Once legislators delegate policymaking responsibility to executive agencies, they have the ability to oversee and potentially influence the actions of these agencies. In this article, we examine, first, whether the actions of agencies reflect the preferences of legislators, and second, whether legislative professionalism enhances the ability of legislatures to influence executive agencies and obtain more preferred outcomes. We study these effects in the context of annual nursing home inspections performed by state administrators and make two predictions. First, as Democratic legislators will, on average, prefer a more activist role for government and for government agencies, we should see agencies issue more citations for violations of regulations when state legislatures are Democratic and fewer when they are Republican. Second, as more professionalized legislatures are better able to monitor the agency inspectors' actions and inspection outcomes, this effect should be intensified for legislatures with greater professionalism. We find support for both arguments: agencies faced with more Democrats in the legislature will be more activist, and this effect is strengthened for more professional legislatures.

Much of the academic literature that analyzes U.S. state-level restrictions on abortion focuses on parental involvement laws and the extent to which abortion is publicly funded through Medicaid. However, one shortcoming common to all of these studies is that they fail to analyze informed consent laws and other types of anti-abortion legislation that received constitutional protection through the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). In this study, a series of regressions on a comprehensive time series cross-sectional data set provides evidence that several types of state-level anti-abortion legislation result in statistically significant declines in both the abortion rate and the abortion ratio. Furthermore, a series of natural experiments provide further evidence that abortion restrictions are correlated with reductions in the incidence of abortion.

Do term limits constrain a legislature's ability to produce complex and broad policy? I investigate this question by examining patterns of policymaking in six states before and after term limits went into effect in four of them. I find that term limits reduced policy complexity in three hybrid and citizen legislatures, while laws became increasingly intricate in the highly professional California legislature. I conclude that both the institutional context and experience of the term-limited legislators condition the effects of this reform on policymaking. In particular, a legislator's experience—in either state or local government—allows him or her to write broad and complex bills, and in legislatures that provide little staff support to compensate for the inexperience of their new members, term limits can reduce overall legislative policy knowledge, thus reducing the complexity of legislation.

We contribute to the literature on judicial independence and performance in the states by analyzing opinion clarity. Written opinions are the primary means of communication for state supreme court justices, and clarity is a core component of judicial performance. Using automated text analysis on a sample of state supreme court opinions from all 50 states, we find that variation in judicial retention systems is not associated with substantively meaningful differences in opinion clarity. Furthermore, elected judges do not seem to produce clearer opinions in salient cases notwithstanding the increased public visibility of those decisions. These results suggest that judges tend to conform to prevailing professional norms despite differing institutional pressures.

Debate rages over whether Americans have become enormously litigious, but little research considers why Americans file cases in the first place or adequately considers rates of litigation over time. This article examines tort filings in ten representative states over a 20-year period and analyzes the impact of social, political, policy, and legal system factors that may account for case filings. We find that filing rates vary substantially over time within individual states, which adds to cautions about claims of general litigiousness. Our analysis also demonstrates that social complexity, opportunities for political participation, and social policy are the most important explanations for variations in filing rates. The tendency of Americans to use the courts to resolve disputes is related to the milieu in which they live and how the political system responds to demands for participation and social support.

In this article, we use data from the American states from 1996 to 2008 to explore the effects of immigration on income inequality. Empirical evidence from both static and dynamic models shows that the foreign-born population has a strong positive effect on state-level income inequality, even when we control for a range of federal and state political and economic contextual variables. We also find that the positive relationship between immigration and state income inequality is driven primarily by low-skill immigrants (rather than high-skill immigrants), and we provide some evidence that high-skill immigrants lower income inequality for some segments of the income distribution. We conclude that immigration—particularly low-skilled immigration—has an important effect on income inequality in the American states.

Political campaigns are dynamic struggles between candidates to define the informational context for voters. Although much research describes how campaigns unfold or explores their effects on voters, less attention has been given to developing and testing a dynamic theory of candidate interaction during campaigns. In this study, the authors examine three different theories of candidate behavior, testing each using data on the TV advertisements aired in 23 gubernatorial elections held in 2002. The analysis examines both the total advertising efforts and the total negative advertising efforts of candidates in these races, differentiating between candidates based on partisanship, incumbency status, and whether they won or lost. The authors find support for all three theories, demonstrating their complementary nature and the value of analyzing campaigns as dynamic processes.

