The use of deception is common in elite correspondence audit studies. Elite audit studies are a type of field experiment used by researchers to test for discrimination against vulnerable populations seeking to access government resources. These studies have provided invaluable insights, but they have done so at the cost of using deception. They have relied on identity, activity, and motivation deception. In addition, they request unnecessary work. Is there a less deceptive alternative? In this article, I present results from a field experiment with state legislative offices that minimize the use of deception. Consistent with elite correspondence audit studies, I find evidence of discrimination against Hispanics among state legislative offices. In addition, I find that discrimination is mitigated when subjects believe their behavior will be public knowledge. This suggests that discrimination can be mitigated through increased monitoring. This article advances the discussion on how to minimize the use of deception in elite field experimentation and how to mitigate discrimination against vulnerable populations.

Many hypotheses in U.S. state politics research are multi-level, positing that state-level variables affect individual-level behavior. Unadjusted standard errors for state-level variables are too small, leading to overconfidence and possible false rejection of null hypotheses. Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo (2007) explore this problem in their reanalysis of Wolfinger, Highton, and Mullin's (2005) data on the effects of post-registration laws on voter turnout. Primo et al. advocate the use of clustered standard errors to solve the overconfidence problem, but we offer an alternative solution: randomization tests. Randomization tests are non-parametric tests that do not rely on comparisons to theoretical test statistic distributions. Instead, they use distributions tailored to the data, created by randomly scrambling the data many times to simulate what would be observed under the null hypothesis. Unlike with clustering, with the randomization test, U.S. state-level reforms generally fail to be significant both as additive effects and as interactions with individual characteristics.

While Lowi (1964) claims that policies can be classified as one of three types, distributive, redistributive, or regulatory, his work has been criticized as incomplete. Policies are frequently multidimensional, and his categories are neither comprehensive nor mutually exclusive. A fourth policy type, morality policy, has now been well-established as distinct from the other three types (e.g., Meier 1994; Mooney 2001). Evidence suggests that some policies can be framed as multidimensional policy types. Abortion funding is one such policy issue that has aspects of both morality policy and redistributive policy in its politics. In this study, we develop models of government abortion funding based on abortion as a morality and a redistributive policy. We estimate these models using weighted least squares to explain the voting outcomes of county-level votes in six state referenda elections for government funding of abortions. Then, we test a combined model and find clear evidence that the combined model, and variables from both perspectives, provide a stronger case than a single policy typology model alone. A practical implication is that policy advocates may purposely emphasize different values and results of the policies. Thus, testing policy theories may need to include more complex views of policies based on policy types.

This study assesses the impact of campaign effort and election reform on voter turnout in state legislative elections. It uses a nationwide survey of state legislative candidates to measure various campaign activities and combines this information with data on election laws, political conditions, and district-level demographics. The primary finding is that candidate expenditures, party get-out-the-vote efforts, and Election Day registration laws have a synergistic effect on turnout. Campaign efforts heighten citizen interest in politics close to the election, often after registration deadlines have passed. Unlike other election reforms, Election Day registration allows citizens' late-campaign interest to be translated into increased voter turnout.

The rapid growth of the Latino population in the U.S. over the past 15 years has led to a significant increase in levels of primary and secondary school enrollment rates of Latino children. Research on Latino education has demonstrated the institutional and contextual challenges faced by this increasingly significant group, but studies that link Latino representation and Latino educational performance have neglected to sort out the direct and indirect effects of representation on student achievement. The central assumption in these studies outlines a causal chain running from Latino political representation (school boards), to Latino bureaucratic representation (administrators and teachers), to Latino student performance. This study tests these theoretical assumptions by employing a path analytic model using data from 1,040 Texas school districts for the years 1997–2001 to tease out the direct and indirect effects of Latino representation on Latino student achievement. We find robust evidence of the impact of Latino political representation on Latino educational attainment in Texas, operating via a direct effect on the number of Latino administrators and teachers and an indirect effect on Latino student performance. Additionally, our results demonstrate that descriptive representation becomes substantive representation in the area of education policy for Latinos and that this relationship remains strong over time. These findings underscore the importance of school board elections and school district hiring practices on Latino student performance.

In order to understand what factors drive child welfare policymaking, this research analyzes data on spending and legislation from the U.S. states over a three-year period. The key independent variables are scandal, litigation, federal oversight, and local discretion. While states that experience a scandal or a lawsuit do not increase their spending levels over previous years, they do enact more child welfare legislation. This raises the possibility that states engage in symbolic rather than substantive responses to child welfare crises. The administrative structure of the child welfare system also affects state policymaking.

