We examine state legislator behavior on restrictive voter identification (ID) bills from 2005 to 2013. Partisan polarization of state lawmakers on voter ID laws is well known, but we know very little with respect to other determinants driving this political division. A major shortcoming of extant research evaluating the passage of voter ID bills stems from using the state legislature as the unit of analysis. We depart from existing scholarship by using the state legislator as our unit of analysis, and we cover the entirety of the period when restrictive voter ID laws became a frequent agenda item in state legislatures. Beyond the obviously significant effect of party affiliation, we find a notable relationship between the racial composition of a member's district, region, and electoral competition and the likelihood that a state lawmaker supports a voter ID bill. Democratic lawmakers representing substantial black district populations are more opposed to restrictive voter ID laws, whereas Republican legislators with substantial black district populations are more supportive. We also find Southern lawmakers (particularly Democrats) are more opposed to restrictive voter ID legislation. In particular, we find black legislators in the South are the least supportive of restrictive voter ID bills, which is likely tied to the historical context associated with state laws restricting electoral participation. Finally, in those state legislatures where electoral competition is not intense, polarization over voter ID laws is less stark, which likely reflects the expectation that the reform will have little bearing on the outcome of state legislative contests.

Despite a long history of nonpartisanship, the Nebraska state legislature has polarized rapidly within the past decade. Using interviews and campaign finance records, we examine politics in the modern Unicam to investigate nonpartisan polarization. We find that newly instituted term limits created opportunities for the state's political parties to recruit and finance candidates in an increasingly partisan fashion. Social network analysis suggests that there is a growing level of structure to campaign donations, with political elites increasingly less likely to contribute across party lines. The results offer a compelling example of parties overcoming institutions designed to eliminate them.

Why do state legislators enact policies that conflict with their immediate self-interest? I address this question by assessing the impact of traditional and non-traditional policy determinants on ethics policy adoption. Specifically, I use event history analysis to identify the factors that explain the authorization of independent state legislative ethics commissions from 1973 to 1996. I find that the determinants of ethics policy are substantially, but not completely, different from those of other policies, with ethics policy fitting into an agenda-setting model better than many other policies. Scandals and the actions of other states played a prominent role in setting the agenda and facilitating the authorization of ethics commissions. The agenda-setting process transforms the immediate self-interest of legislators on this issue from one of concern about their own economic well being to one of concern about re-election. In addition, political culture, institutional power arrangements, legislative compensation, and party competition had small but discernible effects on the likelihood of a state establishing a legislative ethics commission.

Researchers commonly apply inferential statistical procedures to population data from the 50 U.S. states as if they were estimating population parameters from sample statistics. This method is incorrect because with population data there is no need to make inferences about quantities that are already known. Instead, authors should simply provide evidence that their specified model provides a good fit to the data. Summary measures of variance as well as the full engine of Bayesian statistics perform this function. This research note demonstrates why the current practice of making inferences from population data with the null hypothesis significance test is wrong, provides some specific examples of problems in the literature, and gives prescriptive advice about correctly assessing and conveying empirical model results.

State politics scholars often confront data situations where the explanatory variables in a model are highly related to each other. Such multicollinearity (“MC”) makes it difficult to identify the independent effect that each of these variables has on the outcome of interest. In an effort to circumvent MC, researchers sometimes drop collinear variables from the regression model. Using simulated data, we demonstrate the implications that MC has for statistical estimation and the potential for introducing bias that the omitting-variables approach generates. We also discuss MC in the context of multiplicative interaction models, using research on the influence of the initiative on policy responsiveness as an applied example. We conclude with advice for researchers faced with MC in their datasets.

Most lobbying is invisible, meaning that interest groups routinely contact government officials “off the public record.” While such lobbying is ubiquitous, whether and how it may affect public policy decision-making remains largely unknown. I theorize that lobbying that employs both invisible and visible tactics is the most influential. I study the development of 38 health-related regulatory policies in Wisconsin to assess this argument. I employ government records, survey data from more than 350 individuals, and interviews with 15 state policymakers. I find that invisible and visible lobbying—when performed in combination—are associated with greater regulatory policy change. From a normative perspective, these results are both reassuring and troubling. On one hand, the results suggest that invisible lobbying, on its own, rarely drives state regulatory policy shifts. Yet, on the other hand, those interested parties with the resources necessary to lobby across multiple modes are more likely to see policy change.

I argue that candidates shape their issue agendas—the sets of related issues on which they focus—in part in response to the issue agendas of their opponents and that competitive campaigns stimulate candidates to respond to one another at higher rates. I test my theory of candidate interaction using weekly advertising data at the media market level from 146 statewide elections—54 gubernatorial and 92 U.S. Senate contests—from six election years and across all 50 states. I find that candidates systematically respond to one another's issue agendas and do so to a greater extent in competitive elections than in noncompetitive elections.