The introduction of McDonald and Popkin's (2001) measure of the voting eligible turnout rate represents an important advancement in the literature on voter turnout in the United States, most of which was based on studies of turnout among the voting age population. Among other things, their measure called into question many of the findings of research on the decline in turnout during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In this article, we investigate how the measurement of voter turnout affects the interpretation of the sources of turnout in the states. Focusing on voting-age and voting-eligible turnout in presidential elections from 1980 to 2004 as separate dependent variables, we estimate models of state-level turnout and compare the results for each of the measures. Our findings suggest that measurement does matter in state-level voter turnout models and that some inferences drawn from studies of turnout among the voting age population are not sustained when substituting voting eligible turnout.

Recent research has taught us much about the effects of campaign finance laws, but we know little about why states adopt the regulations that they do. I address this question by examining why states increased the stringency of their campaign finance laws from 1993 to 2002. As is the case with other policies regulating the conduct of elected officials, the popular perception exists that politicians resist stringent campaign finance out of a concern for their own electoral self-interest. As a result, I test whether campaign finance policymaking results from the selfish electoral incentives that politicians allegedly have on this issue or decisions on this issue are influenced by factors that influence other types of policies. I find evidence to support both views. Specifically, the initiative option, a liberal government, strong good government groups, legislative professionalism, and scandal increase the likelihood of a state increasing the stringency of their regulations, while states with expensive legislative elections are less willing to do so.

Scholars have long been interested in the politics of taxation in the U.S. states. Research in this area has not, however, sufficiently explored the impact of fiscal federalism on state-level taxing decisions. Drawing on theoretical models of fiscal choice, this study develops the expectation that, under certain conditions, federal grants-in-aid exert significant downward pressure on state-level tax effort. I test that assertion in an analysis of tax effort in the U.S. states between 1971 and 1996.

How do people assign blame in the wake of significant government failures? If the role of the citizenry in a representative democracy is to discipline elected officials for failing to meet collective expectations, then this question is of paramount importance. Much research suggests that the base tendency of citizens is to simply blame the other party—a normatively concerning outcome. However, some argue that information, especially that from expert and nonpartisan sources, may push citizens to overlook their party affiliation and assign blame in a more performance-based fashion. Using an experimental design, we test this possibility, manipulating whether there is unified or divided government, the partisanship of key actors, and the nature of expert information that participants receive during a hypothetical budget crisis at the state level. We find strong evidence that party weighs heavily on individuals' minds when assigning blame, as expected. More importantly, we find that nonpartisan expert information about the situation does not live up to its potential to sway partisans from their priors. Rather, unbiased information appears to be used as a weapon—ignored when it challenges partisan expectations and used to magnify blame of the other party when it conforms with them.

The distribution of income lies at the intersection of states and markets, both influencing and responding to government policy. Reflecting this reality, increasing research focuses on the political origins of inequality in the United States. However, the literature largely assumes—rather than tests—the political mechanisms thought to affect the income gap. This study provides a timely reassessment of one such mechanism. Leveraging variation in labor laws between states and differences in the timing of adoption of right-to-work (RTW) legislation, I examine one political mechanism blamed by many for contributing to inequality. Using a variety of panel designs, I find little evidence that RTW laws have been a major cause of growing income inequality, pointing to the importance of grounding theoretical arguments about the interrelationships between states and markets in a sound empirical reality.

Term limits advocates argued that their reform would make state legislative campaigns more competitive and less expensive, and limited early studies suggested that it may have achieved those goals. But now, with evidence from more than a decade of experience with reform, we re-examine the effects of terms limits on electoral competitiveness and campaign spending in California Assembly elections. We find that while term limits initially suppressed campaign spending, they did not check its growth for long. Today, California's state legislative elections are as expensive in real dollars as they have ever been. In terms of electoral competitiveness, state legislative incumbents are in no more danger of losing their seats today than they were in the pre-term limits days of the late 1980s. Furthermore, open-seat races are not any more competitive under term limits than before them; however, we do find a modest, but significant, decline in incumbents' average winning margin since the imposition of term limits. But since term limits have made fewer incumbents eligible to run for office, this incumbency advantage helps fewer people than it once did. Yet, for the most part, rather than being supplanted by citizen-legislators, career politicians have simply adapted to the constraints imposed by term limits.