While there is a growing literature on the factors linked to the power held by leaders in state legislatures, the complexity of leadership power as a concept makes assessing it difficult. The author demonstrates that measures of formal leadership power derived from the written rules are uncorrelated with survey measures capturing legislators' own assessments of their leader's strength. These differences have practical importance, with each type of measure yielding different substantive findings in models predicting leadership power.

Studies of state judicial selection systems require accurate classification of electoral systems. While agreement exists for most states, Ohio and Michigan are difficult to classify. In this paper, we discuss the different practices and explain how, in the absence of candidates' party affiliation on the ballot, elections in these states may justifiably be classified as partisan. Replicating the results of an important study on participation in judicial elections, we show how the treatment of these states may result in differing substantive conclusions. We conclude by urging scholars to provide evidence that their results are robust to alternative classifications.

Although political parties in U.S. legislatures cannot compel discipline with the threat of expulsion from the legislature, they can encourage greater party loyalty by strategically bestowing benefits upon favored members. This article explores the use of plum committee assignments to encourage legislators' loyalty to their parties. I outline a theory of how party leaders can use committee assignments strategically to encourage more loyal legislative behavior. This occurs when legislative rules meet two criteria: (1) parties and their leaders can determine who serves on committees and (2) committees have real authority over policy outcomes. I test the theory using data from five state legislatures that differ on the relevant set of legislative rules, finding more party loyalty shown by legislators who receive plum committee assignments when rules meet both criteria and no effect when they do not.

Temple University led a six-university effort that built a comprehensive public policy database for Pennsylvania, modeled on the national Policy Agendas Project created by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993). The Pennsylvania database (www.temple.edu/papolicy) enables users to integrate data from all three branches of government and the news media organized into 20 major and 249 minor policy topics since 1979. This article discusses the value of these data, their potential uses in state policy research, and the lessons learned over the four years invested in building the database. Our hope is that interested readers might undertake similar projects in their states to create a standardized national network of state policy databases.

This article examines how the institutional characteristics of state legislatures and governors affect state policy priorities. We argue that differences in the nature of their respective constituencies lead legislators to press for particularized benefits while governors favor collective goods. Empirical analysis of state-level data from 1982 through 2011 confirms that this is the case. The organizational arrangements of the two branches of government have an impact that is usually greater than that of state public opinion but generally less than that of state interest groups. The results from this analysis are important because they show that institutional structure has systematic effects that are independent of ideology, partisanship, and the other factors that are known to shape state policy making.

How do state legislatures use statutory language to control policy implementation by state agencies? In this article, I consider—in a specific policy area and time period—the extent to which this decision is affected by legislative anticipation of the likely actions of state courts. Previous literature has argued that the legislative use of statutory language to control bureaucrats varies with the availability of nonstatutory methods of control, but it does not explicitly consider the potential role of courts. My expectations are derived from a simple formal model of executive–legislative relations and are supported when I test them using data on the number of words added to a state's Medicaid laws from 1995 to 1996. In particular, I find that state legislatures write longer, more constraining, statutes when the likelihood that state courts intervene on their behalf is neither very high nor very low.

What explains the extension of greater rights to traditionally marginalized minorities? This article compares the extension of legal equality to lebian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Mexico and the United States with a focus on the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. A national-level comparison of gay rights in Mexico and the United States presents a theoretical puzzle: most theories predict that the United States would have more egalitarian policies than Mexico, but in fact, Mexico has provided greater legal equality for LGBT people for a longer time than the United States. A subnational analysis of equal relationship rights in the United States and Mexico provides evidence to support social movement and partisan theories of minority rights. We find that religion plays a different role in Mexico than in the United States. The different findings at the national and subnational levels suggest the importance of subnational comparative analysis in heterogeneous federal systems.

During every election cycle, election administrators validate voter registration applications submitted at different times and through various sources, with a notable peak in the demand for voter registration as Election Day approaches. The process of registering to vote, however, is error-prone and may depend on the voter's capacity to fill a form correctly, or the election administrator's capacity to successfully process applications as the voter registration window closes. Such errors can limit a prospective, and eligible, voter's ability to cast a valid ballot. This study assesses the impact of time and registration source on the rates of rejected voter registration applications by analyzing monthly county-level voter registration reports during the 2012 election cycle in Florida. I find that there is a dynamic relationship between administrative and seasonal factors at the county level, which condition the rates of rejected voter registrations as the registration deadline approaches. These findings suggest complications in not only the process of registering to vote that may stem from differences in voter engagement but also the variation in administrative oversight throughout the election cycle.

