Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T21:38:48.217Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who Gets What and When

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

I. William Zartman
I. William Zartman
Affiliation:
New York University
Get access

Extract

Negotiation is one of the basic political or decision-making processes, but if processes in general have been sorely neglected in political analysis, negotiation has been neglected more than most. Legislation as an institutional function has a respectable literature; as a process wherein goal values are constant and decisions are made by aggregating a sufficient number of parties to constitute a numerically superior side, it has become the subject of coalition theory. Adjudication has also given rise to a large quantity of institutional literature, although a theory explaining the process wherein a single party combines events and values to produce a decision is less well established. Similarly, diplomacy—and more recently, collective bargaining—has been thoroughly described, and economists and mathematicians using game and utility theories have developed some complex models of bargaining. But negotiation as a political process, specifically explained in terms of power, is an underdeveloped area of theory.

Type
Review Articles
Information
World Politics , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , April 1974 , pp. 385 - 399
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1974

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Riker, William, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven 1962)Google Scholar; Groennings, S., Kelley, W. E., and Leiserson, M., eds., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York 1970)Google Scholar; Cotter, Cornelius, Kessel, J. H., Mitchell, W. C., and Tanter, R., eds., Conflict, Competition, and Coalitions (Indianapolis 1973)Google Scholar.

2 See, however, Simon, Herbert, Administrative Behavior (Glencoe, 111. 1957)Google Scholar; Bickel, Alexander, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis (Cambridge, Mass. 1957)Google Scholar; Schubert, Glendon, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (Glencoe, Ill. 1959)Google Scholar, chap. 4, and “Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game,” Stanford Law Review, xiv (March 1962), 284; Murphy, Walter F., Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago 1964)Google Scholar, esp. chap. 3; Richard E. Warton, Legal Justice, Power Bargaining and Social Science Intervention: Mechanisms for Settling Disputes, Purdue University Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Paper No. 194 (1968); Atkinson, David N. and Neuman, Dale E., “Toward a Cost Theory of Judicial Alignments,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (May 1969), 271–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Becker, Theodore, Comparative Judicial Politics (Chicago 1970)Google Scholar, chap. 2.

3 See Edgeworth, F. Y., Mathematical Physics (London 1881)Google Scholar, esp. 20–30; Zeuthen, Frederick, Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare (London 1930), esp. 104–50Google Scholar; Shackle, G. L. S., “The Nature of the Bargaining Process,” in Dunlop, John, ed., The Theory of Wage Determination (New York 1957), 292–314CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass, 1960)Google Scholar; Stevens, Carl M., Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations (New York 1963)Google Scholar; Neuman, John von and Morgenstern, Oscar, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (New York 1964)Google Scholar; Shubik, Martin, ed., Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New York 1964)Google Scholar; Walton, Richard E. and McKersie, Robert B., A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York 1965)Google Scholar; and Rapoport, Anatole, Two-Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1966)Google Scholar.

4 Zartman, From, The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Community (Princeton 1971), 202Google Scholar.

5 See also Young, Oran R., The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton 1968), 28Google Scholar.

6 See also Valavanis, Stefan, “The Resolution of Conflict when Utilities Interact,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11 (June 1958), 156–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On “negotiation set,” see Rapoport (fn. 3), 101–2; on “utility frontiers” see Sawyer, Jack and Guetzkow, Harold, “Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations,” in Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior (New York 1965), esp. 476–77Google Scholar. The Sawyer-Guetzkow chapter is still the single best work on the subject of negotiation.

7 Steven Brams has reminded me that even this would not be true in a Prisoners' Dilemma or non-cooperative game without a saddlepoint.

8 See also Young (fn. 5), 29.

9 Cross, 42, and Young (fn. 5), 26, appropriately posit pure cooperation and pure conflict (termed pure bluffing and pure intransigence) as the limits of negotiation. See also Nicolson's “shopkeepers” and “warriors”: Nicolson, Harold, Diplomacy (Oxford 1964), 25fGoogle Scholar. What are process limits to Cross and normative styles to Nicolson become personality types to Harold Lasswell in Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago 1930), esp. 124f and 151f, on “agitators” and “administrators,” respectively.

10 Ikle, Fred Charles, How Nations Negotiate (New York 1964), 3fGoogle Scholar. Ikle's most useful article, incorporating many of the above assumptions, is (with Nathan Leites), “Political Negotiations as a Process of Modifying Utilities,” in Shubik (fn. 3), 243–59, originally appearing in Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (March 1962), 19–28.

11 See also Young (fn. 5), 25–27, 29.

12 See Young, ibid., chap. 16, on the proposition, “Conditions of crisis generate strong incentives for decision-makers to manipulate the perceptions of various parties concerning critical aspects of the clash,” 394. Similar formulations are offered by Lall, Arthur, Modern International 'Negotiation (New York 1966), 54 and 311Google Scholar. Indeed, many of Young's propositions (“hypotheses” is too precise a word for them) are similar to some of Lall's concluding principles; unfortunately, Young does not seem to have been aware of Lall's work. See also Iklé and Leites (fn. 10).

13 See Richard J. Barnet's review of Lapp, Ralph, The Weapons Culture (New York 1968)Google Scholar in Science, CLX (April 19, 1968), 293. It is true nevertheless that Kennedy did take chances in the Cuban negotiations, notably in regard to the first Khrushchev letter. “There was some debate among the experts in Hilsman's office as they tried to decide whether this extraordinary unofficial approach could be taken seriously. . . . The essence of the final approach to Moscow was to gamble that Khrushchev had not been overruled since sending off the secret letter. The President, in effect, accepted a set of terms Khrushchev had never formally offered.” Abel, Elie, The Missile Crisis (New York 1966), 157 and 176Google Scholar.