How do people hold elected officials accountable for expected economic conditions in a system of government in which jurisdiction and responsibility are divided such as they are in the United States? Due to the president's visibility, people may hold all elected officials of the president's party responsible for economic conditions. Or, people may be able to differentiate between state and national economic conditions and jurisdictional responsibilities and hold governors of either party accountable for state economic conditions. I use ordered probit to analyze a pooled model of 13 individual-level mid-1990s Michigan opinion surveys and find no evidence that individuals consistently rely on a presidency-centered referenda model of cognition when evaluating the state's governor. Instead, gubernatorial performance ratings reflect an incumbent-centered accountability model. The evidence also suggests jurisdictional accountability, where gubernatorial evaluations are influenced by state economic expectations, but not by national economic expectations.

Public mask use has emerged as a key tool in response to COVID-19. We develop a classification of statewide mask mandates that reveals variation in their scope and timing. Some US states quickly mandated wearing of face coverings in most public spaces, whereas others issued narrow mandates or no mandate at all. We consider how differences in COVID-19 epidemiological indicators and partisan politics affect when states adopted broad mask mandates, starting with the earliest mandates in April 2020 and continuing through the end of 2020. The most important predictor is the presence of a Republican governor, delaying statewide indoor mask mandates an estimated 98.0 days on average. COVID-19 indicators such as confirmed case or death rates are much less important predictors. This finding highlights a key challenge to public efforts to increase mask wearing, one of the most effective tools for preventing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 while restoring economic activity.

Many conventional accounts of lobbying communities emphasize towering differences in political influence between for-profit and not-for-profit and public organizations and between institutions and membership groups or associations. A central cause of these differences in influence is said to be differences in the persistence of these types of groups in a lobbying system. We test this hypothesis by examining the short-term turnover of organized interests in state interest communities in the 1990s. While we find evidence of substantial year-to-year turnover in lobby registrations, we find little support for the conventional wisdom about the distribution of persistence among types of organizations. Contrary to expectations, institutions are markedly less persistent than membership groups and associations, and for-profit interests are no more persistent, on average, than not-for-profit interests.

Why do states persist in offering large financial incentives to induce firms to relocate to or expand in the state, a practice commonly derided as “smokestack chasing?” The conventional wisdom is that while these incentives have little effect on firms' business decisions in the long term, they are a good political strategy for governors seeking to improve economic conditions and political support in the short term. I test these hypotheses by examining the economic and electoral impact of industrial recruitment policies in Wisconsin, Virginia, Michigan, North Carolina, Maryland, Indiana, and Kentucky. I find, first, that these policies pay immediate dividends for governors by increasing county-level job growth and per capita income prior to the next election. Second, governors recruit firms strategically to relocate to counties that opposed them in the previous election. But, third, this industrial recruitment does not increase electoral support for the governor. In fact, the more success a governor has in recruiting firms or jobs to a county, the fewer votes he or she receives in it in the next election.

Leading theories of local responses to immigration claim that ideology drives policy differences. However, these studies focus exclusively on policy adoption, neglecting whether or not ideological preferences also govern the extent to which local actors choose to cooperate with federal immigration initiatives. To account for this shortcoming, I use zero-inflated negative binomial regression to assess county-level deportations resulting from local participation in the Secure Communities program. I find that existing financial and structural resources as well as financial incentives are strong determinants of county deportation levels. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that conservative counties produce more deportations. Instead, the size of a county's policing budget moderates the relationship between ideological orientations and deportation outcomes. With federal-local policy partnerships on the rise, these findings provide an important foundation for developing a better framework to understand the implications of such partnerships for policy implementation. In short, this article suggests that although policy adoption may be a politicized process, local compliance with federal initiatives is highly dependent on the resource constraints and incentives of the actors involved.

All 50 U.S. states currently regulate lobbying. Data restrictions, however, limit our understanding of the relationship between legislative lobbying laws and interest group influence within the legislative process over time. A comparable measure of these laws published in the summer 2005 issue of State Politics and Policy Quarterly suggests a dynamic analysis. The early 1990s witnessed a marked increase in the stringency of state legislative lobbying regulations. This article examines how lobbying regulation impacted interest group influence across all 50 state legislatures in 1995. I then determine whether changes in a state's regulations affected interest group influence over time from 1990 to 1995. Evidence suggests that increased regulation reduces influence both across and within states over time.