Term limits advocates argued that the reform would revitalize the electorate and spur increased voter participation. They suggested two main mechanisms by which term limits would do this: (1) term limits would increase the number of open-seat races, which tend to be more competitive, and the increased competition would inspire more voting, and (2) the removal of entrenched incumbents would inspire more trust and confidence in government, thereby encouraging voter enthusiasm in a more diffuse way, increasing turnout for all races. I evaluate these hypotheses empirically using data from California state legislative races from 1976 to 2004; incorporating a variety of methods, including pooled cross-sectional time-series regression. I find evidence that state legislative term limits not only fail to achieve the reformers' goals, but they, in fact, decrease voter turnout.

In this note, we revisit the work of Carson and Crespinto examine the effect of different redistricting plans on competitiveness in U.S. House elections. Similar to the previous results, our probit estimates on an expanded dataset that includes redistricting cycles from 1972 to 2012 reveal that commission and court-drawn districts experience more competition on average than those drawn by legislatures. These results provide additional support for the hypothesis that one way to increase the competitiveness of congressional elections is to allow extra-legislative bodies to draw congressional district boundaries.

Interstate compacts hold tremendous promise for resolving tough public problems at the subnational level. They have also been promoted as one way that states can protect their sovereignty vis-à-vis the national government. But the rate at which states participate in such compacts varies widely. Thus, we ask: What explains a state's propensity to join national interstate compacts? Using time-series cross-sectional event count models of state compact participation from 1960–2000, we find that states join compacts to enhance their policymaking capacity and to substitute for policy action by the national government. We also find that the physical connection among states influences their preference for certain types of compacts. Isolated states show a preference for compacts that simply harmonize policies, while more proximate states are more likely to join compacts that effectively open their borders to other states. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, interstate compacts do not appear to be used strategicallyby states as a means to forestall federal preemption.

Scholars of state politics and policy have devoted little attention to the public universities where so many of them work. Public higher education is organized at the state level, and its funding and governance have been debated at length in many states in recent years. Moreover, these universities provide opportunities for contributions to a variety of theoretically-grounded research, including the decision to make or buy public services, principal-agent issues and institutional arrangements for governance, the politics of institutional reform, the determinants of government appropriations and budgetary trade-offs, and internal decisionmaking in state-owned enterprises, public bureaucracies, and nonprofit organizations. Research on these issues could not only generate insights relevant to many types of institutions and public services but also contribute to ongoing policy debates over relations between state governments and higher education.

Do judges defer to executives with increased institutional control over the executive branch? Administrative agencies play a key role in the policy implementation process. Executives could view aggressive judicial review of executive branch activity as a threat to executive power and negatively respond to perceived judicial intrusions. Governors across the country possess varying amounts of institutional authority over the agencies that comprise their states' executive branches. For example, in many states, executive branch officials are elected by the public or appointed by someone other than the governor. Increased fragmentation increases the difficulty of centralized management and decreases gubernatorial influence over the executive branch. I examine whether state supreme courts defer more to agencies in states where governors have more formal control over the executive branch. I find that state supreme courts are more likely to rule in favor of state administrative agencies in states where the governor has increased appointment power and increased power to review agency rulemaking.

During the 2004 and 2006 general elections, a number of states considered different moral policy ballot measures, including marriage definition, abortion bans, and stem cell research. Although more moral policy measures were voted on in the last two general elections, this is certainly not the first time that moral issues have been placed on the ballot. Some political pundits, during these elections, suggested that increased voter turnout in some states was due to these ballot measures. This research examines whether or not the presence of a moral policy measure on a given state's ballot generates higher voter turnout. I find that moral policy ballot measures generate higher turnout in midterm elections but not in presidential elections.

What is the impact of a legislature's institutions on the representational roles its members adopt? We address this question by examining the role orientation of state legislators in eight states, explaining why some legislators identify more with a trustee model of representation and others identify more with the delegate model. Using ordinal logistic regression analysis on data from a survey of 447 legislators, we test for the effects of multimember districts and term limits, along with several other factors. First, we find that representational roles and behavior are related; legislators who think of themselves as delegates are much more likely to hold frequent district office hours than their counterparts who think of themselves as trustees. Second, we find that, overall, legislators are more likely to consider themselves trustees than delegates. Third, we find that multimember districts and term limits increase the likelihood that legislators think of themselves as trustees. Thus, legislative institutions can influence the representational roles legislators adopt.