategic convergence is less likely in cases of repeatedly poor governing performance. Instead, candidates tend to choose strategies through an inward-oriented process of reacting against previous errors. Initial testing suggests the theory is generalizable to other new democracies with at least moderate organizational continuity across elections.

Garrett Hardin's “tragedy of the commons” metaphor is commonly invoked to account for the unfortunate state of world fisheries. But the world s oceans are no longer a global commons and have not been so for the past two decades. Open-access regimes have persisted within many exclusive economic zones (EEZs) during this time, but coastal states' authority to regulate domestic fisheries has existed for more than a generation. Faced with the prospect of Hardin's tragedy, coastal states have had more than twenty years to devise institutional constraints that would prevent it. This article asserts that the dismal experience with EEZs is in large part attributable to distributive bargaining problems that arose within coastal states in the wake of EEZ extension. Moreover, the article argues that high levels of uncertainty that characterize the early stages of institutional development have exacerbated these problems. Finally, the article demonstrates how the variety of institutional designs and paths of institutional development that are observed in the cases of Iceland, Norway, and Atlantic Canada result from the different configurations of political power and political structure within each case. While the empirical discussion is focused upon property rights and fisheries, the theoretical discussion of bargaining and uncertainty has widespread application across comparative and international politics.

Since 1947 the major formal institution for channeling national security advice to Presidents has been the National Security Council. The Council has operated (1) as a forum where senior officials meet with the President; (2) as a focal point for formal policy planning and decision processes; and (3) as an umbrella for establishment of a Presidential foreign policy staff. The first was the goal of its proponents; the last is what it has most importantly become. But the N.S.C. has reflected the relationships among each administration's top officials more than it has shaped them; hence the need to think of broader advisory “systems” combining the formal and the informal. Among the variables shaping such systems are; a President's particular organizational sense; his attitude toward formality and regularity; whether he has (and wants) strong Cabinet officials; how his key advisers work out their role relationships and jurisdictional boundaries; how widely he casts his net for advce; how broad a range of substantive issue involvement he seeks; how much he seeks operational involvement; and his attitude toward divided counsel and interpersonal conflict.

Prescriptions about foreign policy advisory systems tend to stress the President's role as decision maker; they should focus also on the oft-competing role of effective Presidential leadership in getting policies and decisions executed. The importance of execution argues for giving the Secretary of State primacy over other advisers; the need to protect the President's decision authority argues for a White House assistant independent of the Secretary, though perhaps with reduced rank. Presidents also need better advice on the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy, and each could profit from a “mid-term system review” after his institutions and advisory relationships have taken shape.