Does the type of policy being considered determine the politics surrounding it? In this article, I examine how policy reversals may produce different politics than initial policy adoptions in the context of state river management policy. Traditionally, dam building was the dominant management policy, but in recent decades, efforts to restore rivers to their natural conditions through the removal of dams have become more prominent. I find that the patterns of state policymaking for policy reversals are generally similar to those that have been documented for policy adoptions, but with some important differences. Diffusion of reversals involves more states outside of active regions than is seen typically with policy adoption, and reversal diffusion occurs more gradually than adoption diffusion with many policy innovations. Finally, the most important determinants of these state policy reversals are a state's fiscal health and the presence of relevant interest groups.

Integrating a diversity of stakeholder voices in policymaking processes can lead to more legitimate and widely supported laws and rules. While most attention to stakeholder participation in public decision processes has focused on legislative policymaking or the role of industry stakeholders in regulatory processes, strategic choices about participation by non-industry stakeholders in rulemaking remains largely overlooked, particularly at the state level. Previous research shows that agency rulemaking processes often provide greater procedural access to industry actors, who may significantly influence final rule content by bringing greater technical knowledge to bear on rulemaking processes. Less is understood about the strategies used by non-industry stakeholders, such as environmental advocacy groups, to influence regulatory decisions. This study, which compares environmental rulemaking processes across three issues in five states, finds that industry actors and environmental advocacy groups both use a variety of participation strategies classically thought to be “insider” and “outsider” strategies, and that these choices are motivated by reasons other than the perceived effectiveness of the strategy within the formal rulemaking process.

In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 209, which banned the use of affirmative action in state hiring, contracting, and public university admissions. We know that white voters favored Proposition 209 more than nonwhite voters—the question is, why? Did they feel that the racial preferences given to growing numbers of members of racial and ethnic groups threatened them economically, or were they just motivated by old-fashioned racism? We test these two possible explanations—economic anxiety and racial division—for the appeal of Proposition 209 to California voters using exit poll data. We find little support for the economic anxiety explanation. Instead, racial division seems to be the best way to understand white voting on Proposition 209.

Although many people believe that women are disadvantaged by the electoral process, recent research shows women generally do at least as well as men when they run for office. We investigate the gender dynamics of state supreme court elections. We find evidence that women do enjoy an electoral advantage when they run for judicial office. However, unlike previous work, we find that this advantage is highly contingent on the electoral context. Using an original dataset of competitive judicial elections from 1998 to 2014, we find that women only have a significant vote share advantage when they run as a challenger against a sitting incumbent. The advantage does not apply to women as incumbents or in open seat elections. These findings raise important questions about the interplay of institutional barriers and election aversion for the advancement of women in electoral judicial politics.

The popularity and approval of a governor among their state citizenry is a central form of political capital that animates the informal power key to their legislative success and bolsters their prospects for reelection. Within the extant literature exploring the sources of approval of state executives, the lion's share of the work focuses on the deleterious effects on approval of a poorly performing national and state economy. In the present article, we rely on the same logic underlying the economic-centered research—namely, that unhappy citizens blame governors and state governments for their discontent—but focus on the impact on approval of an entirely separate and relatively unexplored domain of life in a state: ethno-demographics. This article advances the hypothesis that citizen discontent over drastic ethnic change in their local environment is politicized as concern over immigration, which in turn serves as a concrete political issue through which personal discontent over increased ethnic diversity is translated into lower approval of state government. This hypothesis is tested within the context of the state of California using pooled statewide survey data. Our analyses demonstrate that growth in the Hispanic population within a respondent's county of residence significantly increases concern over immigration within the state, and that concern over immigration significantly decreases approval of state government across the board, including the governor, the state legislature, and one's local state representatives.

In many states, agency rules are subject to review and possible veto by elected political officials in the legislative and/or executive branches. The consequences of this rule review authority are little understood. Using time-series cross-section data on state environmental compliance costs, this study investigates the impact that several types of administrative rule review procedures have on the stringency of state environmental regulation. The findings suggest that (1) both gubernatorial and legislative rule review powers are systematically associated with reduced environmental compliance costs, (2) legislatures controlled by the Democratic Party use rule review powers to reduce these costs less than Republican ones, and (3) the latter effect is observable only when legislatures have the power to amend or veto rules without the approval of the governor. These results indicate that rule review plays an important, but complex, role in shaping regulatory outcomes.