In mid-2011, the Florida state legislature passed House Bill 1355 (HB 1355) and in so doing placed new regulations on community organizations that historically have helped eligible Floridians register to vote. Among the legal changes promulgated by this bill were new regulations on the operations of groups like the League of Women Voters and a new oath, warning of prison time and fines, that voter registration agents were required to sign. Such changes raised the implicit costs that eligible Florida citizens faced when registering to vote, and we show that voter registrations across the state in the second half of 2011 dropped precipitously compared with registrations in the second half of 2007. This pattern is evident among registrants in general, among registrants age 20 and younger, and among individuals who registered as Democrats. Outside of HB 1355, we know of no credible explanations for these results. Our findings thus show how restrictions on the way that third-party organizations register voters can have tangible effects on actual registrations. Given that registration prior to an election is a civic necessity in Florida and in many other states, such restrictions have the potential to affect electoral outcomes as well.

What effect does the professional character of a legislature have on the power of its legislative leaders? Despite legislative scholars' desire to better understand both institutional professionalism and leadership power, few empirical studies have explored the relationship between these two important elements of American state legislatures. Moreover, of the research that has been conducted, little effort has been made to understand the impact of professionalism on leadership from a theoretical perspective. This article expands our understanding of legislative professionalism and leadership while testing three theoretical models of legislative organization. I examine the effect of professionalism and several control variables on the influence of state house leaders in 38 non-southern states in 1981 and 1995. Contrary to the fears of some analysts, I find that more professional state legislatures tend to have more powerful leaders. These results provide support for a partisan model of legislative organization.

Recent macro-level studies examining the indirect effects of direct legislation on public policy in the American states are decidedly mixed. This study tests whether the macro-level logic of legislative behavior in response to ballot initiatives holds true at the micro-level for individual legislators. I examined the determinants of legislative votes on “counter-majoritarian” legislation—bills that directly challenge the outcomes of earlier statewide ballot initiatives. In 1999, the Colorado state legislature tried to overturn the outcomes of three previous ballot contests. I find that in two of the three cases, a legislator's vote on these bills was related to the vote in his or her district on the respective ballot initiative. This helps explain why many legislators will vote contrary to the outcome of a statewide initiative vote.

We know that state legislative election campaigns have become increasingly expensive in recent years, but have they also become more professionally run? We assess the degree to which campaign professionals have proliferated in state legislative election campaigns and explain this development in terms of the institutional changes in state legislatures and the “congressionalization” of state legislative elections. Nearly one-half of all state legislative candidates answering our survey had hired professionals for their campaigns, using them mostly for direct mail, media advertising, campaign management, and polling. Open-seat candidates waged more professional campaigns than incumbents or their challengers. We find that campaign professionalism in state legislative elections is primarily a function of campaign spending, but that challengers hire professionals at lower spending levels. We also find that employing professionals improves the electoral performance of challengers, but not that of incumbents or open-seat candidates.

The connection between the government and the governed is often evaluated using election results. This article explores this connection between elections using data on gubernatorial approval in the states. Specifically, I ask the question, Do governors with greater job approval ratings have greater influence over the state bureaucracy than governors with lower approval ratings? Measures of both gubernatorial influence and administrator contact with gubernatorial staff are regressed on gubernatorial approval ratings from state polling data, along with controls for other state characteristics. The results show that approval does affect a governor's influence with the bureaucracy, and as such, serves as an additional connection between the government and the governed.

We test the “white backlash” hypothesis—that white racial conservatism grows as black population density increases—using methods and data parallel to those upon which the concept was originally developed. A 1996 Kentucky referendum vote to strike school segregation from the state constitution serves as a rare measure of “old-fashioned racism.” We estimate the white vote for segregation using ecological inference techniques, and show that the county-level pattern of white segregationist support for this referendum actually runs in the opposite direction from that predicted by the backlash hypothesis. Precinct-level Kentucky analysis and county-level analysis of a related South Carolina referendum validate our finding against the white backlash hypothesis. We conclude that the frequent failure of recent research to find white backlash, especially among urban voters, therefore cannot be explained away by the absence of measures of old-fashioned racism. Rather, the geographical pattern of American racial conservatism seems to have changed since the successes of the Civil Rights movement.

What factors influence agenda setting behavior in state legislatures in the United States? Using the localized effects of climate change, we examine whether notable changes in temperature can raise the salience of the issue, thus encouraging a legislative response. To evaluate the behavior of individual legislators around climate policy, we utilize an original data set that includes geographic mapping of climate anomalies at the state legislative district level and incorporates individual, chamber, district, and state characteristics to predict climate bill sponsorship. Using a multilevel model that estimates climate change bill sponsorship among 25,000 legislators from 2011 to 2015, we find a robust relationship between temperature anomalies and bill sponsorship for Democratic members of state legislators while Republicans are unresponsive to such factors. Our data and methodological approach allow us to examine legislative action on climate change beyond final policy passage and offers an opportunity to understand the motivations behind climate innovation in the American states.