14 For a similar use of the term, see Mayer, Lawrence, Comparative Political Inquiry (Homewood, Ill. 1972), 23Google Scholar.

15 Nash, John F., “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica, XVIII (April 1950), 155–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. An important feature of all three works is the initial review and summary of previous work (Cross, chap. II; Coddington, chap. II; Rapoport in Swingle, chap. I). On the use of rationality models, baseline constructs, and the “zero method,” see Popper, Karl, The Poverty of Historicistn (New York 1964), 141Google Scholar.

16 For similar formulations, see Siegel, Sidney and Fouraker, Lawrence E., Bargaining and Group Decision-Making (New York 1960), 81Google Scholar; Zartman (fn. 4), 221.

17 For similar formulations, see Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 57f.

18 For similar formulations, see ibid., 93; Zartman (fn. 4), 216.

19 For similar formulations, see Baldwin, David A., “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics, XXIV (October 1971), 19–38, esp. 28–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 None of the Swingle chapters refer to Cross's or Coddington's work, or even to Siegel and Fouraker. Two chapters in Swingle are not treated here; one, by Kenneth Terhune, because it focuses on psychology, personality, and behavior without touching power; the other, by I. L. Horowitz, because it is neither theoretical nor empirical.

21 Cf. Cross, 37, 64, on explanation in regard to Siegel and Fouraker; and Young, “Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor,” World Politics, xxi (April 1969), 486–511, on explanation in regard to induction.

22 See also Swingle, in Swingle, 251. A full-length work by Otomar J. Bartos developing the subject further is entitled The Process and Outcome of Negotiations (New York, forthcoming).

23 Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 93.

24 Coddington, “A Theory of the Bargaining Process: Comment,” and Cross, “Reply,” American Economic Review, LVI (March 1966), 522–33.

25 The point is briefly touched on by Swingle, in Swingle, 131f; see also Richard Witkin, “The Straphangers' Cliflhanger,” New York Times, December 31, 1969.

28 Cross discusses bluffing as a constant strategy, 166–79, esp. 170, and not as a prelude to agreement.

27 See Lall (fn. 12), 297, 311; Zartman (fn. 4) , 102f, 113f.

28 Young (fn. 5), 177.

29 Ibid., 215. On the use of “soft” terms such as “success,” see Zartman (fn. 4) , 220.

30 Young (fn. 5), 216.

31 Ibid., 178. If “oscillations,” “phases,” and “patterns” are in fact the same thing, then such relationships are tautological.

32 Bartos tends to agree, in a useful article, “How Predictable are Negotiations?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI (December 1967), 481–95.

33 Pen, Jan, “A General Theory of Bargaining,” American Economic Review, XLII (March 1952), 24–42Google Scholar. Unfortunately, Pen's theory, which purports to provide explanation in terms of power and will, is no more determinate and even harder to opera-tionalize than most, as both Cross, 17 and 28, and Coddington, 37–40, have noted.

34 Cf. Rudner, Richard, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966), 91Google Scholar.

35 Gruder in Swingle, 112, trips on the tautology, as does Lall (fn. 12), 162. See also Coddington, xvi, on “skill” as a similar tautology.

36 Deutsch, Karl W., Nerves of Government (Glencoe, Ill. 1963)Google Scholar, ix, cited in Coddington, 542.

37 Cf. Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 42–70, 90, 93; Bartos, in Swingle, on abstract versus “spoken” experiments, 51, 54.

38 Harsanyi, John C., “Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games,” in Bell, R., Edwards, D., and Wagner, R. H., eds., Political Power (Glencoe, 111. 1969), 226–38Google Scholar, originally appearing in Behavioral Science, VII (January 1962), 67–80.

39 James T. Tedeschi, in Swingle, 16m, uses the neologism “mendations” for communication of non-volitional future gratifications (the positive correlate of warnings), an unhappy word for a useful concept. I have termed the same thing “predictions,” and used “promises” for communications of volitional future gratifications (the positive correlate of threats), in Zartman (fn. 4), 207f.

40 Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Decisions and Non-Decisions,” in Bell, Edwards and Wagner (fn. 38), 79–93 and 100–109.

41 See Dahl, ibid., 81, on base; Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations (New York 1960), 110–49Google Scholar, on elements. On power as money, see Talcott Parsons “On the Concept of Political Power,” in Bell, Edwards, and Wagner (fn. 38), 251–84.

42 On the positive and negative pairs, see Singer, J. David, “Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model,” American Political Science Review, LVII (June 1963), 420–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baldwin (fn. 19), and “Inter-Nation Influence Revisited,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, xv (December 1971), 471–86; Zartman (fn. 4), 206–11 and throughout.

43 For some good recent examples, see Allard, Sven, Russia and the Austrian State Treaty (University Park, Pa. 1970)Google Scholar; Terchek, R. J., The Maying of the Test Ban Treaty (Leiden 1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Randle, Robert, Geneva 1954 (Princeton 1970)Google Scholar; Balabkins, Nicholas, West German Reparations to Israel (New Brunswick, N.J. 1971)Google Scholar. For a collection of case studies in both the description and analysis of negotiations, see Zartman, ed. The Analysis of Negotiation (New York 1974).

44 “As alternatives to actions that might precipitate violence during a crisis, efforts to structure die fundamental dimensions and specific issues of the clash in order to utilize or create advantageous asymmetries are apt to become highly influential coercive procedures” Young (fn. 5), 362. For another discussion of asymmetry in negotiation, see Zartman (fn. 4), 221.

45 For an attempt to depict a simple monetary negotiation in rather tight, schematic terms, and the problems and lessons thereby brought to light, see ibid., 67–74.